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Introduction
Think about it: you have better access to your innermost
feelings than anyone, but you still do not always know
how to recognize or label what you are feeling.
(Picard, 2003, p. 2)
We humans feel emotions everyday, almost every minute, not always con-
sciously. Our emotions have a central role in our lives, in our relations with others
(sympathy, empathy, laugh, love...). They can be manipulated by advertisements
to make us buy, by politicians who want us to vote for them, or by any people
wanting to seduce us. They can make us perform impulsive actions that we regret
later. They can make our life more difficult (e.g. shyness, stress...) and interfere
with our work by distracting us. We often want to hide them, due to cultural norms
(like in Japan where people express few emotions in public) or because they could
reveal what we think (in business or when playing poker for example). Finally
we usually believe that we have to control our emotions in order to be rational or
to perform better. Incidentally athletes now have mental trainers who teach them
how to control their emotions. Actually more and more people call on such mental
coaches or read books supposed to help them control undesirable emotions.
Nevertheless controlling one’s own emotions is all the more difficult as we do
not even understand them. Actually we do not even know exactly what is an emo-
tion. We would be incapable of giving a clear definition of this phenomenon. And
yet, many people tried to find such a definition. But the difficulty is that emotions
simultaneously involve several types of interdependent reactions: cognitive, physi-
ological, biological... that relate to different fields of research. So most definitions
of emotions are partial since they only refer to one of their aspects.
Emotions have long interested only philosophers, who often consider them as
something man has to be expurgated of, for example through the concept of cathar-
sis for Aristotle (2003). Spinoza (1994) associates emotions with inadequate ideas
and passivity of mind, in opposition with reason. Descartes (1649) assimilates
emotions (or passions) with animal instincts that human reason has to regulate.
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Then biology assumed that emotions were useful reflexes inherited during evo-
lution (Darwin, 1872), and proposed classifications of basic emotions. Physiol-
ogy then tried to explain the emotional mechanisms and several theories emerged,
disagreeing on the emotional locus that they identified (Lange and James, 1967;
Cannon, 1927). Psychology agrees on the adaptive role of emotions in human
life, and proposed several theories for explaining their triggering from a cogni-
tive point of view (Schacter and Singer, 1962; Arnold, 1950). Sociology gets
in turn interested in explaining emotions, and more particularly their social con-
struction and their role in maintaining the cohesion of a group (Averill, 1980;
Durkheim, 1961). But in spite of all these theories accounting for the essential
role of emotions for individuals and for the society, computer science still neglects
this phenomenon considered as complex and irrational, so irrelevant for rational
agents.
Fortunately, the progress of neuroscience (Damasio, 1994) proves the role of
emotions in intelligent behaviour, decision making, planning, social communica-
tion, and all these supposed rational human abilities: we humans cannot reason
if we do not feel emotions. This tangible evidence begin to convince computer
scientists of the usefulness of emotions for intelligent agents. Then Bates (1994)
introduces the concept of believable agents, agents that can give the illusion of
life, and shows that emotions are something crucial for such agents. Finally Pi-
card (1997) is the first computer scientist to argue that virtual agents need emo-
tions not only to be believable but also to be truly intelligent and to interact in a
natural and friendly way with humans. She introduces the concept of Affective
Computing, and computer science then starts being really interested in emotions.
The agent community thus begins to design emotional agents for various appli-
cations: intuitive human-machine interfaces, believable agents for virtual worlds,
intelligent tutoring agents... These agents must not only express emotions, but also
perceive and understand those of the user to adapt their behaviour to them. Of
course what is called emotions for these agents does not match exactly what we
believe human emotions to be. The virtual emotions given to virtual agents are
rather some kinds of labels concisely describing a particular state of this agent im-
pacting his behaviour (Picard, 1997): when the agent is in this state he expresses
a behaviour consistent with this emotion, even if he does not really “feel” it in our
human sense.
The design of emotional agents must involve both computer science and psy-
chology in cooperation (Gratch and Marsella, 2005). Indeed, psychologists have
already tried to decode emotions for decades. Thus agents designers try to find
a comprehensible psychological theory that is adapted to their objective. Most of
them build on Ortony, Clore and Collins’ typology of emotions (Ortony, Clore,
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and Collins, 1988) that was intended to be used in AI applications. They then pro-
vide their own formalization or implementation of (part of) this theory in order to
integrate it in their agents.
Now we believe that understanding and formalizing the theory is a hard work
that should be done once and for all. It would be a waste of time and energy
to start from scratch each time someone needs to implement an emotional agent.
Moreover, direct implementations of a theory are not reusable for other agents or
applications. Thus it is important to propose generic reusable models ready to
be implemented in agents, and we assume that formal logics offer the required
properties to design such models.
Indeed we just showed that emotions are a complex phenomena whose defini-
tion is often abstract, ambiguous, subjective and non consensual. On the contrary,
emotional agent designers need clear definitions, ready to be implemented in their
agents. Formal logics provide such a universal vocabulary, with a clear semantics.
They also allow reasoning, planning and explanation of an agent’s behaviour. The
logical formalization of a phenomenon can even reveal problems that do not ap-
pear intuitively. BDI logics, viz. logics of Belief, Desire and Intention (Cohen and
Levesque (1990), Rao and Georgeff (1991, 1992), Sadek (1992), Herzig and Lon-
gin (2004), Wooldridge (2000)) ground on the philosophy of language, mind, and
action (cf. Bratman (1987), Searle (1969, 1983)). They propose to model agents
via some key concepts such as action and mental attitudes (beliefs, goals, inten-
tions, choices...). This framework is commonly used in the agent community and
offers well-known interesting properties: great explanatory power, formal verifia-
bility, rigorous and well-established theoretical frame (from the point of view of
both philosophy and formal logic).
Besides, Searle (1983) assumes that emotions are particular mental attitudes
and can be expressed in terms of beliefs and desires, what supports the idea of using
BDI logics to represent them. Nevertheless there is not much work about emotions
in this area yet. For example Meyer (2004) proposes a language for the description
of emotional agents based on a BDI logic, and Ochs et al. (2005) also provide
definitions of some emotions using Sadek’s rational interaction theory (1992), a
particular BDI formalism. But these models do not take advantage of all the assets
of BDI logics. In particular they are more interested in the implementation of their
model in an agent than in the formal reasoning possibilities that it allows. Besides
it seems to be fair to say that they are not faithful enough to the psychological
theories and do not propose a rich enough set of emotions.
Therefore our objective in this thesis is to provide a generic logical model of
emotions. Actually we are only interested in the cognitive aspect of emotions, at
the expense of the biological and physiological aspects. We do not aim at provid-
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ing an agent architecture or implementation, but rather at disambiguating emotions
and reason about their properties. Thus our work is not at the same level than most
of existing computer science approaches to emotions, but rather proposes to be the
basis of their implementations. There already exist some formalizations of emo-
tions, that ground on various formalisms. We will thus argue our choice to use BDI
logics rather than other existing formalisms to design our model. We will then dis-
cuss two existing formalisms that also ground on BDI logics, insisting on what we
propose to improve in these approaches. In particular our model should be faithful
to a psychological theory, provide a richer set of emotions than existing models,
and have a correct and complete axiomatics to allow deductions about emotions.
Indeed, we want to use our model to prove some theorems about emotions, what is
very interesting and was never done before, as far as we know. However this model
should not be restricted to such a theoretical use, what is often criticized in formal
logics, so we also want to use it in practical applications and to implement it in a
BDI agent. This model should provide believable emotions to these agents so we
will finally assess this point.
To summarize, the main objective of our logical model, and its main advantage
over existing formalizations, is to disambiguate emotions as exhaustively as pos-
sible, by representing a great number of them in a formal language, and to allow
reasoning about their properties.
This thesis is structured in three parts. The first part is dedicated to the state of
the art, from the point of view of both psychology and computer science. In Chap-
ter 1 we answer the essential question of “what is an emotion?” by introducing
some psychological theories of emotions in a historical perspective. Confronted
to the great variety of existing theories, a second question arises: “which theory is
best adapted to be formalized?”, that we will also answer there. This theory will
be described in more details than the other ones. Then, to convince readers won-
dering whether emotions are really useful for virtual agents, we will expose some
key research findings that initiated the interest of computer science in emotions,
and describe some existing Artificial Intelligence applications where emotions im-
prove the efficacy of intelligent agents in their task (Chapter 2).
The second part sets up the core of this thesis, viz. our formalization of emo-
tions. We introduce our particular BDI formalism, give its semantics and axiomat-
ics, and prove its soundness and completeness (Chapter 3). We then formalize
twenty emotions in terms of the modal operators thus described; we discuss our
choices of formalization as well as the differences between several psychological
theories describing these emotions or other close emotions (Chapter 4). Once our
definitions are accepted (and we hope that our arguments can help this), our logic
allows us to prove some intuitive properties of emotions (Chapter 5). This supports
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the accuracy of our definitions, as well as the power of BDI logics to disambiguate
complex concepts.
Finally the third part exposes some concrete applications and ongoing work
following from this formalization. In particular we show some small case studies
on Ambient Intelligence and machine-machine dialogue (Chapter 6). We then de-
scribe an implementation of our formalism in the agent PLEIAD and its use for
assessing the believability of the generated emotions (Chapter 7). Finally we ex-
pose preliminary results about the formalisation of coping, the process describing
how an agent can manage his negative emotions, in the same logical formalism
(Chapter 8).
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Part I
Emotions: from psychology to
computer science
The beginning of knowledge is the discovery of something
we do not understand
Frank Herbert
Chapter 1
Emotions in psychology
The great tragedy of science  the slaying
of a beautiful hypothesis by an ugly fact
Thomas Huxley, biologist and writer.
1.1 Short history
Emotions have always been subject to great debate. They were first only inves-
tigated by philosophy and assumed to be disorganizing and irrational. Darwin
designed the first modern theory of emotions, recognizing their essential role in
survival and their adaptive function. Several researchers designed other evolu-
tionary theories, proposing different sets of basic emotions with various including
criteria. This variety in the number and names of the basic emotions considered led
to criticism and doubt on the very existence of basic emotions (Ortony and Turner,
1990).
Besides, the first cognitive theories appear. Arnold (1960) introduces the con-
cept of cognitive appraisal as prior to any emotion: an emotion can only be trig-
gered by the awareness of the reactions ordered by the brain in response to the
appraisal of the situation. Almost at the same moment Schacter and Singer (1962)
also propose to integrate cognition in the emotional triggering process: they sug-
gest that an emotion arises from the analysis of physiological signals, but these
signals must be cognitively disambiguated first. The concept of appraisal is agreed
on by Lazarus (1966) who says that stress depends on the meaning of the stimulus
for the individual perceiving it. This importance given to cognition makes emotions
too deliberative and was much criticized since. Zajonc (1980) exposes experiments
proving that emotions can arise without any cognitive activity. Lazarus (1984a) an-
swers by showing that the same situation can trigger different emotions depending
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on how the individual appraises it. A great debate then opposed the sustainers of the
primacy of cognition (Lazarus, 1984b) and those of the primacy of affect (Zajonc,
1984) during the 80s. Leventhal and Scherer (1987) then propose to distinguish
between three levels of cognitive appraisal: the sensorimotor level is innate and
unconscious; the schematic level is acquired but still unconscious; finally only the
conceptual level is conscious. Provided this distinction, we can admit that emo-
tions really involve cognitions but of more or less high level. The debate may then
have arisen from a disagreement on the definition of cognition. In the sequel cog-
nitive appraisal theories become an active branch of psychology, and the concept
of appraisal is developed by numerous researchers (Frijda, 1986; Scherer, 1987;
Ortony, Clore, and Collins, 1988; Lazarus, 1991).
In this chapter we give an overview of the main psychological trends in the
theorization of emotions. We then highlight the assets of one particular type of
psychological theories of emotions: the cognitive appraisal theories. We give more
details on two theories of this research trend that particularly interest us in this
thesis: Ortony, Clore and Collins’ typology, and Lazarus’ theory. Finally we will
conclude about the emerging interest of computer science in the psychology of
emotions.
1.2 Main trends in psychological research on emotions
As the history showed, several trends of research oppose to each other to answer
some big questions about emotions. Actually two questions mainly interest psy-
chology of emotions:
1. classification: can we find some basic emotions or emotional categories?
Different types of approaches consider (for various reasons) that there effec-
tively exists a limited set of basic emotions, while continuous theories are
opposed to this view (cf. Section 1.2.1);
2. functioning: how are emotions triggered? What is their influence on be-
haviour? Does cognition play a role? Do physiological changes trigger
emotions or do emotions trigger physiological changes? Physiological (cf.
Section 1.2.2) and cognitive (cf. Section 1.2.3) theories take opposite views
on these questions.
Below we list what we believe to be the main trends in psychological research
on emotion, and give a few details about some theories in each trend. We also
summarize in tables the answers that each theory proposes to these essential ques-
tions, in order to make it easier to compare these theories. Actually these theories
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sometimes answer only one of these questions and take an implicit position or no
position at all on the other one. Table 1.1 summarizes these trends of research and
their answers to the big questions presented above (“-” means that this theory does
not explicitly answer the question or is not concerned with it).
Table 1.1: Different trends in the psychology of emotions
Basic emotions? Cognitive component?
Discrete theories Yes -
• Evolutionary theories Yes, adaptive No
• Non-evolutionary Yes, biologic No
• Building blocks Yes, primary -
Continuous theories No -
Physiological theories - No
Cognitive theories - Yes
• Two-factor - Interpretation of arousal
• Appraisal - Appraisal of stimuli
1.2.1 Theories interested in the representation of emotions: discrete
vs continuous
The first important question that psychology tried to answer about emotions was
their classification. Two different trends take opposite views on this problem: the
first one assumes that there exists a limited set of basic emotions, while the second
one considers emotions as a continuous function of two or three dimensions. In the
“discrete trend”, Ekman (1999a) distinguishes three different definitions of basic
emotions:
• adaptive emotions in relation with an evolution theory: the basic emotions
are those designed along evolution to solve specific problems, and are now
innate answers programmed in individuals (e.g. Darwin, Ekman, Oatley and
Johnson-Laird);
• discrete emotions that importantly differ one from another (not inevitably in
relation with an evolution theory, e.g. Tomkins, Izard); this view is opposed
to continuous approaches considering that emotions are all similar in essence
and only differ by the values of some dimensions like intensity or valence
(e.g. Lang, Russell);
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• building blocks: this is Plutchik’s view, comparing basic emotions to primary
colours, and building complex emotions as a combination of the basic ones;
this view is in contradiction with the evolutionary notion of basic emotions,
since it assumes the possible coexistence of several basic emotions at the
same time.
In the following subsections we expose some theories that subscribe to each of
these trends.
1.2.1.1 Evolutionary theories
In a context where emotions were mainly investigated by philosophy, and consid-
ered irrational, Darwin (1872) proposed the first modern theory of emotions. Sev-
eral researchers followed him and defined other evolutionary theories, sharing the
hypothesis that we humans inherited a small set of adaptive basic emotions along
evolution. These theories thus subscribe to the first trend for the definition of basic
emotions. Nevertheless they differ on which emotions they consider basic. These
theories assume that emotions are innate reflexes, with no cognitive component.
We propose a description of some of these evolutionary theories.
Darwin. Darwin (1872) is interested in the selection during evolution of some
basic emotions for their adaptive function. He studies photographes and uses ques-
tionnaires to find a continuity in behaviour and emotional expressions from ani-
mals to humans. He then builds a taxonomy associating a specific behaviour and
expression to each of his six basic emotions: happiness, sadness, fear, disgust,
anger, surprise. He shows that emotional behaviours have an adaptive function,
viz. they help the individual to face the dangers in his environment and to survive.
Besides, he believes that emotions also have a communicative function, since their
expression serves to communicate the individual’s intentions (for example an ani-
mal bares his teeth to indicate his intention to attack). These facial expressions still
last now because they are useful to communicate one’s emotions to others.
Ekman. Ekman (1992b; 1992a; 1999a; 1999b) also agrees on the existence of a
limited set of basic emotions, that are present in other primates and each have spe-
cific feelings, universal signals, and corresponding physiological changes. He also
agrees with the evolutionary thesis assuming that emotions are inherited adaptive
functions.
“Yet I believe the primary function of emotion is to mobilize the organ-
ism to deal quickly with important interpersonal encounters, prepared
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Table 1.2: Summary of Darwin’s theory
Emotions described Happiness, sadness, fear, disgust, anger, surprise
Why basic Inherited through evolution
Triggering Innate reflex
Discrete emotions Yes
Causality Emotion → physiological changes
Cognitive component No
to do so by what types of activity have been adaptive in the past. The
past refers in part to what has been adaptive in the past history of our
species, and the past refers also to what has been adaptive in our own
individual life history.” (Ekman, 1999a, p. 2)
According to him, emotions are triggered by the automatic appraisal of universal
antecedent events and are characterized by their quick onset, their brief duration,
and their unbidden occurrence (see all his characteristics of basic emotions in (Ek-
man, 1999a, table 3.1 p.9)). Then these emotions cause the modifications of facial
expression. This assumption is contrary to the facial retroaction thesis adopted by
Tomkins and Izard (cf. Section 1.2.1.2 below).
Ekman distinguishes six of these basic emotions whose expression is univer-
sal, even if it can be inhibited or highlighted by social and cultural rules. These
expressions are supposed to have had an adaptive function:
• joy is expressed by a true smile, involving a spontaneous contraction of the
eye orbicular muscle, the rest of the body being relaxed;
• disgust implies a universal grimace which reminds the action of spiting out
a poison or pinching one’s nose to avoid a bad smell (according to Darwin);
• surprise is characterized by eyebrow rising, giving more light to eyes to fa-
cilitate the perception of potential threats, it is a state of acute arousal useful
to face unknown situations;
• sadness is expressed by the relaxation of jaw and the contraction of eye-
brows, accompanied by a desire of withdrawal and loneliness, favorable to
soothe grief;
• anger is accompanied by an attack preparation expression, a quick mobilisa-
tion of energetic resources, and a blood influx in hands to make them ready
to move;
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• fear makes the face relax and turn pale, eyes suddenly open to increase the
visual ability, and blood floods in legs to favor flight.
Later, Ekman studied the influence of the contraction of each facial muscle on
the facial expression, and designed the Facial Action Coding System, a system to
describe the facial behaviour in terms of Action Units (Ekman and Friesen, 1978;
Ekman, Friesen, and Hager, 2002). Action Units are kinds of atomic facial modi-
fications, corresponding to the contraction of part of a muscle, or of one or several
muscles at the same time. He then proposed a correspondence between the felt
emotion and the Action Units involved in its expression.
Table 1.3: Summary of Ekman’s theory
Emotions described Joy, sadness, disgust, surprise, anger, fear
Why basic Universal facial expression
Triggering Automatic appraisal of universal antecedent events
Discrete emotions Yes
Causality Emotion → physiological changes
Cognitive component No
Oatley and Johnson-Laird. Oatley and colleagues (Oatley and Johnson-Laird,
1987; Oatley, 1992; Johnson-Laird and Oatley, 1992; Oatley and Jenkins, 1996;
Oatley and Johnson-Laird, 1996) consider that emotions play a crucial adaptive
role in the organization of cognitive processes. They believe that this role has been
shaped by evolution.
What [emotions] do is prompt us, create an urge and a readiness, to act
in a way that on average, during the course of evolution and assisted
by our own development, has been better either than simply acting
randomly or than becoming lost in thought trying to calculate the best
possible action.
(Oatley and Jenkins, 1996, p. 261) (bold is mine)
Their main postulate is that emotions play a communicative role.
“Each goal and plan has a monitoring mechanism that evaluates events
relevant to it. When a substantial change of probability occurs of
achieving an important goal or subgoal, the monitoring mechanism
broadcasts to the whole cognitive system a signal that can set it into
readiness to respond to this change. Humans experience these signals
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and the states of readiness they induce as emotions.”
(Oatley, 1992, p. 50)
The authors assume that cognitive processes work parallely and asynchronously
and communicate with each other in two ways: the propositional or symbolic
communication allows to share information about the environment; the non propo-
sitional or emotional communication does not transmit information but interrupts
all the processes and shifts them into the emotional mode, what increases their at-
tention.
“Emotion signals provide a specific communication system which can
invoke the actions of some processors [modules] and switch others
off. It sets the whole system into an organized emotion mode without
propositional data having to be evaluated by a high-level conscious
operating system... The emotion signal simply propagates globally
through the system to set into one of a small number of emotion
modes.” (Oatley and Johnson-Laird, 1987, p. 33)
Since these basic emotions have no propositional content, Oatley et al. assume that
no high-level conscious processing is involved.
Emotions are triggered by particular “plan junctures” viz. particular situations of
the current plans. As the other evolutionary authors, Oatley et al. propose that emo-
tions then have adaptive effects, here expressed in terms of modifications on the
agent’s plans. Thus emotions are control signals monitoring current plans to signal
problems in their execution. Once triggered each emotion also induces specific
physiological changes. Table 1.4 describes the possible emotions modes, along
with their corresponding eliciting situations and their adaptive effect on the agent’s
plans.
Table 1.4: Oatley et al.’s table of basic emotions (Oatley, 1992, p. 55)
Emotion Elicitor: situation Effect on current plan
of current plan
Happiness Subgoals achieved Continue plan, modify it if needed
Sadness Major plan failed Do nothing or find new plan
Anxiety Self-preservation goal Stop current plan, monitor
violated environment, keep posted or flee
Anger Active plan frustrated Try again, attack
Disgust Gustatory goal violated Reject substance, withdraw
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One particularity of this theory is that it is computationally tractable. Indeed the
authors noticed that computational models of human mind and reasoning neglect
emotions and thus decided to fill this gap by proposing this Communicative Theory
of Emotions.
Table 1.5: Summary of Oatley et al.’s theory
Discrete emotions Yes
Emotions described Anger, disgust, anxiety, happiness, sadness
Why basic No required propositional content
Triggering Modification of plan juncture
Causality Emotion → physiological changes
Cognitive component No high-level evaluation
Oriented towards AI Yes
Conclusion. Evolutionary theories highlight the communicative and adaptive func-
tions of emotions. They agree on the fact that emotions are inherited reflex and thus
need no cognition. They also agree on the emotional sequence: emotions trigger
(adaptive) physiological changes. This sequence is contradicted by other discrete
theories exposed in the next section.
Table 1.6: Summary table: evolutionary theories
Basic emotions Yes
Why basic Adaptive emotions inherited through evolution
Basic emotions No agreement on number or names
Causality Emotions → (adaptive) physiological changes
Cognitive component No
1.2.1.2 Well-differentiated discrete emotions vs continuous emotions
Discrete theories also consider that emotions are well differentiated from one an-
other, but they do not build this assumption on an evolutionary view. These theories
are opposed to continuous ones assume that emotions all are similar phenomena,
only different by the values of two or three dimensions. The following paragraphs
describe two discrete theories that do not take an evolutionary view, and a contin-
uous one.
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Tomkins. Tomkins (1962, 1963, 1980) is interested in primary emotions that he
calls affects. They consist in organized physiological, bodily and facial responses
to stimuli, directly triggered by neural activation without any cognitive processing.
Actually, he defines a notion of density of neural firing (the number of neurons
used per time unit) whose modification (either an increase, a decrease, or a main-
tain at a high level) triggers an emotion. These changes in the density of neural
firing can be induced by an innate releaser, a drive, another emotion... without
any cognitive appraisal. For example when activation increases, the individual will
feel either fear or interest, depending on the suddenness of the change. Neural
activation amplifies the physiological responses, then their perception by the indi-
vidual makes him feel the affect. According to his “facial retroaction” thesis, the
facial expression strongly influences the induction and determination of emotion.
Tomkins distinguishes nine primary affects having different corresponding facial
expressions: interest, joy, surprise, anxiety, fear, and anger, that are innate, and
contempt, disgust, and shame, that are acquired. For example surprise corresponds
to lifted eyebrows and blinking eyes.
Figure 1.1: Tomkins’ facial retroaction hypothesis
Tomkins thus assumes that physiological changes (here the facial expression) pre-
cede the feeling of an emotion. This sequence has been subject to debate within
the branch of physiological theories (cf. Section 1.2.2).
Izard. Izard (1977; 1992) gets his inspiration from Tomkins and even worked
with him (Tomkins and Izard, 1965). Like him he insists on the motivational and
adaptive significance of affects. His model, named “Differential Emotions Theory”
because of its focus on distinct discrete emotions is a model of the interplay be-
tween emotion and other personality subsystems1. He distinguishes ten fundamen-
1According to Izard, personality is constituted of six autonomous subsystems, independent but
complexly interrelated: emotions, drives (information signals about bodily needs, like hunger, thirst,
reproduction, pain avoidance, comfort), homeostatic (automatic and unconscious systems, like the
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Table 1.7: Summary of Tomkins’s theory
Emotions described anger, interest, contempt, disgust, distress,
fear, joy, shame, surprise
Why basic density of neural firing
Triggering Facial retroaction
Discrete emotions Yes
Causality Physiological changes → emotion
Cognitive component No
tal emotions (Tomkins’ nine emotions more one emotion of guilt) differentiated by
specific values of their three components:
• a subjective component viz. the emotion consciousness or feeling;
• a neurophysiological component viz. innately stored neural programs;
• an expressive component viz. characteristic and universally understood (fa-
cial, vocal, gestural, and physiologic) observable expressions.
Thus each emotion is triggered by a specific neural activation (induced by internal
or external events), then induces in the individual a specific experience and expres-
sion, and has a specific influence on his whole behaviour, including perceptions,
cognition, action, and personality development. The main assumption of this the-
ory is that “emotions constitute the primary motivational system of human beings”
(Izard, 1977, p. 1). Moreover Izard explicitly states that:
“emotion has no cognitive component. I maintain that the emotion
process is bounded by the feeling that derives directly from the activity
of the neurochemical substrates.” (Izard, 1984, p. 24)
Izard also argues that “the emotions play an important role in organizing, motivat-
ing and sustaining behavior” and that “each of the fundamental emotions has an
inherently adaptive function” (Izard, 1977, p. 83). Finally, according to Izard, ba-
sic emotions are complex phenomena that motivate and organize all the behaviours
in an adaptive goal. Past experience shape the future behaviour. Thus emotions are
neither disorganized nor disorganizing, but adaptive and functional (in developing
and regulating relationships and communications).
cardiovascular one), perceptual, cognitive and motor.
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Table 1.8: Summary of Izard’s theory
Emotions described Anger, interest, contempt, disgust, distress,
fear, joy, shame, surprise, guilt
Why basic Innate neural program
Triggering Specific neural activation
Discrete emotions Yes
Causality Physiological changes → emotion
Cognitive component No
Russell. The continuous approach assumes that emotions can be represented with
a few dimensions in a multidimensional space. Most researchers (e.g. Lang (1994);
Russell (1980)) agree on two dimensions: valence is the intrinsic pleasantness of
the emotion, differentiating positive emotions like joy from negative ones like
anger; arousal is the bodily activation concomitant with the emotion, manifest
through physiological changes like increasing heart rate, perspiration... Besides,
some researchers argue that two dimensions are not sufficient: for example, anger
and fear have the same valence and arousal while they are very different emotions.
They thus add a third dimension, named control, potency, or dominance (Russell,
1997), allowing to differentiate emotions w.r.t. the associated action tendency, ei-
ther fight or flight.
Table 1.9: Summary of continuous theories
Emotions described Continuous function of
arousal, valence and dominance
Triggering Computation of the values of dimensions
depending on stimulus
Discrete emotions No
Conclusion. There is thus a debate on the representation of emotions. Table 1.10
summarizes the views of these two non-evolutionary discrete theories.
1.2.1.3 Emotions as building blocks
Plutchik. Plutchik (1980) designed the “psychoevolutionary theory of emotions”,
representing emotions on a coloured wheel. He differentiates eight primary emo-
tions (acceptance, fear, surprise, sadness, disgust, anger, anticipation/curiosity, and
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Table 1.10: Summary of non-evolutionary discrete theories
Basic emotions Yes
Why basic Biologically differentiated
Basic emotions No agreement on number
Causality Physiological changes (facial expression)
→ emotions
Cognitive component No
joy) that can blend like primary colors to form secondary emotions. His argument
to differentiate these eight emotions is that they correspond to specific adaptive
processes (safety, reproduction, socialization...). He also specifies the triggering
situations of these emotions, and the resulting adaptive behaviour or expression.
• fear is elicited by a threat or danger; it results in a behaviour of escape or
flight aiming at seeking for protection and safety;
• anger is elicited by an obstacle or enemy, and results in an attack to destroy
this obstacle;
• joy is elicited when the individual gains possession of a valued object; as a
consequence he tries to retain the new resources;
• sadness emerges from the loss of a valued object or from an abandonment;
as a consequence the individual cries to try to reintegrate the group or recover
the object;
• acceptation is triggered by the belonging to a group, by having friends; it
expresses incorporation and mutual support;
• disgust is triggered by disgusting objects or poison; as a consequence the
individual vomits the poison or rejects the object;
• anticipation (what other authors call hope, curiosity or expectation) arises
from the presence of a new territory; it results in a behaviour of exploration
aiming at mapping this unknown territory;
• surprise is triggered by unexpected events; it results in an interruption of
current actions: the individual stops in order to use all his time and resources
for reorientation.
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Plutchik represents emotions with three dimensions (cf. Figure 1.2): their similar-
ity to each other (corresponding to their proximity on the wheel), their positive or
negative polarity (the eight emotions are grouped into four pairs of polar oppo-
sites, like joy and sadness), and their intensity (he uses three words per emotion,
corresponding to three degrees of intensity).
Figure 1.2: Plutchik’s circumplex model of emotions
Plutchik assumes that emotions can be felt by all animals, but that their expression
was differentiated along evolution and now varies from one species to another, even
if some prototypical patterns can be identified. Like other evolutionary theories,
Plutchik argues that there is a limited number of basic primary emotions, of which
all other emotions are combinations. According to him, they have an adaptive role,
in that they help animals to manage their environment when it is threatening their
survival.
Table 1.11: Summary of Plutchik’s theory
Discrete emotions Yes
Emotions described Acceptance, fear, surprise, sadness,
disgust, anger, anticipation, and joy
Why basic Correspondence with adaptive processes
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1.2.1.4 Conclusion
Discrete theories all agree on the existence of a limited set of basic emotions, but
they reached no consensus about the nature and number of these basic emotions.
The authors even differ in their methods and in their criteria for calling an emo-
tion a basic one (cf. Table 1.12). Due to this lack of consensus, some authors
Table 1.12: Basic emotions in various theories (table adapted from (Ortony and
Turner, 1990))
Author Basic emotions Basis for inclusion
Plutchik Acceptance, anger, anticipation, Relation to adaptive
disgust, joy, fear, sadness, surprise biological processes
Izard Anger, contempt, disgust, distress, fear, Hardwired
guilt, interest, joy, shame, surprise
Darwin Happiness, sadness, fear, Adaptive processes
disgust, anger, surprise
Ekman et al. Joy, sadness, fear, Universal facial
disgust, anger, surprise expressions
Tomkins Anger, interest, contempt, disgust, Density of
distress, fear, joy, shame, surprise neural firing
Oatley et al. Anger, disgust, anxiety, No propositional
happiness, sadness content
are very doubtful about the very existence of such basic emotions. Ortony and
Turner (1990) argued that there are no basic emotions at all, neither from a bio-
logical nor from a psychological point of view. As a reaction, three researchers
answered them (Ekman, 1992a; Panksepp, 1992; Izard, 1992) by arguing once
again in favour of the existence of basic emotions.
Most of these discrete theories mainly ground on universal facial expressions
to differentiate basic emotions. But several researchers highlighted the fact that the
universal expressions identified were posed expressions, played by actors (Scherer
and Sangsue, 1995), and not spontaneous. Besides, some studies prove that even
actors, referring to standard prototypical expressions, actually show great variabil-
ity in their expressions (Galati, Scherer, and Ricci-Bitti, 1997, quoted by (Scherer
and Sangsue, 1995)). Ekman (1999b) argues against this criticism. He says that
the fact that people recognize posed expressions proves that they might have al-
ready seen them in their social life. Moreover, he presents results of a study on
spontaneous expressions also supporting his thesis of universal expressions.
Thus, representative theories still disagree on the structure of the emotional
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space: are emotions discrete or continuous? Other kinds of theories focusing on
other aspects of emotions do not always make explicit their view on the representa-
tion of emotions. Another important debate about emotions is the question of their
triggering: do emotions have a cognitive component? Does brain intervene in the
triggering of emotions? The next sections expose two opposing trends of research:
physiological theories (Section 1.2.2) highlight the role of physiological changes
in the triggering of emotions while cognitive theories (Section 1.2.3) highlight the
primacy of cognition in emotion. Contrary to the previous theories that focus on
the representation of emotions, physiological and cognitive theories try to explain
their triggering.
1.2.2 Physiological theories
They consider that physiological activation is the only origin of emotions. They
are not interested in the continuous or discrete representation of emotions.
1.2.2.1 James and Lange
James (1884) postulates that emotions are triggered by the perception of the phys-
iological changes directly induced by a stimulus. Emotions thus are genetical re-
flexes, which need no intervention of brain.
“My theory ... is that the bodily changes follow directly the percep-
tion of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as
they occur is the emotion. Common sense says, we lose our fortune,
are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are
insulted by a rival, are angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be
defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect ... and that the
more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry
because we strike, afraid because we tremble ... Without the bodily
states following on the perception, the latter would be purely cogni-
tive in form, pale, colorless, destitute of emotional warmth. We might
then see the bear, and judge it best to run, receive the insult and deem
it right to strike, but we should not actually feel afraid or angry.”
Actually the individual notices his physiological arousal and deduces that his body
is preparing for a particular situation, for example a frightening situation. He then
feels the corresponding emotion.
Lange2 agrees with James about this conception of emotion as a consequence
of the perception of physiological changes. But for him, physiological changes are
2His text is originally published in Danish, but it was reprinted, cf. (Lange and James, 1967)
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not reflex, but are controlled by a part of the brain, the vasomotor center.
Figure 1.3: James and Lange’s emotional sequence
1.2.2.2 Cannon
Cannon (1927) contradicts the main assumption of the two previous theories, viz.
the fact that physiological responses are differentiated among emotions. According
to him viscera react too slowly, so we must feel the emotion before the physiologi-
cal reaction. Moreover he notices that the physiological changes are quite the same
for all emotions, so viscera may not be sensitive enough to allow the differentia-
tion of emotions. He refers to physiological and anatomical experiences showing
that artificial induction of physiological modifications is not sufficient to trigger
a determinate emotion. He thus postulates that emotions actually result from the
activation of the thalamus, that then produces the physiological changes.
Figure 1.4: Cannon’s emotional sequence
But several researchers then showed that Cannon was not right either, since the
stimulation of other parts of the brain, like the limbic systems, can also trigger
emotions.
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1.2.2.3 Conclusion
Even if his hypothesis turned out to be wrong, Cannon was the first one to criticize
the physiological differentiation of emotions proposed by James and Lange and
also agreed on by Izard or Tomkins who assume that the facial expression deter-
mines the emotion. Then Schacter and Singer (1962) also conduced experiments to
contradict this facial differentiation of emotions. They injected epinephrin to peo-
ple in order to artificially induce a physiological arousal. They then noticed that
people interpret their arousal depending on the situation: actually some of them
were placed in a room with an actor pretending to be happy, others with an actor
pretending to be angry, and others were left alone. The results shown that people
tend toward feeling the same emotion expressed by the actor, and do not interpret
their arousal when they are alone. The authors conclude that physiological arousal
alone is not sufficient to trigger an emotion, but that it still has to be interpreted.
Actually some emotions can have a distinct biological substrate but a cognitive fac-
tor is essential to make subtle differences between close emotions like shame, guilt
and embarrassment. This is the basic postulate of the cognitive theories exposed in
the next section.
1.2.3 Cognitive theories
The physiological theories assume that stimuli cause a physiological activation (re-
spectively of the viscera, the vasomotor center, or the thalamus) that creates emo-
tions, with no cognitive intervention. The evolutionary theories assume that emo-
tions were inherited during evolution and are automatically triggered by innately
stored programs with no cognitive intervention either. On the contrary, cognitive
theories assume that cognition is essential in the triggering of emotion.
In this section we present three different kinds of cognitive theories: the first
cognitive theories assuming that physiological activation must be interpreted to
identify the corresponding emotion (Schacter and Singer, Valins); the cognitive
appraisal theories introducing the concept of appraisal, a process of evaluation of
the stimuli w.r.t. various criteria (Arnold, Frijda, Lazarus, Scherer, Ortony, Clore
and Collins); and the schematic theories assuming that emotions are activated when
their cognitive elements are activated (Leventhal).
1.2.3.1 First cognitive theories
Schacter and Singer. Schacter and Singer (1962) agree on the importance of ac-
tivation but insist on the need to cognitively interpret this activation to identify the
emotion that is felt. They thus consider emotions as the result of both physiological
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Figure 1.5: Schacter and Singer’s emotional sequence
activation and cognition. Their two-factor theory gets its name from their hypoth-
esis that emotions have two components: the physiological arousal of the individ-
ual’s body, and the individual’s cognitive explanation for these changes. This is
different from James and Lange’s theory assuming that the individual can directly
associate a particular kind of physiological arousal with a particular emotion.
They refer to sociological theories to assume that an individual needs to un-
derstand his physiological state at every moment. Thus when he experiences an
undifferentiated activation, he tries to find a cognition allowing to specify the cor-
responding emotion. If he has no relevant cognition he will identify his emotion by
comparison with other individuals in the same situation. The authors support their
theory with an experience where they artificially induce a physiological activation
(by adrenaline injection) and then manipulate the resulting emotion by giving the
individuals various explanations or putting them in touch with an actor simulating
a given emotion (cf. Section 1.2.2).
Valins. Valins (1966) is interested in the role of environment in the interpretation
of emotions. He completes Schacter and Singer’s works by showing that physio-
logical activation itself is not necessary, since the belief of activation is sufficient
to create an emotion. Emotion is thus only constituted of two cognitions (the belief
of an activation and the causal attribution of this activation to a stimulus).
Finally, the emotional sequence is the same in these first cognitive theories as
in James and Lange’s theory: the arousal comes first, followed by the emotion.
However the difference is that a cognitive appraisal mediates between the arousal
and the emotion. Actually, the individual appraises his physiological arousal de-
pending on the context, and does not appraise the stimulus. This is the difference
with cognitive appraisal theories.
42
1.2.3.2 Appraisal theories
These particular kinds of cognitive theories insist on the cognitive determination of
emotion and on its adaptive function. They assume that emotions are triggered by
the evaluation of a stimulus w.r.t. several criteria: this process is called appraisal
(cf. Figure 1.6). The term “appraisal” was first introduced by Arnold (1960), along
with the notion of “action tendency”. The following paragraphs present Arnold’s
theory and some of the main subsequent cognitive appraisal theories.
Figure 1.6: The cognitive appraisal theories
Arnold. Arnold (1960) is the one who first introduced the concept of appraisal.
According to her, appraisal is the process determining the significance of a situation
for the individual, viz. is it good or bad for him. This processes triggers an emotion
that induces an action tendency of attraction or repulsion, and the corresponding
physiological changes. The aim of this readiness is to adapt to the environment.
Later, many researchers agreed on the concepts of appraisal and action tendency
introduced by Arnold. We give the broad lines of some of these cognitive appraisal
theories in the following paragraphs.
Lazarus. Lazarus (1966; 1991) presents a relational, motivational, cognitive the-
ory of emotion. According to him emotions result from the cognitive appraisal of
the interaction between an individual and his environment in relation to the individ-
ual’s motivations. He distinguishes primary appraisal, evaluating the relevance and
congruence of the stimulus to the individual’s well-being, and secondary appraisal,
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Table 1.13: Arnold’s appraisal theory: summary
Automatic appraisal Yes, automatic, unconscious
Criteria Good (induces attraction)
or bad (induces repulsion)
Discrete emotions Yes: Anger, aversion, courage, dejection,
desire, despair, fear, hate, hope, love, sadness
Why basic Relation to action tendencies
Determinant of emotion Specific action tendency
Consequences of emotion Action readiness, physiological changes
evaluating the resources available to cope with this stimulus. Like Arnold, he con-
siders that emotions induce action tendencies and physiological modifications de-
riving from these action tendencies, with the aim of adapting to the environment.
Table 1.14: Lazarus’ appraisal theory: summary
Automatic appraisal Dual: some appraisals are automatic,
others are cognitively controlled
Criteria Goal relevance, goal congruence,
ego-involvement, credit, future expectations,
coping potential
Discrete emotions No
Determinant of emotion A particular appraisal pattern
Consequences of emotions Action readiness, physiological changes
Scherer. Scherer (1984; 1987) considers emotions as a multicomponent process,
including a cognitive component. His appraisal process consists in a sequence of
stimulus processing steps, the “Stimulus Evaluation Checks”. They evaluate in
turn: the novelty and unexpectedness of the stimulus, its intrinsic pleasantness, its
congruence with goals, the coping possibilities, and its compatibility with norms.
This appraisal involves two automatic processes under the control of a con-
scious process (Leventhal and Scherer, 1987). At the sensorimotor level, a first
process is responsible for the automatic unconscious perceptual processing of the
stimulus w.r.t. innate sensors, and induces reflex responses. At the schematic level,
a second process is responsible for the automatic unconscious matching of the cur-
rent stimulus with learned stimulus patterns, and induces coordinated responses.
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At the conceptual level, a conscious process intervenes when the two automatic
ones generate a response that is intense enough to be conscious, and uses propo-
sitional knowledge to refine this emotional response. This process becomes more
and more automatic by repetition. Scherer and Sangsue (1995) then classify the
Stimulus Evaluation Checks in these three levels of processing.
Scherer (2001) also proposed a correspondence between emotions and different
types of physiological changes. For example facial expression corresponding with
an emotion is expressed in terms of Ekman’s Action Units.
Table 1.15: Scherer’s appraisal theory: summary
Automatic appraisal Consciously controlled automatic appraisal
Criteria novelty, unexpectedness, intrinsic pleasantness
congruence with goals, coping possibilities,
compatibility with norms
Discrete emotions No
Determinant of emotion Sequenced evaluation of appraisal criteria
Consequences of emotions Physiological changes (facial, vocal...)
Frijda. Frijda (1986) focuses on the action tendencies induced by emotions. A
stimulus first passes through various steps of evaluation determining its character-
istics (causes and consequences, relevance and congruence with interests, coping
possibilities, urgency). A control signal is then generated to distract or interrupt
the current action. An action preparation is then generated (action plan, action ten-
dency, activation mode) that induces physiological changes, and finally an action
is selected and executed. According to Frijda it is the associated action tendency
that differentiates emotions from each other.
Table 1.16: Frijda’s appraisal theory: summary
Criteria Causes and consequences, relevance and
congruence with interests, coping
possibilities, urgency
Determinant of emotion A particular action tendency
Consequences of emotions Action preparation, physiological changes
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Ortony, Clore and Collins. Ortony, Clore, and Collins (1988) considered emo-
tions as being valenced reactions to three kinds of stimuli: events, actions of agents,
aspects of objects. They thus design a typology (known as the OCC typology) that
has three branches. Each branch corresponds to a type of stimulus appraised with
respect to a particular appraisal variable, and related to particular mental attitudes.
The event-based branch contains emotion types whose eliciting conditions de-
pend on the evaluation of the desirability of an event with respect to the agent’s
goals. For example, the stimulus event “it is raining” is appraised as being undesir-
able w.r.t. the agent’s goal of taking coffee on a terrace. The agent-based branch
contains emotion types whose eliciting conditions depend on the judgement of the
praiseworthiness of an action, with respect to the agent’s standards. The object-
based branch contains emotion types whose eliciting conditions depend on the
evaluation of the attraction of an object with respect to the agent’s likings. These
branches are then differentiated into several groups of emotion types with simi-
lar eliciting conditions, depending on other criteria called local variables. Other
criteria called intensity variables affect the intensity of these emotions.
Table 1.17: Ortony, Clore and Collins’ appraisal theory: summary
Criteria Desirability of an event, praiseworthiness of an
action, attraction of an object + local variables
Discrete emotions No (generic categories of emotion types)
Determinant of emotion Particular eliciting conditions
Intended for AI applications Yes
Conclusion. The common assumption in all these theories is that individuals
continuously appraise their environment w.r.t. various criteria, mainly its relevance
for their well-being. This concept of appraisal was introduced by Arnold, and the
subsequent theories bring some differences to it. Lazarus assumes that appraisal
is necessary but also sufficient to trigger emotions, and asserts that emotions are
thus entirely determined by a particular appraisal pattern. Scherer or Ortony, Clore
and Collins also assume a correspondence between appraisal patterns and emo-
tions. On the contrary, Arnold or Frijda believe that what determines emotions is
the associated action tendency; Frijda adds new action tendencies to the two ones
postulated by Arnold (attraction, aversion). Another common point between these
theories is their adaptive point of view: they all agree on the fact that emotions in-
duce action tendencies and corresponding physiological changes aiming at a better
adaptation to the environment.
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Cognitive appraisal theories and discrete theories were considered to be very
different approaches to emotions ((Ortony and Turner, 1990), cf. Section 1.2.1.4).
However, appraisal theories also focus on the description of a small number of
emotions. Actually, the difference is that cognitive appraisal theories do not ex-
plicitly assume that these emotions are (biologically, adaptively...) more basic than
the other ones.
Table 1.18: Appraisal theories: summary table
Appraisal criteria No agreement
Discrete emotions Yes (Arnold), No (Lazarus, Ortony et al), implicit
Sequence of application Yes (Scherer), No (Lazarus)
Conscious appraisal No (Arnold), dual (Lazarus), controlled (Scherer)
Determinant of emotions Appraisal frame (Lazarus, OCC, Scherer)
vs action tendency (Arnold, Frijda)
1.2.3.3 Schematic theories
Other cognitive theories are the schematic theories. They assume that memory
stores some emotional information allowing to reactivate an emotion when one of
its elements is activated, even if this emotion has no link with the stimulus (see for
example Leventhal 1980 ou 1984).
1.2.3.4 Conclusion
All these cognitive theories highlight the fact that cognition is crucial to determine
which emotion the individual feels in a given situation. Some of them (like Valins)
even assert that cognition is sufficient to trigger an emotion. This too deliberative
view on emotion was much criticized (in particular by Zajonc, see Section 1.1).
Then Leventhal and Scherer (1987) showed that this debate was actually about the
definition of cognition and proposed to differentiate various cognitive processes at
various levels of consciousness. Then many other researchers agreed on this com-
bination of automatic and controlled processing to generate emotions. For exam-
ple, neuropsychology also distinguishes between innate primary emotions handled
by the limbic system, and more complex learned secondary emotions, or social
emotions, needing a cortical processing. Some appraisal researchers then refined
their model (Lazarus, 1991; Ortony, Clore, and Collins, 1988; Clore and Ortony,
2000) to include this notion of duality: emotional responses are produced by the
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interaction of automatic processing (perceptual processing of stimuli and compar-
ison with existing schemas) and conscious effortful processing. Thus finally, there
seems to be a consensus that cognition plays a role in emotion, but at different
levels depending on the situation.
We will now discuss why, among the various trends of research presented in
this review, cognitive appraisal theories are more adapted to reach our goal of for-
malizing emotions. The next section is dedicated to this trend of research: it ex-
poses its assets and then give more details on two theories of this trend that we will
use in the following of the thesis.
1.3 Cognitive appraisal theories: assets and details
1.3.1 Advantages of cognitive appraisal theories over other theories
We have exposed several kinds of theories of emotions, that differ on various fea-
tures. We will now discuss the assets of appraisal theories in comparison to other
theories, as exposed by (Scherer, Schorr, and Johnstone, 2001).
First, cognitive appraisal theories allow a fine-grained differentiation between
emotions. The theories exposed before propose various explanations for the differ-
entiation of emotions. Physiological theories explain this differentiation by a spe-
cific biological substrate, but experiments show that visceral responses are mainly
undifferentiated; continuous theories differentiate emotions by a continuous value
of two or three dimensions, but some emotions have quite close values of these
dimensions while being subjectively very different; evolutionist theories character-
ize each emotion by a specific facial expression; some cognitive theories suggest
that each emotion is associated with a particular action tendency. But finally all
these explanations seem to be insufficient. On the contrary cognitive appraisal the-
ories assume that emotions result from the evaluation of stimuli. Thus each distinct
emotion corresponds to a particular appraisal pattern, viz. a particular combination
of appraisal criteria.
This cognitive mediation between the stimulus and the emotion is also the only
way to account for inter-individual differences: in the same situation, several indi-
viduals can feel different emotions, that actually result from different evaluations of
the situation. It also accounts for the temporal variability of emotions: the same in-
dividual can appraise differently the same situation at different moments, and thus
feel different emotions about it depending on the current context. On the contrary,
a direct correspondence between the stimulus and the emotion cannot account for
this variability, since the stimulus itself does not vary. Cognitive appraisal theories
also explain cross-situational similarities, viz. the fact that a large number of situa-
tions (actually an infinity) can trigger the same emotion: all these situations match
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the same appraisal pattern. Besides they can be completely new situations, with
no concrete common features with other known situations. Theories assuming that
emotions are conditioned responses specified by evolution cannot account for this
kind of phenomena.
Moreover, the theories focusing on the physiological triggering of emotions,
independently from the situation, cannot explain the appropriateness of the emo-
tion to the particular current situation. Now studies show that emotions are not
disorganized as it was believed before, but on the contrary have an adaptive func-
tion to deal with their triggering situation. Cognitive appraisal theories account for
this adaptive role since they propose that emotions are triggered by the evaluation
of a particular situation and then induce an appropriate action tendency to deal with
this situation.
Finally, we will give significantly more details about the two appraisal theories
that are mainly used in computer science: Lazarus’ cognitive motivational rela-
tional theory, and Ortony, Clore and Collins’ typology of types of emotions. The
latter is the theory that we will formalize in the sequel of this work.
1.3.2 Lazarus’ motivational relational theory
Lazarus (1991) assumes that an individual continuously evaluates the relation with
his environment. Emotions are elicited by particular encounters viz. particular re-
lations between the individual (his goals, his preferences) and the environment (its
constraints, its resources). According to him, the human emotional process is made
up of two indivisible processes: appraisal and coping.
1.3.2.1 Appraisal
According to Lazarus, knowledge or beliefs about the world are not enough to trig-
ger an emotion. Another process is necessary to assess the personal signification of
this knowledge for the individual: this is the appraisal process. Indeed, knowledge
is neutral, objective, while appraisals are subjective and depend on the person’s
goals; this accounts for the inter-individual variability in emotional responses to
the same situation. Actually, the individual continuously modifies his relationship
with his environment as he acts on it; environmental feedbacks then lead to reap-
praisal of the situation and to new emotions. Finally, “emotions are always in flux”
(Lazarus, 1991, p. 134).
Appraisals (and reappraisals) are constituted of two complementary types of
appraisal. Primary appraisal assesses the relevance of the encounter to the indi-
vidual’s well-being. It has three components: goal relevance, goal congruence, and
type of ego-involvement.
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• Goal relevance is the importance of the situation for the individual: does the
situation involve issues about which I care? If the situation is not relevant to
any goal, then it can trigger no emotion.
• Goal congruence: if the situation is congruent with one of the individual’s
goals, viz. if it facilitates achievement, then a positive emotion will be trig-
gered; if it is incongruent with some goal, viz. if it threatens or impedes its
achievement, then a negative emotion will be triggered.
• Type of ego-involvement3 gathers several features of ego-identity and per-
sonal commitments, sorted in six categories: self- and social esteem, moral
values, ego-ideals, meanings and ideas, well-being of other persons, and life
goals. Actually, it represents in which way the agent is personally involved
in the current situation.
Secondary appraisal assesses the individual’s coping options, viz. the actions he
may perform and their envisaged effects on the situation. It has three components:
blame or credit, coping potential, and future expectations.
• Blame or credit are an attribution of responsibility to a person accountable
for the situation at hand. If this person had control on what happened, then
she can receive blame or credit. Did someone deliberately provoke this situ-
ation?
• Coping potential is an evaluation of how the individual can manage the sit-
uation, change it or change his goals, in order to restore a good relationship
with his environment. Can I do something to restore the balance between
me and my environment?
• Future expectations represent the expected modifications of the situation if
the agent does not intervene: will the situation turn out right if I do nothing?
Lazarus’ appraisal components match those of other researchers (Frijda, 1986;
Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984; Smith and Ellsworth, 1985). However, contrarily
to others like Scherer, he assumes that their evaluation is not sequential. Primary
and secondary appraisal are complementary to determine the significance of the en-
counter for the individual, but they can be performed in any order (Lazarus, 1991,
p. 151).
3This seems to be the most abstract and complex concept in Lazarus’ theory of appraisal. In our
view, this is why this theory is so hard to formalize.
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1.3.2.2 Emotional appraisal patterns
Lazarus describes nine negative and six positive emotions, and gives their appraisal
pattern viz. the corresponding values of their appraisal components. He also gives
their definitions, that he calls “core relational themes” (Lazarus, 1991, table 3.4
p.122). Below we quote this definition and give the corresponding appraisal pattern
(Lazarus, 1991, Chap. 6 and 7). However we do not repeat for each emotion that
the situation is goal relevant.
The negative emotions all arise when the situation is goal incongruent.
• Anger is “a demeaning offense against me and mine”. The agent’s self-
identity is damaged or threatened by an agent that receives blame. If a viable
attack is possible, with positive future expectancies of the environmental
response, then anger is facilitated.
• Fright is a “concrete and sudden danger of imminent physical harm”, ego-
involvement is not relevant; anxiety is an “uncertain, existential threat”, the
agent is involved to protect his ego-identity or personal meanings; these two
emotions are close but differ in the kind of threat.
• Guilt is “having transgressed a moral imperative”, a self disgrace, and the
individual is involved to manage this moral transgression; shame is “a fail-
ure to live up to an ego-ideal”, a social disgrace, and the agent is involved
to manage this failure. Guilt and shame thus differ on their type of ego-
involvement. Favorable coping potential and future expectations reduce guilt
or shame.
• Sadness is due to an “irrevocable loss”; the individual suffers a loss in any
kind of ego-involvement, there is no one to blame, and his coping potential
is unfavorable. If his future expectations are positive then sadness is blended
with hope, else it leads to despair.
• Envy is “wanting what someone else has”, another individual possesses
something lacking to any type of ego-involvement, his responsibility is not
relevant to determine envy; favorable coping potential and future expecta-
tions increase envy. Jealousy is “resenting a third party for loss or threat
to another’s affection [or favor]”: the individual’s ego-involvement is threat-
ened by a lack of affection, and someone else receives blame for taking this
affection in a contestable way; favorable coping potential and negative future
expectations increase jealousy.
• Disgust is “taking in or being too close to an indigestible object or idea
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(metaphorically speaking)”. Any type of ego-involvement is threatened by
this “poisonous idea”.
Positive emotions mainly arise when the situation is goal congruent, but some of
them are problematic4.
• Joy or happiness is a “reasonable progress towards the realization of our
goals”. Future expectations must be favorable to set up a favorable back-
ground for joy.
• Pride is an “enhancement of one’s ego-identity by taking credit for a val-
ued object or achievement, either our own or that of someone or group with
whom we identify”. The type of ego-involvement is an enhancement of es-
teem5. One must receive credit for this enhancement in order to feel pride.
• Love or affection is “desiring or participating in affection, usually but not
necessarily reciprocated”. The type of ego-involvement is a desire for mutual
appreciation.
• Relief arises when “a distressing goal incongruent condition has changed
for the better or gone away”. This emotion arises when a goal-incongruent
situation changes towards a goal-congruent one.
• Hope is “fearing the worst but yearning for better”. According to Lazarus it
is a problematic emotion since it is felt as positive but arises when the situa-
tion is goal-incongruent. Moreover the future expectations must be negative
but uncertain.
• Compassion is “being moved by another’s suffering and wanting to help”. It
is another problematic emotion, felt as positive but arising in a situation that
is incongruent with someone else’s goals. There must be no one to blame.
1.3.2.3 Coping
Lazarus considers that a second process is intimately linked to appraisal: cop-
ing. Lazarus and Folkman (1984) quote two origins of the concept of coping: the
darwinian theory of stress and control in animals, defining coping as acts control-
ling aversive situations to lower psychological and physiological perturbations; and
psychoanalytic ego psychology, defining coping as realistic and flexible thoughts
4Lazarus call them problematic since they are subjectively felt as being positive, but arise in a
goal-incongruent situation.
5Please remind that the type of ego-involvement in anger was a damage of self-esteem. Thus
Lazarus opposes pride with anger.
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and acts that solve problems and reduce stress. But for Lazarus, what is important
in coping is not the result but the efforts, that differentiate coping from automatic
adaptive processes like action tendencies or reflexes. He thus gives a new definition
of coping:
“constantly changing cognitive and behavioral efforts to manage spe-
cific external and/or internal demands that are appraised as taxing or
exceeding the resources of the person” (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984)
Coping thus has to do with the mastering or minimization of stressful situations.
Lazarus then distinguishes two kinds of coping: problem-focused coping is ori-
ented toward the management of the problem creating the stress, and is more prob-
able when appraisal indicates a possible solution to this problem; emotion-focused
coping is oriented toward the regulation of the emotional response to the situation,
and is more probable when appraisal indicates no solution to the problem.
Lazarus uses a questionnaire called Ways of Coping that he designed with col-
leagues (Folkman et al., 1986) to determine the coping strategies used by people in
stressful situations. He identifies eight strategies.
• Confrontive Coping consists in making aggressive efforts and possibly tak-
ing risks in order to modify the stressing situation.
• Distancing consists in making cognitive efforts to minimize the importance
of the situation and detach from it.
• Self-Controlling consists in trying to regulate one’s emotions and actions.
• Seeking Social Support consists in asking for information, material help or
emotional support.
• Accepting Responsibility consists in admitting one’s responsibility in the
situation and trying to repair it.
• Escape-Avoidance consists in trying to escape or avoid the problem, through
wishful thinking or behavioural efforts.
• Planful Problem Solving consists in focusing on the problem and deliber-
ating to try to solve it.
• Positive Reappraisal consists in trying to find a positive aspect in the situa-
tion by focusing on personal growth or religion.
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Notice that all these strategies involve conscious efforts from the individual. Emo-
tions are also associated with action tendencies that are innate dispositions, un-
conscious reflexes involving no effort. On the contrary coping strategies are more
complex and deliberate and can inhibit or redirect the action tendency to match the
individual’s plans.
1.3.2.4 Conclusion
Lazarus’ theory is quite complex, particularly from a computer science point of
view. In particular the appraisal patterns are quite subjective: emotions correspond
with qualitative abstract values of the appraisal components (for example ego in-
volvement). Moreover some appraisal patterns match no emotion while several
different appraisal patterns can match the same emotion. Some emotions are also
very close and their appraisal patterns only differ on minor points.
Because this theory is so abstract and complex, it is difficult to formalize it in
order to implement it. Actually, as far as we know, this theory was only imple-
mented by Gratch and Marsella (2004a) in their EMA agent.
The next section describes another cognitive appraisal theory that is far less
complex than Lazarus’ one.
1.3.3 Ortony, Clore and Collins’ typology of emotions
Ortony, Clore and Collins wanted to develop a cognitive theory of the origin of
emotions, and not of their behavioural or physiological consequences. Their aim
was to identify classes of emotions gathering several emotion words actually ac-
counting for the same emotion with different intensities or consequences.
Their theory is a cognitive appraisal theory, since the origin of emotions is
believed to be the appraisal of an antecedent situation w.r.t. some appraisal vari-
ables. Emotions are valenced reactions to three types of stimuli: events, agents,
and objects. The theory is structured in three branches each one differentiated in
several groups of emotions, depending on the involved appraisal variables. This
structure is summarized in Figure 1.7. The first branch gathers emotions result-
ing from the appraisal of the desirability of an event w.r.t. the agent’s goals. The
second branch gathers emotions resulting from the appraisal of the praiseworthi-
ness of another agent’s action w.r.t. the agent’s standards. The third branch gathers
emotions resulting from the appraisal of the appealingness of an object w.r.t. the
agent’s likings. There also exist composed emotions resulting from the conjoint
appraisal of several criteria.
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Figure 1.7: The three branches of the OCC typology, corresponding with the three
types of stimuli that can trigger an emotion
1.3.3.1 Appraisal variables
Desirability, praiseworthiness, and appealingness are central appraisal variables,
that intervene in the determination of the type of emotional reaction to the situation.
An event is desirable (resp. undesirable) if it facilitates (resp. interferes with)
the agent’s main goal, or a subgoal supporting it; goals represent what the agent
wants to be. An action is praiseworthy (resp. blameworthy) if it upholds (resp.
violates) some of the agent’s standards; standards represent what the agent thinks
to be normal, viz. legal, moral... An object is appealing (resp. unappealing) if it
matches (resp. does not match) the agent’s likings. These central variables also
affect the intensity of the emotions in the corresponding branch: they are local
intensity variables. Other local intensity variables are specific to each emotional
group, so they will be detailed in the next sections.
Some global intensity variables also affect the intensity of all emotions: sense
of reality measures how much the emotion-inducing situation is real; proximity
measures how much the individual feels psychologically close to the emotion-
inducing situation; unexpectedness measures how much the individual is surprised
by the situation; arousal measures how much the individual was excited before the
stimulus.
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1.3.3.2 Reactions to events
The emotion types in this branch all have an eliciting condition and an intensity
depending on the desirability of an event w.r.t. the individual’s goals. They are
divided into four groups of emotions:
• Well-being emotions (joy, distress) correspond to the appraisal of the desir-
ability for self of an event that has occurred.
• Prospect-based emotions (hope, fear) correspond to the appraisal of the de-
sirability for self of an event that could occur.
• Confirmation emotions (satisfaction, fears-confirmed, disappointment, re-
lief) correspond to the appraisal of the desirability for self of an event that
was expected before it occurred (these emotions thus arise after a corre-
sponding prospect-based emotion).
• Fortunes-of-others emotions (happy-for, sorry-for, gloating, resentment) cor-
respond to the appraisal of the presumed desirability for another agent of an
event.
The intensity of prospect-based and confirmation emotions is also affected by: like-
lihood which is the degree of belief that the prospected event will happen; effort
which is the degree of utilization of resources to make the prospected event happen
or to prevent it from happening; and realization which is the degree to which the
prospected event actually happens.
The intensity of fortune-of-others emotions is also affected by: desirability for
other measuring how much the appraised event is presumed to be desirable for
the other agent; liking indicating if the individual appraising the situation has a
positive or negative attitude toward the other individual; deservingness measuring
how much the individual appraising the situation believes that the other individual
deserved what happened to him.
1.3.3.3 Reactions to agents’ actions
The emotion types in this branch all have an eliciting condition and an intensity
depending on the praiseworthiness of an action w.r.t. the agent’s standards. They
are structured in one group of emotions. Attribution emotions (pride, shame, admi-
ration, reproach) correspond to the appraisal of the praiseworthiness of an agent’s
action (who is either the agent himself or another one).
The intensity of attribution emotions is also affected by other parameters: strength
of cognitive unit measures how much the individual identifies with the individual
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or institution that is the author of the action inducing the emotion; expectation-
deviation measures how much the individual’s action deviates from what is usually
expected from him, depending on the norms, his social role, his personality...
1.3.3.4 Reactions to objects
The emotion types in this branch all have an eliciting condition and an intensity
depending on the appealingness of the aspects of an object w.r.t. the agent’s likings.
They are structured in one group of emotions. Attraction emotions (love, hate)
correspond to the appraisal of the appealingness of the aspects of an object.
The intensity of attraction emotions is also affected by familiarity, measuring
how much the object is familiar to the individual.
1.3.3.5 Composed emotions
Moreover, there is a group of composed emotions corresponding to the simultane-
ous appraisal of the situation w.r.t. several central variables: desirability and praise-
worthiness. Well-being and attribution composed emotions (gratification, remorse,
anger, gratitude) correspond to the appraisal of the consequences of an action and
of the praiseworthiness of its author.
1.3.3.6 Conclusion
This theory is finely structured and the values of appraisal variables are simpler
than in Lazarus’ theory, making it easier to formalize. This may result from the au-
thors’ intention of proposing a computationally tractable theory for AI applications.
This goal was quite reached since this typology has already been implemented in a
huge number of agents (we give some examples in the next chapter), what shows
that it is also well adapted to their designers’ goals. For all these reasons it is this
theory that we choose to formalize in this work.
1.4 Conclusion
The study of emotions is an active field of research in philosophy, biology, psychol-
ogy and sociology. This shows that emotions are a complex phenomenon involving
various aspects: physiological modifications, innate reflexes, subjective feelings,
cognitive evaluation, impact on social interactions... In spite of many debates be-
tween these various views, there seems to be a consensus on the role of cognition
in the triggering of emotions and on their adaptive function. We also show that
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cognitive appraisal theories, assuming that emotions are triggered by the evalua-
tion of stimuli w.r.t. various criteria, have many assets and are more adapted to be
formalized.
This chapter was intended to answer the question of what is an emotion? Our
historical review shows that there are several opposite views. Actually, various
theories often focus on various aspects of emotions and answer different questions
about them. So finally the existing theories are both contradictory on their answers
to questions and complementary because they do not answer the same questions.
The question in which we are more interested here is the cognitive triggering of
emotions. Cognitive appraisal theories all answer this question in a rather close
way, but we need to choose one of them to set up the basis of our model. Indeed
to endow an agent with believable emotions it is important to build on psycho-
logical definitions that have already been experimented for a long time. Actually,
few of the theories reviewed in this chapter are both computationally tractable and
explicative enough of the triggering of emotions. Finally we choose to formalize
the OCC typology, for various reasons. First, the authors claim that their theory is
intended for Artificial Intelligence applications. As a consequence of this choice,
their theory is very structured and uses a limited number of quite comprehensi-
ble concepts, what makes it easier to understand even for a computer scientist.
On the contrary Lazarus uses some highly abstract criteria like ego-involvement,
which appeared hard to formalize. Second it is already well structured in several
categories of emotions with similar eliciting conditions, what simplifies our work.
Moreover the OCC typology seems to cover quite exhaustively the range of situ-
ations that an artificial agent can face. Of course at this point, and in spite of all
our efforts of comparison, we cannot say that one theory is better than the other
ones. Nevertheless the fact that most of existing emotional agents ground on this
OCC typology gives it a kind of legitimacy: it seems to be adapted to the aim
of most of emotional agents designers, what tends to prove its validity as a ba-
sis for our model. To further convince the reader of our choice, we will discuss
this choice again in more details later: when formalizing emotions (in Chapter 4)
we will compare Ortony et al.’s sayings with those of Lazarus on each formalized
emotion. Moreover our formalization will allow us to assess the OCC typology of
emotions (cf. Chapter 7).
Once this choice is made (even if it is still debatable for now), we can address
the second question: why endow virtual agents with emotions? Actually we
saw that several psychologists are already convinced of the crucial role emotions
will play in intelligent systems, and propose computationally tractable models of
emotions: Oatley and Johnson-Laird (cf. Section 1.2.1.1), and Ortony, Clore and
Collins (cf. Sections 1.2.3.2 and 1.3.3). The role of emotions in human intelligence
is also supported by recent findings made possible by advances in neuroscience and
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medical imagery (Damasio, 1994). Yet meanwhile computer scientists still exclude
emotions from the design of rational intelligent agents. Agent designers have long
been incredulous that emotions, even if crucial for humans, are also needed for
their agents: virtual agents may not need to function as we do. But computer
science recently began, with success, to endow agents with emotions, mainly by
implementing (part of) the OCC typology.
It is important to understand that our aim is not to design another emotional
agent implementing the OCC typology. This thesis rather proposes to design a
formal model of emotions, intended to serve as a generic reusable basis for fu-
ture implementations in various agents for various applications. The next chapter,
providing a review of existing work about emotions in computer science, is thus
intended to convince the reader of the crucial role that emotions play in this field,
and then of the usefulness of our model.
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Chapter 2
Emotions in computer science
The question is not whether intelligent machines
can have emotions, but whether machines can
be intelligent without any emotions.
(Minsky, 1988)
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we get interested in the use of the psychological theories of emotions
in a field that may seem completely opposite: computer science. After having
neglected emotions for decades, computer science starts getting interested in their
potential for artificial agents in the 90s. It is important to notice that what is called
emotions for an agent does not match exactly human emotions. As Picard (1997)
says, they are rather labels characterizing a particular mental state.
The computer’s emotions are labels for states that may not exactly
match the analogous human feelings, but that initiate behaviour we
would expect someone in that state to display.
(Picard, 1997, p. 298)
In the Section 2.2 we discuss some early work from various fields of research
aiming at integrating emotions into virtual agents or at proving their usefulness for
such agents. Then we describe some emotional architectures (Section 2.3) and var-
ious application fields where they are used increasingly often: pedagogical agents
(Section 2.4) and conversational agents (Section 2.5). We then notice that all these
applications directly implement emotions into their agents. These emotional mod-
els may thus be ad hoc, specific to their application, not generic and not reusable.
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Therefore a new line of research emerges, aiming at designing generic formal mod-
els of emotions. In Section 2.6 we discuss why BDI logics can be used to design
such models, and describe some attempts in this sense.
2.2 Why use emotions in computer science?
The previous chapter showed that psychology have now acknowledged the role
of emotions in the functioning of human mind. Several theories recognize their
adaptive function (cf. Chapter 1). Moreover some psychologists are even interested
in providing computationally tractable models in order to allow AI researchers to
integrate emotions into their intelligent systems. Oatley and Johnson-Laird, as
well as Ortony, Clore and Collins, were early interested in the role of emotions in
computer science systems, and their theories are intended for AI applications.
But meanwhile computer scientists, even if they start looking at emotions, are
only interested in making their agents more believable. They do not care yet about
the functions of emotions and their influence on behaviour and social interaction.
This notion of “believability” was first introduced by Bates (Section 2.2.1). Then
several other fields of research, like neurology, also support the role of emotions
in intelligence and design models of their impact on reasoning (Section 2.2.2).
Some computer scientists then start getting aware of the importance of emotions
not only for their agent’s believability but also for their impact on interactions with
the user: this is the beginning of Affective Computing (Section 2.2.3). Emotional
agents become fashionable and various works appear. We then summarize Gratch
and Marsella’s attempt to clarify emotional psychology for agents designers (Sec-
tion 2.2.4).
2.2.1 The role of emotions for believable agents
Bates’ 1994 central assumption is that AI researchers wanting to create lifelike
characters should find insight in artistic work about “believable characters”, in par-
ticular in the field of animation. By analogy with it, he introduces the term of
“believable agents” that he defines in the following way:
“It does not mean an honest or reliable character, but one that pro-
vides the illusion of life, and thus permits the audience’s suspension
of disbelief” (Bates, 1994, p. 1)
He notices that AI researchers try to create the illusion of life by endowing agents
with human abilities that they consider essential in intelligence (like reasoning,
problem solving, learning...), but then rather create artificial scientists than artifi-
cial humans. On the contrary, cartoon animators have to abstract the very essence
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of human life in order to give life to simplistic unrealistic drawings. In particu-
lar, animators highlight that one crucial quality of believable characters is to have
“appropriately timed and clearly expressed emotion”. Thus when representing the
emotions of a character they obey three important rules. First the character’s emo-
tional state must always be clearly defined in order to be clearly identifiable. Sec-
ond, this emotional state must be reflected by the character’s actions and reasoning.
Third, animators must use various techniques to help the spectator decode the ex-
pressed emotion, like stylizing or exaggerating it. Bates builds on these rules to
create believable agents. In the Oz project, Bates (1992) designs a virtual world
inhabited by Woggles, animated emotional creatures.
First, the Woggles’ emotional model is built on the OCC typology, which guar-
antees that these creatures always have a well-defined emotional state. Second,
each emotion is mapped with a “behavioural feature” that influences the subse-
quent behaviour. Bates’ Woggles then meet the first two requirements of believable
characters. Nevertheless Bates does not use any technique to make their emotional
state easily decodable. These techniques, like exaggerating the agent’s emotions,
are unrealistic but crucial for spectators to understand the scene. Finally, artists and
AI researchers have the same goal, so Bates conclude that AI should find insight in
cartoon animators’ work.
Other researchers show this central role of emotions and personality in believ-
able agents (Rousseau and Hayes-Roth, 1998). Then several research findings help
showing that emotions do not only improve believability but also impact cognition.
2.2.2 Some proofs of the emotional impact on cognition
The neuroscientist Damasio (1994) conduced well-known experiments showing
that a patient with brain damages preventing him from feeling emotions was also
subsequently unable to make decisions or to interact socially. He then formulates
the “Somatic Marker Hypothesis” saying that emotions guide and improve human
decision-making.
Psychologists also propose models of the impact of emotions on cognitions.
Forgas (1995) proposes the Affect Infusion Model, a framework allowing to ex-
plain how affectively loaded information can modify reasoning. This influence
intervenes in two aspects: not only the informational content of cognitions is modi-
fied, but also the reasoning processes applied to these cognitions. Indeed the author
supposes that individuals dispose of a set of possible reasoning strategies among
which they choose depending on the context in order to minimize their efforts. In
his model, Forgas proposes four strategies of information processing: direct pro-
cessing retrieves a reaction already triggered in the past; motivated processing is
a selective research, directed by a motivation towards a precise target; heuristic
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processing uses a limited set of information and associations to produce a low-cost
answer when the two first strategies do not work; substantial processing is only
used for complex new tasks.
Actually, numerous research findings attest the impact of emotions on all abil-
ities characteristic of human intelligence (planning, memory, learning...). This is
not the object of this thesis to exhaustively expose all these works here (see (Gratch
and Marsella, 2005) for a review).
2.2.3 The birth of Affective Computing
As a result of the growing number of proofs of the impact of emotions on interac-
tion, Picard (1997) assumes that some computer systems may need to be able to
recognize the user’s emotions. Nevertheless she concedes that it is a difficult task
for a machine since even we who are better informed than anyone about our own
emotional state are not always able to recognize or label it.
Picard, Vyzas, and Healey (2001) then developed a technique to measure a
user’s emotion. Their system is set up of sensors measuring several physiological
indicators of the autonomic nervous system changes. They used it to measure the
emotional state of a person over a long period of time. Their results contradict
Schacter and Singer’s assumption (cf. Section 1.2.3.1 page 41) that physiological
signals are mainly undifferentiated. Indeed Picard and colleagues were able to
accurately differentiate eight emotions from their physiological signals. But they
suffer from one important limitation: they force the choice between a limited set
of eight emotions; only inside this set can the machine accurately determine which
emotions is expressed.
Picard (1999) is more particularly interested in Affective Computing for the
design of intelligent human-computer interfaces. She believes that Affective Com-
puting improves interfaces by allowing affective communication with the user, and
providing ways to exploit the received affective information. Mainly, interfaces
can reduce the user’s frustration by helping him express his emotions and then
recognizing his emotional expressions. Picard highlights that it is important to let
the user choose if he wants to express his emotion or not: the user wants to keep
control over his expression.
Finally, emotions have been too long neglected in computer systems and re-
searchers must now take them into account. Nevertheless they must use emotion in
an intelligent and balanced way: not all computers need emotions. Moreover we
can notice that Picard’s method to measure the user’s emotion is quite intrusive:
it reveals that the perception of the user’s emotions really improve the system, but
this perception should then be done through other means. We will envisage later a
solution using the model designed in this thesis (cf. Section 6.2).
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2.2.4 Useful emotional abilities for virtual agents
Gratch and Marsella (2005) agree on the crucial role emotions play in human intel-
ligence and on the need to integrate them into virtual agents. However they notice
that computer scientists are mainly interested in making their agents more believ-
able by endowing them with emotional expressions. They thus want to highlight
that emotions are not only a means to make agents more believable and convincing
(for example in human-computer interfaces). Indeed they expose several effects
of emotions on cognition and interaction, that must be known by agent designers
since they can impact their application in a positive but also in a negative way.
The authors identify two main views on the functions of emotions: the intra-
agent view interested in their influence on cognitive processes; and the inter-agents
view studying their impact on social interaction. They then discuss some generally
accepted cognitive functions of emotions. Emotions favor perception and catego-
rization of relevant stimuli; they suggest adapted reactions to the environment; they
trigger the use of adaptive coping strategies, unfairly considered to be irrational;
they facilitate learning and recall1.
They also expose some of the generally accepted social functions of emotion.
First, emotions (sincere or conventional) can be interpreted to deduce informa-
tion about the agent’s mental state; they communicate these mental states more
efficiently than speech. Second emotions can be used to manipulate the hearer’s
emotions, motivations and behaviour. Third, emotional display makes people more
believable and calls for trust and empathy.
Finally agent designers must formalize these functions in order to faithfully
simulate social interaction. The authors distinguish between two implementa-
tion approaches. Communication-driven approaches select an emotional expres-
sion because of its communicative or manipulating effect, while simulation-based
approaches try to simulate the emotional process and to give true emotions to
the agent. There exist some mixed approaches: for example for Prendinger and
Ishizuka (2001), appraisal triggers emotions among which a communicative filter
then selects the one that will be expressed to match the dialogue goal.
Finally Gratch and Marsella discuss the problem of the expression of emotion.
Should an expressive agent rather express a realistic emotion, through a multi-
modal behaviour faithful to how humans express their emotions? Or should he
on the contrary display stylized and thus unrealistic emotions in order to make it
easy for the user to recognize them? We said before that Bates consider the second
solution to be better, since humans are not very good at understanding emotions.
1Bower (1991) shows that memorized information is affectively loaded depending on the current
mental state; then it is easier to retrieve information that is loaded with the same emotion than the
current one. This makes it easier to retrieve information that is relevant in the current context.
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The central role of emotion in the design of intelligent virtual agents is thus
well recognized now: emotion makes these agents more believable, and impacts
their cognitive processes and their interaction with the user. Most of computer
scientists are now aware of the usefulness of emotions for their agents in a great
variety of applications. For example Gmytrasiewicz and Lisetti (2002) quote three
main reasons why emotions are essential in the design of rational agents: they
can control the allocation of resources in constrained environments; they can help
agents communicate their mental state to other agents in a universal vocabulary;
and they must be recognized during an interaction with a human user to make it
more efficient and pleasant.
Thus, the next step is to design computational models of emotions, that would
translate the psychological theories exposed in the previous section into a com-
prehensive and computationally tractable form. The next section describes some
emotional architectures.
2.3 Emotional architectures
This section describes some emotional architectures, viz. some computational mod-
els where emotions impact various cognitive functions.
2.3.1 Sloman
Sloman (2001) notices that great debates often arise from the confusion and in-
determinacy in the very definition of complex concepts like emotions. On the
contrary, he believes that architecture-based definitions of concepts are precise and
allow to clearly answer questions.
Sloman thus developed the CogAff architecture of mind, a three by three grid
obtained by combining two distinctions: the first one between perception, central
processing and action, is introduced by Nilsson (2001) in his triple tower model;
the second one is introduced by Sloman himself, between reactive, deliberative and
meta-management processing levels, that appeared at different steps of evolution
and provide more and more abstract and flexible processing mechanisms.
At the reactive level there are no representation, evaluation or comparison
mechanisms between possible actions and their future consequences. The per-
ception of stimuli leads to one or several competing reactions among which one
is selected without any deliberation or inferences. Reactive organisms have proto-
emotions (primitive versions of evolved emotions), proto-desires (needs), and a
proto-mood modulating their behaviour, but they can be unable to represent or de-
tect these states.
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The deliberative level provides various deliberative abilities depending on the
sophistication of the architecture: the possibility to represent, analyse, compare,
evaluate and react to abstract descriptions, hypotheses or explanations. Delib-
erative processes interact with emotional processes, since the evaluation of ab-
stract representations (plans, hypotheses, prospected future events...) can lead to
new kinds of emotions that cannot exist in purely reactive systems. Due to these
new representational abilities, emotions at the deliberative level also have a richer
and more varied propositional content. Deliberative organisms modulate their be-
haviour depending on the context. When an organism has deliberative processes,
he needs different types of interruption mechanisms to suspend them. Then he
also needs to limit these interruptions, what is made possible by the addition of a
filtering mechanism with a variable threshold. The new processes managing the
attention threshold are called meta-management processes. They account for a
human’s ability to be more or less focused on what he does.
The meta-management level offers reflective meta-management processes that
are crucial in a human architecture. These processes allow self-observation and
self-monitoring of internal states, as well as their categorisation and evaluation,
and high level mechanisms to learn and control reasoning. These new possibilities
enrich the existing concepts. The third level controls processing, but it can be
interrupted by the other levels of processing that can override its decisions.
Finally, Sloman believes that the architecture of an organism impacts the emo-
tions that this organism may feel. He intends his architecture to be generic enough
to describe not only emotions but also other intelligent processes like learning or
even awareness.
2.3.2 Elliott
Elliott (1992) exposes in his PhD thesis in philosophy the functioning of the Affec-
tive Reasoner, a collection of LISP programs simulating the emotional behaviour
of humans in an agent.
His emotion eliciting condition theory is based on Ortony and colleagues’ ty-
pology. The agent has several databases: one containing his own goals, standards
and preferences, and another one containing the concerns of other agents that he
learned (and that thus are incomplete and possibly erroneous). The agent also has
relationships with other agents, and can reason about their emotions.
An eliciting situation is appraised by a process determining the correspond-
ing emotion eliciting conditions, that are then matched with an emotion template
thanks to a database of domain-independent rules. Several emotions, even contra-
dictory ones, can arise at the same time. Their intensity depends on some variables
among a set of twenty-two possible ones (e.g. importance, surprisingness, tempo-
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ral proximity). The agent’s personality influences his appraisal of the situation, but
also his expression of emotions. The agent disposes of a database containing sev-
eral types of actions (e.g. somatic, behavioural, communicative, evaluative). Some
actions are elicited among the candidate actions depending on the agent’s personal-
ity and emotions, and some rules allow to resolve possible conflicts between them.
Finally the Affective Reasoner is a functional emotional program, including
interesting functionalities like domain-independent appraisal, action generation, or
personality management.
2.3.3 Reilly
Reilly (1996) aims at designing believable emotional agents for social interaction.
Like Bates he considers the artistic aspect of this problem. He wants to create
emotionally rich agents, who can feel emotions in a great variety of situations
and who can express them in a great variety of ways. He thus designs Em, an
architecture intended to help artists to design their own personalized believable
emotional agents. He stresses that his aim is not to design cognitively plausible
agents, even if he builds on psychologist theories. On the contrary, his framework
allows to design unrealistic agents, so far as they are interesting from an artistic
point of view. He thus subscribes to what Gratch and Marsella call “simulation-
based approaches”.
Em emotional process works as follows. First emotion generators associate the
inputs with emotion structures. An emotion structure consists in a type of emo-
tion, an intensity, an optional direction (the agent towards whom the emotion is
directed), and an optional cause. Second, emotion storage functions sort the gener-
ated emotion structures into an emotion types hierarchy depending on their effects.
Third an emotion combination function computes an intensity for each emotion
type in the hierarchy, depending on the intensities of the emotion structures stored
in this emotion type. This intensity decays over time following a decay rate speci-
fied by the user. Finally, emotions do not affect directly the agent’s behaviour. They
are mapped with behavioural features in Bates’ sense. Then these behavioural fea-
tures affect the agent’s behaviour.
The artist is supposed to fill in all the user-specified elements of this architec-
ture in order to design his own believable emotional agent. Since this task may be
difficult to achieve from scratch because of the great freedom and flexibility of the
system, Reilly also provides a default emotional system, viz. a default filling of his
Em architecture. In this default setting the emotion generators are built on the OCC
typology. Reilly thus considers his thesis as a manual to teach the artists how to
design believable emotional agents with his Em architecture.
This architecture is integrated in an agent, and emotions interplay with several
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features of the agent’s behaviour, such as perception and motivation. All together
this system is very complete.
2.3.4 Velàsquez
Velàasquez and colleagues (1997, 1997) designed the Cathexis architecture by
grounding on notions from several fields of research including psychology and
neurobiology. This architecture is set up of an emotion generation system and a
behavioral system.
The emotion generation system is a network of components called proto-specialists,
each one representing an emotion among six basic ones: anger, fear, distress/sadness,
enjoyment/happiness, disgust and surprise. Actually each basic emotion is a family
of related affective states sharing some characteristics like their antecedent events,
expression, likely behavioral response and resulting physiological activity. Other
emotions are either a variation inside a basic family or a blend or mixed emotion,
viz. the simultaneous feeling of several basic emotions. Each proto-specialists has
several kinds of sensors to monitor internal and external stimuli and detect the
elicitation conditions of this emotion. Velàsquez grounds on Roseman’s (1984) ap-
praisal theory to describe the cognitive elicitors (e.g. appraisals, attributions, mem-
ory...), and he also envisages non-cognitive elicitors ranked according to Izard’s
(1993) view: neural, sensorimotor (e.g. the facial expression) and motivational
(e.g. drives, other emotions, pain regulation). The input from these sensors either
increases or decreases the intensity of the emotion. Each proto-specialist manages
two thresholds of arousal: an activation threshold over which the emotion becomes
active, and a saturation threshold being the maximal value of arousal for this emo-
tion. The values of these thresholds set up the temperament of the agent. Finally
each proto-specialist has a decay function controlling the duration of the emotion.
Proto-specialists also manage moods, that differ from emotions by a lower activa-
tion and thus a higher duration. All proto-specialists continuously and parallely
update their intensity, depending on several parameters: previous intensity, values
of elicitors, and interactions (inhibitive or excitative) with other proto-specialists
that are simultaneously active.
The behavioral system selects an adapted behavior depending on the current
emotional state. It is set up of a network of behaviors competing for controlling the
agent. The value of each behavior is computed as the sum of the values of several
factors called its releasers, and the higher-valued behavior become active. Each
behavior has two components: an expressive one determining the agent’s facial
expression, body posture and vocal expression; and an experiential one influencing
the agent’s motivations and action readiness.
The Cathexis architecture was completely implemented in a framework for the
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design of emotional agents, that was then used to design Simòn, a toddler agent
with which the user can interact at various levels in order to assess the underlying
architecture. Finally, this is a complete and original architecture that takes into
account not only the cognitive aspect of emotions but also their physiological and
biological aspects.
2.3.5 Gratch and Marsella
Gratch and Marsella developed the EMA agent, endowed with a domain-
independent model of emotions built on Lazarus’ relational theory of emotions2.
EMA’s current mental state is represented with a complex mental structure, called
Causal Interpretation, designed by the authors to unify in one single architecture
/ structure all the needs of an emotional agent. Indeed, they believe that none of
the existing formalisms is rich enough to express the variety and complexity of
emotions. They thus decided to pick parts from these different formalisms, and
enriched a classical planning representation with concepts from decision theory,
like probability and utility. The Causal Interpretation is set up of three causally
linked parts: the causal history (the past), the current world (the present) and the
task network (the future).
The appraisal process analyses the configuration of the Causal Interpretation
w.r.t. several appraisal variables to trigger one or several emotions. The most in-
tense emotion thus generated provides a coping opportunity, viz. it can induce a
coping process, that is an attempt by the agent to adapt to his emotions and his
environment. EMA disposes of several coping strategies adapted from the COPE
model (Carver, Scheier, and Weintraub, 1989): planning, positive reinterpretation,
acceptance, denial, mental disengagement, shift blame. The different strategies are
assessed w.r.t. their coping potential, and the agent chooses and applies his pre-
ferred one. Its effect on the Causal Interpretation is mainly expressed in terms
of intention dropping or modification of utility or probability values. The authors
regret to have a too direct link between appraisal and coping, while psychology
underlines the complexity of this link.
This agent finds applications in the Mission Rehearsal Exercise, a virtual world
to teach decision-making in high-stress situations to militaries. Other work exists
about emotional agents integrated into virtual worlds to favor the user’s immersion.
For example El Jed et al. (2004) design emotional agents that interact with the
user’s avatar in a virtual world for safely training firemen to decision-making in
dangerous situations.
2EMA stands for “Emotion and Adaptation” in homage to Lazarus’ book (1991).
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2.3.6 Conclusion
The Affective Reasoner and the Em architecture are built on the OCC typology.
Similarly, most of emotional agents described in the next sections also ground
on this typology. But there also exists models based on other theories: on Rose-
man’s theory (Velàsquez’ Cathexis architecture discussed above), on Frijda’s the-
ory (Staller and Petta, 2001), on Lazarus’ theory (Gratch and Marsella’s EMA
agent discussed above), on Oatley and Johnson-Laird’s communicative theory (cf.
(Meyer, 2006), that will be discussed in Section 2.6.2), or on Scherer’s theory
(Paiva et al., 2004).
Believable agents endowed with a computational model of emotions (we will
call them “emotional agents”) then find many applications in various domains: they
help motivate students in pedagogical environments, they participate in a better
immersion of the user in virtual worlds, for training or entertainment, ... In the
next sections we describe some agents from some domains of applications. We
will show that each domain has its own characteristics, but the emotion always
plays a central role. We do not intend to be exhaustive but just to illustrate the
usefulness of emotions for virtual agents.
2.4 Pedagogical agents
A great amount of work shows the positive impact of animated pedagogical agents
on learning and motivation (Lester et al., 1997). Bates (1994) shows that emo-
tions play an important role in these agents’ believability. So researchers now try
to endow their pedagogical agents with emotional intelligence. Section 2.4.1 illus-
trates how emotional expressiveness makes Vincent more motivating for students.
Besides Elliott, Rickel, and Lester (1999) identify two complementary emotional
reasoning abilities that are useful for such agents: expressing emotions, and under-
standing those of the student. Section 2.4.2 illustrate the integration of emotional
expressiveness into Steve. Section 2.4.3 illustrates the integration of emotional
responsiveness in Herman the Bug. Finally Section 2.4.4 briefly describes the Me-
diating Agent, using a BDI formalisation of the student to infer his emotion and
choose the adapted pedagogical strategy depending on it.
This state of the art is not intended to be exhaustive but to illustrate the claim
that emotional abilities make pedagogical agents better teachers, and more gener-
ally that emotions make virtual agents more intelligent.
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2.4.1 Vincent
Vincent (Paiva and Machado, 1998) is a pedagogical agent composed of two main
modules: the Mind Module manages his cognitive behaviour and the Body Module
manages his physical behaviour. The Mind Module chooses a pedagogical strategy
depending on the trainee’s behaviour, and the Body Module acts consequently.
Vincent first presented only four emotional reactions: impatience when time out,
sadness on bad performance, friendliness on average performance, and happiness
on high performance. But experiments revealed that after long interactions with
him, trainees get annoyed by his monotonous behaviour and find it inconsistent
because of sudden variations.
Paiva, Machado, and Martinho (1999) thus enrich Vincent with rich emotional
abilities and a complete and stable personality. First they endow Vincent with
a temperament associated with typical interaction sketches. Second they extend
Vincent’s behaviour space with an emotional dimension influencing the way he
performs actions. Third they list all events and actions that may be relevant in the
environment and fix the model of the user. Fourth they define Vincent’s goals, that
impact his actions and appraisals. Finally they define Vincent’s emotional profile
consisting in an emotional resistance (the intensity threshold necessary for the trig-
gering of an emotion), an emotional memory (the duration of his emotions), and
a set of emotional reactions. Vincent only appraises the trainee’s success or fail-
ure to trigger prospect-based emotion of the OCC typology. The intensity of these
emotions depends on a temporal proximity variable. When it increases beyond the
agent’s emotional resistance threshold, the agent actually “feels” the emotion.
Finally, the authors argue for the necessity of emotions in pedagogical agents
who interact with students, and they propose a methodology to integrate emotions
in existing pedagogical agents. Similar work has been conduced by Elliott, Rickel,
and Lester (1999) who share the hypothesis that “affective reasoning will make
pedagogical agents better teachers” (Elliott, Rickel, and Lester, 1999, p2). They
thus try to integrate Elliott’s Affective Reasoner in existing pedagogical agents:
Steve (Rickel and Johnson, 1997) and Herman the Bug (Lester, Stone, and Stelling,
1999). They illustrate two different kinds of emotional reasoning: emotional re-
sponsiveness for Steve, and affective user modeling for Herman. The next sections
describe this work.
2.4.2 Steve
Steve (Rickel and Johnson, 1997) is an animated agent who inhabits a 3D environ-
ment and teaches students to operate a high pressure air compressor. Steve is aware
of the student’s actions and of their effect on the environment. He monitors the stu-
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dent’s behaviour, and can answer his questions, help him, or demonstrate the task.
Elliott, Rickel, and Lester (1999) want to make Steve a better teacher by enrich-
ing him with the emotional abilities offered by Elliott’s Affective Reasoner. Steve
would thus be able to feel emotions w.r.t. past, present or future events, actions,
objects, and towards his student, according to the OCC typology.
Steve’s emotions are a function of his goals and principles, but also of the stu-
dent’s presumed appraisal of the situation and of Steve’s relationship with him.
Such elements intervene in OCC fortunes-of-others emotions that make Steve not
only interested in what the student does but also in what he feels (Steve seems to
care about him). Since Steve’s emotions are triggered by the cognitive appraisal
of stimuli, he is able to explain their cause to the student, which is a great peda-
gogical tool. Moreover, Steve’s current emotional state influences the subsequent
appraisals: for example a negative emotional background facilitates the triggering
of a negative emotion. The intensity of each emotion must be proportioned with
the eliciting situation and is a function of twenty-two intensity variables that can
be internal to one agent (personality) or common to all (domain-dependant).
This work shows that the Affective Reasoner can be integrated in a pedagogical
agent to generate emotional responsiveness and personality. Another functionality
of affective reasoning in such agent is the affective modeling of the user. This is
illustrated by the same authors with the integration of the Affective Reasoner in
Herman the Bug, detailed in the next section.
2.4.3 Herman the Bug
Herman the Bug (Lester, Stone, and Stelling, 1999) in an insect agent inhabiting the
Design-a-Plant environment to teach students about botanical anatomy and physi-
ology. He can realize various entertaining actions, and helps the students to solve
problems while they graphically design customized plants that can only thrive in
precise environmental conditions.
Elliott, Rickel, and Lester (1999) want to illustrate which are the benefits of
affective user modeling abilities in such an agent. They state that the Affective
Reasoner framework offers a reusable model of appraisal. Thus a pedagogical
agent endowed with this model should be able to manage a concerns-of-others
component (cf. Section 2.3.2 page 67) concerning the student, and to use it to
understand his emotions. This model of the user (and thus also the inferences
derived from it) obviously cannot be perfect but the agent disposes of five ways to
update it: he can directly ask the user, use stereotypes about the user’s personality,
use contextual information like the interaction history, use affective stereotypes
derived from statistics on all students, or if everything else fails infer how he would
feel himself in the same situation. Knowing the student’s principle is important to
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notice when he is frustrated and to intervene but it is difficult since they differ
from one student to another. Thanks to his internal representation of the student’s
dispositions, Herman interprets the presumed effect of events on him to infer his
emotion. Various intensity variables intervene: the importance of the event for the
student depending on his personality, the student’s effort depending on the time
he spent solving the problem, the student’s mood inferred from the past successes
or failures in the interaction history, and the student’s arousal depending on his
answering time span.
To conclude, Elliott and colleagues’ work shows that emotional agents improve
learning in several ways: by showing that he cares about his progress, the agent
encourages the student; he shows and shares enthusiasm about the subject at hand;
and his rich and funny personality attracts the student and makes him spend more
time on learning.
2.4.4 Mediating Agent
Affective user modelling was also investigated by other researchers. Jaques et
al. (2004) developed a pedagogical agent, the Mediating Agent, able to infer the
student’s emotions in order to adopt the better pedagogical strategy and enable the
better conditions for learning. The model of the student is represented in X-BDI,
an executable BDI formalism. This agent uses a domain-dependant desirability
notion to trigger seven emotions from the OCC typology, associated with a qual-
itative intensity depending on OCC intensity variables. The agent then uses his
beliefs about the student’s emotion and profile, and the event at hand, to choose
an appropriate affective tactic to help him. A scenario illustrates the assets of such
affective user modelling during a pedagogical interaction.
2.4.5 Conclusion
Finally emotions have a positive impact for pedagogical agents and improve the
students’ learning experience. Emotional agents have a strong effect in motivating
the student. Besides they also have an impact on interaction. Therefore more and
more embodied conversational agents are now endowed with emotions. The next
section describes some of these emotional conversational agents.
2.5 Conversational agents
As early noticed by Picard (1999), affective agents have a positive impact on the
user and can reduce his frustration during interactions with a machine. The chal-
lenge is thus to endow interfaces with two main affective abilities: encouraging the
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user to express emotions, and being able to recognize his expressed emotions in
order to manage them.
The recognizing of the user’s emotions was answered in various ways like rec-
ognizing the user’s facial expression (e.g. with eyeglasses sensing his facial move-
ments, as reported in (Picard, 1997)), vocal variations, or by monitoring various
physiological signals. For example Prendinger and Ishizuka (2001) ground on Pi-
card’s work 1997 to deduce an emotion label from monitoring the user’s physi-
ological signals and gaze direction. But this problem is not in the scope of this
state of the art. In this section we will rather get interested in the second problem:
to make the user express his emotion. One way to achieve this goal is to design
believable agents that can get the user’s sympathy and trust. An important point
when designing believable agents is to give them relevant multi-modal affective
expressions.
Affective expressions in conversational agents can fill several functions: im-
prove their believability, catch the user’s sympathy, convey empathy, convey infor-
mation or communicative intentions... The following sections explore some of the
functions already addressed by agent designers.
2.5.1 Greta: an empathetic agent
In designing embodied conversational agents, it is important to endow them with
believable affective facial expressions. Pelachaud and Bilvi (2003) are interested
in endowing a conversational agent with non-verbal behaviour expressing his emo-
tions during discourse to make him more believable.
Following Ortony (2003) the authors characterize emotions with two dimen-
sions: a positive or negative valence, and time (past, present or future, indicating
when the emotion eliciting stimulus occurs). These dimensions allow to differen-
tiate not only emotions but also their typical facial expression. A belief network is
used to match a situation with an emotion; then the corresponding dimensions are
computed and associated with a facial expression.
The agent Greta was endowed with such an emotional system (de Rosis et
al., 2003). It was then used to dialogue with users in medical applications where
empathy with the user is crucial.
2.5.2 Max: a believable life-like agent
Becker, Kopp, and Wachsmuth (2004) are interested in modelling the dynamics of
emotions over time in the multi-modal conversational agent Max. They integrate
an emotional system into Max’s architecture to improve this agent’s lifelikeness
and believability. Max is then used as a museum guide.
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The authors differentiate between emotions, that are short-lasting and asso-
ciated with an eliciting stimulus, and mood, that is long-lasting and undirected.
Mood is influenced by emotions, and then impacts the triggering of new emotions.
They focus on the temporal dynamics of emotions and their interaction with mood,
and on the ways of communicating an identifiable emotion. They represent the
communication of emotions with three dimensions: pleasure (positive or negative),
arousal (level of stimulation) and dominance (level of control). They introduce a
concept of boredom corresponding to a state of relatively low arousal because of a
lack of stimulation. In a real-time interaction, this degree of boredom allows Max
to exhibit natural proactive behaviours when the level of interaction is too low.
An emotion is triggered depending on external information. It then influences
Max’s facial expressions, gestures, speech, behaviour and cognitive functions. Ac-
tually emotions intervene at two levels in Max’s architecture. First, discrete emo-
tional labels, modulated by a continuous intensity, are matched with a facial ex-
pression and influence Max’s reasoning. Second, continuous dimensions associ-
ated with the current emotion are used to modulate Max’s observable physiological
behaviour (e.g. the tonality of his voice or his eye blinking rate).
2.5.3 Facial expression of communicative intentions
Emotional expressions do not only create believability. They can also carry out a
communicative function. Poggi and Pelachaud (2000) investigate the use of facial
expressions to convey the speaker’s communicative intention, viz. the performative
of his speech acts.
Indeed, the speaker engages in dialogue with a general goal among three global
types: requests, questions and informative acts. An agent who wants to communi-
cate one of these communicative intentions may choose one or several (redundant
or complementary) modalities to express it. Actually the speaker specifies his gen-
eral type of goal depending on the context. He selects a specific performative that
is adapted to convey his intention in this particular context. Various features of
the context constrain the choice of a facial expression: the type of encounter, more
or less formal, determining politeness expressions; the power relationship between
sender and addressee, determining dominance or submission expressions; and the
two agents’ personalities influencing the expressed emotions.
The selected performative has an affective component, corresponding to an
actual or potential affective state. For example a request may be accompanied by
potential anger to highlight that the hearer should obey it. Therefore this affective
component may be expressed at the same time as the speech act. It is expressed by
an emotional expression, computed in terms of the Facial Action Coding System
developed by Ekman and Friesen (1978).
76
This agent is thus able to determine the performative adapted to the expression
of his communicative intention in a particular context of interaction, and to convey
this performative through affective facial expressions.
2.6 Logical formalizations
In the previous sections we differentiated several types of work about emotions.
First, some researchers design emotional architectures (cf. Section 2.3), simulating
the influence of emotions on various cognitive functions and their interplay with
mood or personality. The EMA agent is the most complete one, even integrating
an account of coping strategies. These works thus match what Gratch and Marsella
call simulation-based approaches (cf. Section 2.2.4). But these architectures are of-
ten complex, involving specific representations (e.g. Gratch and Marsella’s Causal
Interpretation).
Second, other researchers directly implement some emotions into their agents
to reach a specific goal like making it more believable during a conversation with
the user (Section 2.5) or having him motivating a student (Section 2.4). These
approaches then rather match what Gratch and Marsella call simulation-driven ap-
proaches. They are not much interested in the internal functioning of emotions,
and in their influence on the agent’s cognitive functions like memory or coping.
They mainly aim at making their agent more believable from the user’s point of
view, so they are not always very faithful to a psychological theory.
Moreover, even if some agents build on an existing emotional architecture (e.g.
Steve and Herman the Bug integrate the Affective Reasoner architecture), most of
them have their own specific emotional modules and are often domain-dependent
and therefore not generic or reusable (for example the Mediating Agent uses a
domain-dependent notion of desire and is thus limited to applications in a tutoring
environment). Designers build on various psychological theories and use various
technologies to formalize these theories, making it difficult to reuse these works.
Thus it seems that the agent community needs a generic reusable emotional
model, faithful to psychology, and using a widespread technology ready to be im-
plemented in a great variety of agents. Various formalisms have been explored to
reach this objective: dynamic belief networks (Carofiglio and Rosis, 2005), fuzzy
logic (El Nasr, Yen, and Ioerger, 2000), BDI logics (Meyer, 2004; Ochs et al.,
2005), decision theory (Gmytrasiewicz and Lisetti, 2000), mixed with planning
representations (Gratch and Marsella, 2004a). Among those we prefer formal log-
ics, that have well-known advantages: a clear semantics allowing to disambiguate
concepts, a great explanatory power of the agent’s behaviour, and a formal verifi-
ability allowing to reason about the formalized concepts. In particular BDI logics
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propose to formalize an agent’s mental attitudes. Now, according to Picard 1997
virtual emotions are precisely labels on the virtual agent’s mental states. Even
some philosophers support this view of emotions as mental attitudes (we will dis-
cuss Searle’s view below). BDI logics thus seem particularly adapted to formal-
ize emotions. Moreover they are philosophically founded (Bratman, 1987), and
they and are already widely used to design agent architectures (Wooldridge, 2000),
what guarantees that a model grounding on these logic would be reusable in a great
amount of agents. In this section we will thus focus on the use of BDI logics to
provide a generic and reusable formal model of emotions. Since the use of logic
may seem at least surprising or really contradictory, we begin with exposing (in
Section 2.6.1) Searle’s thought that emotions are complex intentional states, thus
mental attitudes like belief and desire. We then discuss some attempts to formalize
an agent’s emotions in a logical framework: Meyer uses his KARO logic (Sec-
tion 2.6.2) and Ochs et al.’s use Sadek’s rational interaction theory (Section 2.6.3).
Since our aim is also to provide such a BDI logic formalisation of emotions, we
may criticize the existing ones and conclude about what our own model is intended
to improve (Section 2.6.4).
2.6.1 A philosophical view
Expressing emotions in a BDI logic may first seem rather contradictory. How-
ever, philosophy of mind has already considered emotions as mental attitudes, viz.
the concepts that BDI logics propose to model. Indeed Searle (1983) defines in-
tentional states as a kind of mental attitudes that concern a proposition. He then
assumes that beliefs are intentional states whose direction of t is mind to world,
desires and intentions are intentional states whose direction of t is world to mind,
and emotions are intentional states with an empty direction of fit. So according to
him emotions are particular intentional states, and thus they are mental attitudes
just like belief and desire are.
Moreover, Searle (1983, pp. 48–51) gives some semi-formal definitions of var-
ious emotional states (e.g. fear, disappointment, remorse, regret, pride, shame...)
expressed in terms of beliefs and desires. These definitions are quite close (al-
though less formal) to those that we will provide in Chapter 4. Searle finally as-
sumes that any affective state, and more generally any intentional state, can be
expressed in terms of desires and beliefs.
This philosophical view supports the accuracy of the use of logic to handle
emotions. Since emotions can be considered as particular mental attitudes, it seems
natural to represent them with BDI logics, a framework that has been designed to
formalize a rational agent’s reasoning, and that is already well-tried with other (less
debated) mental attitudes.
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2.6.2 Meyer
Meyer (2006) describes the use of the KARO formalism (developed in (van der
Hoek, van Linder, and Meyer, 1998)) to formalize some emotions and their ef-
fects on an agent’s behaviour. More precisely, he focuses on the dynamic interplay
between emotions and the agent’s plans. He then builds on Oatley et al.’s com-
municative theory of emotions and define four of their six emotions (happiness,
fear, sadness, anger) in terms of the agent’s goals and plans. However, as he states
himself, his aim is not to be strictly faithful to this psychological model.
Instead of trying to capture the informal psychological descriptions
exactly (or as exact as possible), we primarily look here at a descrip-
tion that makes sense for artificial agents.
(Meyer, 2004, p.11)
Meyer assumes that emotions are labels on particular mental attitudes. To rep-
resent them he introduces five operators: belief, desire, knowledge, action and
ability. Moreover he disposes of a very expressive language to describe complex
actions, like sequences or conditional actions. But the subsequent definitions of
emotions are rather “task-oriented”, since emotions only arise from situations rel-
evant to the agent’s intentions. Actually goals are extracted from desires (they are
realizable desires not yet satisfied), and intentions are selected goals that the agent
can reach (viz. he is able to perform an action that leads to this result). We believe
that this excludes some situations where the same emotions could arise indepen-
dently from any intention. For example I can be happy because the sun shines,
while I can do no action to make it shine.
Meyer then proposes two axioms for each emotion: the first one expresses
the emotion eliciting condition, viz. the particular combination of mental attitudes
leading to the triggering of this emotion; the second one expresses the effect of this
emotion on the agent’s plans. For example an agent who is sad about the failure
of a plan will deliberate to choose to revise either his plan or his goal. We believe
that this link is too direct between emotion and action. Emotions may rather have
a more subtle influence on the agent’s behaviour (see for example the notion of
behavioural feature used by Reilly, Section 2.3.3).
Finally Meyer proposes an expressive formal framework to model emotions.
He accounts for their triggering as well as their effects on the agent’s plans. Ac-
tually the triggering of emotions only depends on the agent’s plans, thus not cov-
ering a number of other emotional situations that are not relevant to Meyer’s aim.
Moreover the triggering of emotions is also limited to individual aspects and does
not take social standards into account; besides only a few emotions are described.
Their effect is formalized by an axiom expressing how they influence the agent’s
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deliberation process, grounding on action tendencies in the sense of Frijda (1986).
Thus in our sense this effect is fixed, viz. each emotion always has the same kind
of effect on the agent’s behaviour. On the contrary in this work we will formal-
ize the impact of emotions on behaviour in terms of coping strategies in the sense
of Lazarus and Folkman (1984) (cf. Chapter 8). This way, each emotion can lead
to the use of any strategy depending on the context, what allows a more varied
behaviour making the agents more believable. Yet Meyer’s aim is not to design
believable agents but efficacious ones, using emotions as heuristics for decision-
making: his formalization of action tendencies may thus be more adapted for his
aim. Moreover this formalization has well-established semantics and axiomatics
and allows to disambiguate emotions; in this sense the simplifications mentioned
above were necessary. Finally Meyer has also designed a programming language
to actually integrate such emotions into agents (Dastani and Meyer, 2006).
2.6.3 Ochs et al.
Ochs et al. (2005) give a formalization of emotions based on Sadek’s Rational
Interaction Theory (1992), a logic of belief, intention, and uncertainty. They
then define abbreviations for particular mental attitudes called present and fu-
ture (un)desirability in terms of the (actual or expected) realization of the agent’s
choices. They next define four emotions from the OCC typology (joy, sadness,
hope, and fear) that actually match these four mental attitudes. As in Meyer’s
work, the authors focus on the individual aspects of the defined emotions. Indeed
their aim is to compute the facial expression of an animated agent. They also dis-
cuss how such an agent can express several emotions at the same time through a
mixed facial expression.
There seem to be some formal problems in the definitions exposed. First these
mental attitudes do not involve beliefs but uncertainty (that are exclusive from be-
liefs, viz. if an agent is uncertain about a proposition then he does not believe it
to be true or false). Thus an agent can feel an emotion about a proposition only if
he is uncertain about this proposition. If an event makes me believe that a given
proposition is true, I am no more uncertain and thus I feel no emotion. For example
I cannot be happy that the sun is shining unless I have doubts that it is.
Moreover Sadek’s choice is supposed to be strongly realistic, viz. when an
agents believes a proposition to be true, he also chooses it to be true (cf. Chapter 3).
Then any event that adds a belief to the agent’s knowledge base also adds the
corresponding choice. So the emotions cannot either be defined as a belief that a
choice was realized, or the agent would feel joy whatever the occurred event. We
believe that actually emotions do not arise from the realization of goals but from
the one of desires. Indeed desires are not strongly realistic.
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Finally this work is another attempt to disambiguate emotions through logi-
cal definitions. The focus is not the same as in Meyer’s work, so the result is
less formal. However it also supports the use of logical representation of emo-
tions, considered as mental attitudes. Moreover it explores some other aspects like
emotional blending. This work was recently enriched to account for empathetic
emotions (happy for, sorry for, ...) and their role in human-computer interaction
(cf. (Ochs, Sadek, and Pelachaud, 2007) or (Ochs, Pélachaud, and Sadek, 2006)).
Once again the focus is not on providing a sound and complete axiomatization of
emotions (indeed no semantics is given for the modal operator representing emo-
tions), but rather on the disambiguation of the effects of emotions.
2.6.4 Conclusion
These two logical formalizations adopt two different views on the use of BDI log-
ics. Meyer focuses on providing a well-established semantics and axiomatics of
emotions, that allow to reason about their effects on the agent’s plans. On the con-
trary Ochs et al. rather use logical formulas to disambiguate their definitions of
emotions and then focus on their expression or effect on the interaction. Never-
theless these two works show that it is possible to provide a logical description of
such a complex phenomenon as emotions. Such a description is inevitably simplis-
tic but it allows to disambiguate the phenomenon and to integrate emotions into
virtual agents. Indeed a great number of agents already build on BDI architectures
(Wooldridge, 2000).
However we would like to highlight a number of limitations of these works.
First, both formalisations focus on the individual aspects of emotions and neglect
the social aspects, in particular the influence of social norm on the construction
of emotions. However this influence in essential, all the more in studying the in-
fluence of emotions on interaction. Second, they define rather few emotions, and
are not always very faithful to the original psychological definitions on which they
build. Nevertheless we believe that designers of believable agents should trust the
psychologists who have tailored their definitions for decades. Finally, they both
neglect the concept of desire: we can say that they are too task-oriented since they
only consider goals, choices or plans. On the contrary we believe that desires are
essential in the triggering of human emotions. Their definitions are thus not generic
enough to capture all the variety of situations that can trigger emotions.
In the light of this review of existing work, we can now define more precisely
the aim of this thesis.
81
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter has proven that emotions are worth being integrated into virtual agents,
and improve their behaviour in a variety of applications, ranging from pedagogical
agents to virtual worlds. We then noticed that the great amount of works to design
such emotional agents makes it necessary to design a generic model of emotions
that designers could reuse in various agents and for various applications. We thus
discussed several existing attempts to provide such a formal model, in particular by
using BDI logics that are a widespread technology to describe rational agents archi-
tectures. Philosophy of mind supports the underlying hypothesis that emotions can
be considered as a kind of mental attitudes. We then criticized several drawbacks
of these existing BDI formalisations of emotions, in particular their lack of gener-
icity due to the use of goals instead of desires, and their focus on individual aspects
at the expense of social ones. Moreover we can regret that these approaches do
not take advantage of the power of BDI logics to reason about emotions and prove
some properties about them.
On the contrary our aim in this thesis, as stated in the introduction, is to propose
a formal model of emotions. Following Searle and Meyer, we consider emotions
as particular mental states and choose to build our model on a BDI logic. This
model should meet several requirements. First it must be as faithful as possible to
the OCC typology. Indeed psychology has already experimented its definitions for
decades, so we have to trust them. Moreover our aim is not to design efficacious
agents optimized for a given application, but rather to propose a model as generic
as possible, independent from any domain of application. We thus stay close to the
underlying psychological theory and let each agent designer optimize our model
for his own application if needed. Second we want to formalize a great number
of different emotions because diversified emotional expressions are essential to
make agents more believable. Actually we will propose definitions for twenty
emotions of the OCC typology, viz. all but the object-based ones. Our model will
thus offer the richest set of formal definitions of emotions up to date. We then
let the agent designers choose which emotions among the formalized ones they
need for their particular application. Third we want to consider the social aspects
of emotions and we will then introduce a modal operator accounting for social
standards. Fourth we want to stay as generic as possible, in particular our model
should not be task-oriented as it is the case for Meyer and Ochs et al.’s accounts.
We will thus express emotions in terms of desires rather than in terms of goals
(this choice will be further discussed along with our other formalization choices in
Chapter 4). Fifth we want to be able to reason about emotions and prove some of
their properties. We will then strive to keep our logic not too complex, in order to
be able to prove its soundness and completeness. The proofs of a set of theorems
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about emotions constitute the main originality of our work.
The next part of this thesis is dedicated to our formalization of the OCC typol-
ogy. We begin with introducing our particular BDI framework (Chapter 3), then
proceed with providing and justifying our formal definitions of twenty emotions
from the OCC typology (Chapter 4), and finally expose and prove various proper-
ties of these emotions (Chapter 5). This work sets up the core of this thesis.
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Part II
Logical formalization of emotions
Feelings are not supposed to be logical. Dangerous is the
man who has rationalized his emotions
David Borenstein
Chapter 3
Logical framework
Logic: The art of thinking and reasoning
in strict accordance with the limitations and
incapacities of the human misunderstanding.
Ambrose Bierce
3.1 Introduction
As we showed in the state of the art, the agent community recently got very in-
terested in emotional agents. Unfortunately all the approaches design their own
emotional model starting from scratch, viz. from one of the numerous existing psy-
chological theories. Thus, there exists a great variety of computational models
of emotions, depending on the application, the context of use, or the underlying
formalism (cf. Chapter 2). We believe that the agent community needs a generic
formal model of emotions, and we assume that BDI logics (viz. logics of Belief,
Desire and Intention, e.g. Cohen and Levesque (1990), Rao and Georgeff (1991;
1992), Sadek (1992), Herzig and Longin (2004)) allow to develop such a model.
Indeed emotions are complex phenomena, their psychological definition is of-
ten abstract, ambiguous and non consensual, what leads to many debates (cf. Chap-
ter 1). For example two of the most cited psychological theories disagree on the
definition of hope: according to Lazarus (1991) hope is the emotional state aris-
ing when expecting something bad to happen but still envisaging something better;
according to Ortony, Clore, and Collins (1988) the probabilities are inverted and
hope arises when you expect something good to happen but you are not sure of it.
Psychological definitions of emotions are thus often subjective, whereas emotional
agent designers need clear definitions, ready to be implemented in their agents.
Formal logic provides such a universal vocabulary, with a clear semantics. It also
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allows reasoning, planning and explanation of an agent’s behaviour. The logical
formalization of a phenomenon can even reveal problems that do not appear intu-
itively. BDI logics (Cohen and Levesque (1990), Rao and Georgeff (1991,1992),
Sadek (1992), Herzig and Longin (2004), Wooldridge (2000)), that ground on
the philosophy of language, mind, and action (cf. Bratman (1987), Searle (1969,
1983)), propose to model agents via some key concepts such as action and men-
tal attitudes (beliefs, goals, intentions, choices...). This framework is commonly
used in the agent community and offers well-known interesting properties: great
explanatory power, formal verifiability, rigorous and well-established theoretical
frame (from the point of view of both philosophy and formal logic).
In this chapter we thus provide a BDI framework to model emotions. Our logic
is a propositional modal logic. While there is a large consensus about the logic of
belief, several concepts of desire exist in the literature. Broadly these concepts fall
in two categories. In the first one desire is viewed as something that is abandoned as
soon as it is satisfied, such as an agent’s desire on a rainy day that the sun shines,
which is dropped when finally the sun comes out. (This is similar to Bratman’s
concept of intention.) In the second category desires rather correspond to general
preferences whose existence does not depend on its satisfaction, such as an agent’s
general preference of sunny days over rainy days. In many BDI approaches the
second option is taken, and moreover desires are strongly connected to beliefs (cf.
the goal concept of Cohen and Levesque (1990) or Rao and Georgeff (1991), or the
choice concept of Sadek (1992) or Herzig and Longin (2004)). Here we opt for the
second view, but we do not connect desires to beliefs as the other approaches do.
Finally, it turns out that the intention component can be omitted in our framework,
as well as any “intermediate” mental attitude (choice, achievement goal, persistent
goal, intention...), since they are not needed to describe the OCC emotions (but note
that intentions will be central when it comes to coping strategies (cf. Chapter 8).
Moreover, our framework also uses time, action, and ideality operators. Our notion
of ideality allows to represent an agent’s internalized standards, be they moral,
legal...
This chapter explains this particular BDI framework in details. Section 3.2 ex-
poses the semantics of our modal operators. Section 3.3 describes their axiomatics.
Section 3.4 proves the soundness and completeness of our logic.
3.2 Semantics
Let AGT = {i, j, k, ...} be the set of agents and ACT = {α, β, γ, ...} the set of
actions.
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3.2.1 Kripke models
We use a standard possible worlds semantics, and a model M is a triple 〈W,V,R〉
where W is a set of possible worlds, V is a truth assignment which associates
each world w with the set Vw of atomic propositions true in w, and R =
{A,B,P,D,G,I} is a tuple of mappings made up of the following:
• A : ACT → (W → 2W ) associates each action α ∈ ACT and possible
world w ∈ W with the set Aα(w) of possible worlds resulting from the
performance of action α in w. We impose that for every w ∈ W : (1) if
w′ ∈ Aα(w) and w′′ ∈ Aβ(w) then w′ = w′′; (2) if w ∈ Aα(w′) and
w ∈ Aβ(w
′′) then w′ = w′′. This imposes that actions are organized into
histories1 and take one time step. Therefore, actions are deterministic in the
future and in the past;
• B : AGT → (W → 2W ) associates each agent i ∈ AGT and possible
world w ∈ W , with the set Bi(w) of possible worlds compatible with the
beliefs of agent i in w. All these accessibility relations are serial, transitive
and euclidian;
• P : AGT → (W → 22
W
) associates each agent i ∈ AGT and possible
world w ∈ W with a set of sets of possible worlds Pi(w). According to
Chellas (1980, chap. 8), these sets of possible worlds are called neighbour-
hoods of w. We will impose below that neighbourhoods are “big” subsets of
Bi(w): every U ∈ Pi(w) intuitively contains more elements than its com-
plement Bi(w) \ U . The following constraint is slightly weaker2 and does
not completely capture this intuition: for every w ∈ W , if U1, U2 ∈ Pi(w)
then U1 ∩ U2 6= ∅. In other words, if ϕ is probable (viz. ϕ is true in all the
worlds of neighbourhood), then ¬ϕ is not (since each other neighbourhood
contains at least one world where ϕ is true). Finally, in order to ensure that at
least tautologies are probable, we impose that Pi(w) 6= ∅ for every w ∈W ;
• D : AGT → (W → 2W ) associates each agent i ∈ AGT and possible
worldw ∈W with the set Di(w) of worlds compatible with what is desirable
for the agent i in the world w. All these accessibility relations Di are serial;
• G : W → 2W associates each possible world w ∈ W with the set G(w) of
possible worlds in the future of w. This accessibility relation is a linear order
(reflexive, transitive, antisymmetric and total).
1It does not impede the parallel execution of several actions, but it guarantees that all these parallel
actions lead to the same world (at the same time in the same history).
2There are neighbourhoods satisfying our constraints while “gathering” less than 50 % of the
worlds, cf. Walley and Fine (1979).
89
• I : AGT → (W → 2W ) associates each agent i ∈ AGT and possible
world w ∈ W with the set Ii(w) of worlds ideal for agent i. In these ideal
worlds all the (social, legal, moral...) obligations, norms, standards... that
the agent i has internalized (accepted for himself) hold. All these relations
are serial.
Moreover, we impose some constraints involving two or more accessibility
relation types:
• if w ∈ Bi(w′) then Pi(w) = Pi(w′) and Di(w) = Di(w′), which ensures
that agents are aware of their probabilities and desires3;
• if (Bi ◦ Aα)(w) 6= ∅ then (Aα ◦Bi)(w) ⊆ (Bi ◦ Aα)(w), which ensures
that agents do not forget their previous alternatives (“no forgetting”, alias
“perfect recall” (Fagin et al., 1995)). This is based on the hypothesis that
actions are public, viz. that they are perceived correctly and completely by
every agent;
• U ⊆ Bi(w) for each U ∈ Pi(w), which entails that belief implies proba-
bility;
• G ⊇ Aα for each α, which ensures that the future of every w contains the
worlds resulting from the performance of actions in w;
• finally, for the sake of simplicity, we make the hypothesis that what the agent
desires persist: if wGw′ then Di(w) = Di(w′);
• we make the same hypothesis for (social, legal, moral...) obligations, norms,
standards... that the agents have accepted for themselves: if wGw′ then
Ii(w) = Ii(w
′).
We are aware that in general these last two constraints are too strong, but they
are quite realistic for rather short time intervals like a small dialog.
3.2.2 Modal operators and language
We associate modal operators to these mappings:
• Afterα ϕ reads “ϕ is true after performance of action α”;
• Beforeα ϕ reads “ϕ is true before performance of action α”;
3Due to the transitivity and euclidianity of the Bi relations, agents are also aware of their beliefs,
viz. we can derive the following property: if w ∈ Bi(w′) then Bi(w) = Bi(w′).
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• Bel i ϕ reads “agent i believes that ϕ”;
• Probi ϕ reads “for i ϕ is more probable than ¬ϕ”;
• Gϕ reads “henceforth ϕ is true”;
• Hϕ reads “ϕ has always been true in the past”;
• Idl i ϕ reads “ideally it is the case for i that ϕ”.
• Des i ϕ reads “ϕ is desirable for i”;
ATM = {p, q...} is the set of atomic formulas. Every atomic formula is a
complex formula. If ϕ and ψ are two complex formulas and ¤ is one of the above
modal operators, then ¬ϕ, ϕ∨ψ and¤ϕ are complex formulas. The set of complex
formulas is noted FORM = {ϕ,ψ...}.
As usual, if ϕ and ψ are complex formulas, we define ϕ ∧ ψ and ϕ → ψ as
abbreviations of complex formulas. We also define the following abbreviations:
• Happensα ϕ
def
= ¬Afterα ¬ϕ reads “α is about to be performed, after which
ϕ”;
• Doneα ϕ
def
= ¬Beforeα ¬ϕ reads “α has just been performed, and ϕ was
true before”;
• Fϕ
def
= ¬G¬ϕ reads “ϕ is true or will be true at some future instant”;
• Pϕ
def
= ¬H¬ϕ reads “ϕ is or was true”.
3.2.3 Truth conditions
The truth conditions are standard for almost all of our operators:
w ° ¤ϕ iff w′ ° ϕ for every w′ ∈ R¤(w)
where (¤,R¤) is either (Afterα ,Aα) with α ∈ ACT , or (Bel i ,Bi) with i ∈
AGT , or (Des i ,Di) with i ∈ AGT , or (G ,G ), or (Idl i ,Ii) with i ∈ AGT .
For the dual operators we have:
w ° ¯ϕ iff w′ ° ϕ for every w′ so that w ∈ R¯(w′)
where (¯,R¯) is either (Beforeα ,Aα) with α ∈ ACT , or (H ,G ).
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The truth conditions illustrate that the operator H is interpreted as the dual of G
and Beforeα is interpreted as the dual of Afterα . Moreover:
w ° Probi ϕ iff there exists U ∈ Pi(w) so that for every w′ ∈ U , w′ ° ϕ.
Hence ϕ is probable for i in w if there is a “big” subset of Bi(w) where ϕ holds.
Validity of a formula ϕ in the class of all Kripke models obeying our semantic
constraints is defined as usual, and is noted |= ϕ.
3.3 Axiomatics
We now introduce a set of axioms that our modal operators have to satisfy. First
we recall what a normal modal operator is.
3.3.1 Normal operators
¤ is a normal operator iff the axiom (K-¤) and the necessitation rule (RN-¤) are
valid. This characterizes a possible worlds semantics in the sense of Kripke (1963).
(RN-¤) means that if ϕ is true then it is necessarily true.
¤(ϕ→ ψ) → (¤ϕ→ ¤ψ) (K-¤)
ϕ
¤ϕ
(RN-¤)
We recall that in any normal modal logic, the semantics validates in particular4
the factorisation rule (C-¤) and the inference rule (RM-¤) expressing that the set
of necessary formulas is closed under implication:
ϕ→ ψ
¤ϕ→ ¤ψ
(RM-¤)
(¤A ∧¤B) → ¤(A ∧B) (C-¤)
The dual of ¤ is denoted ♦ and obeys the following theorem, meaning that if
A is true in every world and there exists a world where B is true then there exists a
world where A and B are both true:
(¤A ∧ ♦B) → ♦(A ∧B) (3.1)
♦ also obeys the following inference rule (Chellas, 1980, Theorem 4.4 p.116):
A→ B
♦A→ ♦B
(RK-♦)
For more details on the formal properties of normal modal logics, cf. (Chellas,
1980, chap. 4).
4We only recall the principles that will be needed to prove some theorems in Chapter 5.
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3.3.2 Action
Afterα and Beforeα have the standard tense logic Kt in a linear time version, viz.
a normal modal logic K extended with the following axioms (cf. Burgess (2002)
for more details):
Happensα ϕ→ Afterβ ϕ (CD-HA)
Doneα ϕ→ Beforeβ ϕ (CD-DB)
ϕ→ AfterαDoneα ϕ (CONV-AD)
ϕ→ BeforeαHappensα ϕ (CONV-BH)
(CD-HA) and (CD-DB) are the axioms of common determinism, and entail that
actions are deterministic in the future and in the past (one can see that when α is
β). The conversion axioms (CONV-AD) and (CONV-BH) link past and future.
In the following, the notation i:α reads “agent i is the author of action α”.
3.3.3 Belief
The operators Bel i have the standard logic KD45 (cf. Chellas (1980) or Hin-
tikka (1962) for more details). The corresponding axioms are those of normal
modal logics plus the following ones:
Bel i ϕ→ ¬Bel i ¬ϕ (D-Bel i )
Bel i ϕ→ Bel i Bel i ϕ (4-Bel i )
¬Bel i ϕ→ Bel i ¬Bel i ϕ (5-Bel i )
Thereby an agent’s beliefs are consistent (D-Bel i ), and an agent is aware of what
he believes (4-Bel i ) and of what he does not believe (5-Bel i ).
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3.3.4 Time
The operators G and H have the linear tense logic S4.3t (cf. Burgess (2002)) which
is a normal modal logic K for each operator plus the following axioms:
Gϕ→ ϕ (T-G)
(Fϕ ∧ Fψ) → F (ϕ ∧ Fψ) ∨ F (ψ ∧ Fϕ) (3-F )
Gϕ→ GGϕ (4-G)
Hϕ→ ϕ (T-H )
(Pϕ ∧ Pψ) → P(ϕ ∧ Pψ) ∨ P(ψ ∧ Pϕ) (3-P )
Hϕ→ HHϕ (4-H )
ϕ→ GPϕ (CONV-GP)
ϕ→ HFϕ (CONV-HF)
(T-G) and (T-H ) mean that future and past are taken in a broad sense: if a
proposition is always true in the future or in the past, it is true in particular in the
present.
(4-G) et (4-H ) express the transitivity of time in past and future: if ϕ is true
in all the futures (resp. in all the pasts), then ϕ is also true in all the futures of these
futures (resp. in all the pasts of these pasts).
(3-F ) and (3-P) indicate that if two formulas are true at two instants in the
future (resp. in the past) then one is necessarily true before the other. This entails
that the time is linear in the future and in the past. Figure 3.1 illustrates this on a
model where w0 ° Bel iGϕ, w1 ° ¬Bel i ¬(¬ϕ∧Fϕ), w1 ° ¬Bel i ¬Gϕ and
w1 ° ¬Bel i ¬G¬ϕ.
(CONV-GP) and (CONV-HF) are the conversion axioms.
present︸︷︷︸
past
︸ ︷︷ ︸
future
w0
ϕ ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ ϕ
Bi Bi Bi
Bi(w0)
w1
¬ϕ ¬ϕ¬ϕ
ϕ ϕ ϕ
¬ϕ ¬ϕ ϕ
Bi Bi Bi
Bi(w1)
Figure 3.1: Representation of linear time
One might object that at least future should be branching. For us, what is
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important is not the nature of time but rather the perception that agents have of
it: we choose to represent the diversity of futures through different histories whose
present are different epistemic worlds (cf. Figure 3.1). Thus, although we represent
time in a linear setting, the agent has a branching perception of it.
3.3.5 Probability
The probability operators correspond to the notion of weak belief, based on the
notion of subjective probability measure (this aspect is captured semantically by
the fact that probable worlds belong to the set of believed worlds).
The logic of Prob is weaker than the logic of belief. In particular, the formula
(Probi ϕ∧Probi ψ) → Probi (ϕ∧ ψ) is not valid, and this is enough to make it a
non normal logic (Chellas, 1980, Theorem 4.3).
The semantical conditions validate the following principles:
ϕ→ ψ
Probi ϕ→ Probi ψ
(RM-Probi )
ϕ
Probi ϕ
(RN-Probi )
Probi ϕ→ ¬Probi ¬ϕ (D-Probi )
Thereby an agent’s probabilities are consistent (D-Prob i ) and closed under
implication (RM-Probi ). Moreover tautologies are probable (RN-Prob i ).
3.3.6 Desirability
Its logic is identical to the one of the standard deontic logic (SDL) and is also
expressed in terms of ideal worlds: the logic associated with the operators Des i is
KD, viz. the normal modal logic K plus the following axiom:
Des i ϕ→ ¬Des i ¬ϕ (D-Des i )
which makes desires consistent.
An agent’s desires are individual preferences. They can be unrealistic because
we do not impose that Bi(w) ∩ Di(w) 6= ∅ : an agent can desire to be in various
states that he currently believes to be impossible.
We stress that in principle (e.g. Lang, Van Der Torre, and Weydert (2002),
Castelfranchi and Paglieri (2007)), desires are closed neither under implication nor
under conjunction: I can desire to marry Ann and desire to marry Beth without
desiring to be a bigamist. However, for the sake of simplicity, our Des i operators
are normal and thus do not respect these principles (viz. they are closed under both
conjunction and implication).
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3.3.7 Ideality
The notion of ideality considered here is an obligation that is taken in a large sense:
it embraces all the rules imposed on the agent by some external authority, provided
that the agent has internalized them, viz. accepted them for himself. They can
be explicit (like laws) or more or less implicit (like social or moral obligations).
Therefore they can be said to correspond to the agent’s moral values. They are a
kind of social preferences stemming from the groups to which the agent belongs,
and thus differ from the agent’s personal desires that are expressed by means of the
Des i operator.
The logic of ideality is the Standard Deontic Logic (Jones and Carmo, 2002),
viz. the normal modal logic K plus the following axiom making ideals consistent:
Idl i ϕ→ ¬Idl i ¬ϕ (D-Idl i )
3.3.8 Mix axioms
The interdependencies between some modal operators are captured by the follow-
ing axioms.
First, the following introspection axioms express that the agents are aware of
their probabilities and desires:
Probi ϕ→ Bel i Probi ϕ (4-MIX1)
¬Probi ϕ→ Bel i ¬Probi ϕ (5-MIX1)
Des i ϕ→ Bel iDes i ϕ (4-MIX2)
¬Des i ϕ→ Bel i ¬Des i ϕ (5-MIX2)
From these axioms plus (D-Bel i ), we can easily prove their converse, and we
thus have equivalences. For example, we deduce the converse of (4-MIX1) from
Bel i Probi ϕ → ¬Bel i ¬Probi ϕ (D-Bel i ) and ¬Bel i ¬Probi ϕ → Probi ϕ (5-
MIX1).
Then the following axioms express that actions are public:
Doneα> → Bel iDoneα> (4-MIX3)
¬Doneα> → Bel i ¬Doneα> (5-MIX3)
From these axioms plus (D-Bel i ), we can easily prove their converse, and we thus
have equivalences.
We express the inclusion of probable worlds in the set of epistemic worlds
through the following axiom:
(Bel i ϕ ∧ Probi ψ) → Probi (ϕ ∧ ψ) (C-MIX)
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which allows to derive the following intuitive theorems:
Bel i ϕ→ Probi ϕ (3.2)
Probi ϕ→ ¬Bel i ¬ϕ (3.3)
(3.2) reads “if agent i believes ϕ then for him ϕ is more probable than ¬ϕ”. (3.3)
reads “if agent i considers that ϕ is probable then he envisages that ϕ can be true”.
Time and action are linked: if ϕ is always true in the future then ϕ will be true
after every action performance (GA-MIX). Similarly, if ϕ was always true in the
past, then ϕ was true before every performance of an action (HB-MIX). So:
Gϕ→ Afterα ϕ (GA-MIX)
Hϕ→ Beforeα ϕ (HB-MIX)
Finally, desires and undesires persist (viz. they are preserved through time):
Des i ϕ→ GDes i ϕ (Pers-Des i )
¬Des i ϕ→ G¬Des i ϕ (Pers-¬Des i )
These two principles entail that we have an equivalence.
For the same reasons, the ideals imposed to an agent also persist:
Idl i ϕ→ GIdl i ϕ (Pers-Idl i )
¬Idl i ϕ→ G¬Idl i ϕ (Pers-¬Idl i )
These two principles entail that we have an equivalence.
We stress that we have not supposed that the agents are aware of imposed
ideals. Indeed, intuitively, the principles Idl i ϕ → Bel i Idl i ϕ and ¬Idl i ϕ →
Bel i ¬Idl i ϕ would be too strong, and they are not valid in our semantics.
The “no forgetting” constraint linking actions and belief is captured by the
following axiom:
Bel iAfterα ϕ ∧ ¬Bel iAfterα⊥ → Afterα Bel i ϕ (NF-Bel i )
This axiom expresses that the agents do not forget their previous alternatives, when
the performance of the action is not surprising for them (¬Bel iAfterα⊥ reads
“agent i does not believe that α is not executable”). Otherwise, if Bel iAfterα>
holds, then the agent has to revise his beliefs upon learning that α occurred. We do
not go into this here, and refer the reader to (Herzig and Longin, 2002).
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3.4 Soundness and completeness
We call L the logic thus axiomatized, and write `L ϕ iff ϕ is a theorem of L.
Theorem (Soundness and completeness). ` ϕ iff |= ϕ.
Sketch of proof. It is a routine task to check that all the axioms correspond to their
semantic counterparts. It is routine, too, to check that all of our axioms are in the
Sahlqvist class, for which a general completeness result exists (Sahlqvist (1975),
Blackburn, de Rijke, and Venema (2001))
3.5 Conclusion
We thus dispose of a set of modal operators to describe the agents’ mental attitudes
and reasoning abilities. Our logic is a propositional modal logic. An agent has
beliefs, probabilities, personal desires and internalized social ideals, and he can
reason about time and action.
The next step of our work now consists in characterizing emotions in terms of
these concepts. The soundness and completeness will then be important to reason
properly about these emotions and prove some of their properties.
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Chapter 4
Formal denitions of emotions
Life obey no logic,
why do we want to deduce its meaning with logic?
Gao Xingjian
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter we tackle the core of this work: formalizing emotions in the logical
framework exposed in the previous chapter. We have shown in Chapter 1 that
cognitive appraisal theories are best adapted to reason about emotions and their
cognitive antecedents, viz. the particular mental state that cause them. Among
the various available cognitive appraisal theories, we have already discussed in
Section 1.4 (page 57) why we choose to formalize the so-called OCC typology
due to Ortony, Clore and Collins (1988, cf. Section 1.3.3). Indeed it is easier to be
understood by a computer scientist than the other theories, since it was intended
for Artificial Intelligence. It has thus become the most cited approach in the agent
community. This gives it a kind of legitimacy, since it seems to fit the requirements
for most of existing emotional agents. Of course this argument does not ensure that
this theory is better than the other ones, so this problem will be discussed again in
Chapter 7 when using our model to assess the underlying theory.
In this chapter we start from the OCC typology and try to formalize its defini-
tions in our formal language presented in Chapter 3. Actually we only formalize
two branches of the OCC typology. The event-based branch of the OCC typology
contains emotion types whose eliciting conditions depend on the evaluation of an
event w.r.t. the agent’s goals. Desirability is a central intensity variable accounting
for the impact that an event has on an agent’s goals, viz. how it helps or impedes
their achievement. The agent-based branch of the OCC typology contains emotion
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types whose eliciting conditions depend on the judgement of the praiseworthiness
of an action, with respect to standards. An action is praiseworthy (resp. blamewor-
thy) when it upholds (resp. violates) standards. The standards under concern are
supposed to be internalized, i.e. the (evaluating) agent has adopted them.
There are some difficulties in such an initiative. The first one is to understand
what is meant in the definition: the concepts involved can be ambiguous, and we
have to interpret the definition before formalizing it. The second one is to find an
adapted formalization for these concepts: indeed a logical language is inevitably
far less expressive that natural language, and it is difficult to match complex psy-
chological concepts with a limited set of modal operators. Therefore, our formal
definitions depend on our interpretation of Ortony et al.’s informal definitions, and
this interpretation is subject to debate. That’s why in the following sections we
will not only expose our formalizations but also discuss our choices for each one
of them. Moreover we will also support the accuracy of our choices by showing
that our definitions can capture the situations that Ortony et al. use in their book to
illustrate their emotion types.
In the following we present ten pairs of opposite emotions (that can be en-
tire groups or subgroups in the OCC typology), while always respecting the same
structure:
• we begin with giving Ortony and colleagues’ informal definitions of one or
several close pairs of emotions; we immediately propose a formal defini-
tions of these emotions and apply them to Ortony et al.’s examples (the page
numbers always refer to their book (Ortony, Clore, and Collins, 1988));
• we then discuss our choices of formalization and support them by giving
some examples;
• finally we compare Ortony et al.’s definitions of these emotions with the
definitions of close emotions from Lazarus’ theory (we always refer here to
his book (Lazarus, 1991), presented in details in Section 1.3.2).
4.2 Well-being emotions
The emotion types in this group have eliciting conditions focused on the desirabil-
ity for the self of an event.
4.2.1 Well-being emotions
Definition by OCC (Joy and distress). An agent feels joy (resp. distress) when he
is pleased (resp. displeased) about a desirable (resp. undesirable) event.
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Our formal definition 1 (Joy and distress).
Joy i ϕ
def
= Bel i ϕ ∧Des i ϕ
Distress i ϕ
def
= Bel i ϕ ∧Des i ¬ϕ
Example by OCC. For example in (Ortony, Clore, and Collins, 1988, p. 88),
when a man i hears that he inherits of a small amount of money from a remote
and unknown relative k (Bel i (m ∧ d)), he feels joy because he focuses on the
desirable event (Des i m). On the contrary, this man does not feel distress about his
relative’s death, because since he did not know him we can guess that his death is
not undesirable for him (¬Des i ¬d). On the contrary, a man j (p. 89) who runs
out of gas on the freeway (Bel j o) feels distress because this is undesirable for him
(Desj ¬o).
4.2.2 Choices of formalization
4.2.2.1 Desirability
In this definition (and in all the following ones), we represent something “desir-
able” for the agent i through the modal operator Des i . Other researchers who tried
to account for emotions in a logical framework have rather characterized this desir-
ability through the achievement of a goal (Ochs et al., 2005; Meyer, 2004). So why
do we use desires rather than goals? Let’s illustrate this choice with two examples.
First, we suppose that a man has to go to the dentist to treat caries. He believes
that it will hurt so he desires not to go, he does not like to go. But he also knows
that it would be worse if he does not go, so he decides to and adopt the goal or
intention to go. The day of the operation he is probably afraid about it. Now, we
suppose that the dentist calls him to cancel the operation. The man would probably
feel relieved about this, although his intention has just failed. What makes him
happy here is his satisfied desire (not to go to the dentist) and not his goal.
Second we suppose that a woman hears that some singer that she likes has just
died in an accident. She feels quite sad about this because she liked this person.
However we cannot say that she had the intention that the singer does not die,
since this does not depend on her, she cannot do anything to prevent it. Actually
this woman does not intend that the singer stays alive, but she desires it.
Finally, desires are something weaker than intentions (to desire something does
not imply that it is possible to make it happen). When they are realistic some de-
sires can be selected and become goals or intentions, but many times desires are
contrary to intentions. For example I intend to go to work every morning while I
desire to stay at home. Desires are closer to what Lazarus calls ego-involvement,
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they represent the agent’s very personality, what makes him really different from
the other agents. That’s why in the following we always use desires rather than
goals or intentions to represent what makes an agent feel emotions. Thus we for-
malize desirability through our Des i operators.
4.2.2.2 Belief or surprise
Some researchers suppose that the agent needs to be surprised in order to feel joy.
We agree that surprise can increase the intensity of joy: indeed according to Ortony
and colleagues the intensity of event-based emotions is impacted by the likelihood
of the event; and many researchers consider the novelty (or surprisingness) of the
stimulus as an appraisal variable. But we believe that surprise is not necessary to
feel joy: for example a couple who has a baby has awaited him for nine months,
they are thus not surprised at all the day of his birth, and nevertheless they feel joy.
We thus do not impose in the definition that the event at hand is surprising for the
agent.
4.2.3 Discussion
According to Lazarus, the core relational theme1 for joy is “reasonable progress
towards the realization of our goals”. But he also specifies that happiness (or joy)
happens when “we have gained or are gaining what we desire”. This seems to
support our choice of using desires rather than goals in our definitions.
Moreover Lazarus imposes that the general existential background should be
favorable, since the presence of situations inducing negative emotions can at the
same time decrease or even prevent joy. This is not imposed by Ortony et al.: in
their view the individual would have several blended emotions with different inten-
sities depending on the respective importance of the desires involved. Actually we
believe that in an unfavorable background, joy would yet be triggered (even if it is
not expressed due to the presence of more intense negative emotions) and would
maybe mitigate these negative emotions. However we do not describe in our model
how several emotions triggered at the same time can interact with each other. This
could be an interesting continuation of our approach.
4.3 Prospect-based emotions
The emotion types in this group have eliciting conditions focused on the desirabil-
ity for self of an anticipated (uncertain) event, that is actively prospected. They use
1This is Lazarus’ term for designing his definition of the particular type of relation between the
individual and his environment that triggers an emotion (cf. Chapter 1, Section 1.3.2).
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a local intensity variable called likelihood, accounting for the expected probability
of the event to occur.
4.3.1 Prospect-based emotions
Definition by OCC (Hope and fear). An agent feels hope (resp. fear) if he is
pleased (resp. displeased) about the prospect of a desirable (resp. undesirable)
event.
Our formal definition 2 (Hope and fear).
Hopei ϕ
def
= Expect i ϕ ∧Des i ϕ
Fear i ϕ
def
= Expect i ϕ ∧Des i ¬ϕ
Example by OCC. For example a woman w who applies for a job (p. 111) might
feel fear if she expects not to be offered the job (Expectw ¬get-job), or feel hope if
she expects that she will be offered it (Expectw get-job).
An employee e (p. 113) who expects to be red (Expect e f ) will feel fear if it
is undesirable for him (Dese ¬f ), but not if he already envisaged to quit this job
since in this case we can suppose that this is not undesirable for him (¬Des e ¬f ).
4.3.2 Choices of formalization
4.3.2.1 Likelihood
We formalize likelihood with the abbreviation Expect i defined below.
Definition 1. Expect i ϕ
def
= Probi ϕ ∧ ¬Bel i ϕ
Expect i ϕ reads “agent i expects ϕ to be true but envisages the possibility that
it could be false”. We can notice that if i expects something then he necessarily
envisages it:
Expect i ϕ→ ¬Bel i ¬ϕ (4.1)
From (D-Probi ) we can easily prove the consistency of expectations:
Expect i ϕ→ ¬Expect i ¬ϕ (4.2)
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4.3.2.2 Probabilities
The probabilities considered here are debatable. Indeed one can say that on the
contrary, one feels hope when something desirable is little probable, like winning
Loto. Besides, Ortony et al.’s definition of hope is opposite to Lazarus’ one in
terms of the considered probabilities.
Actually we believe that what determines hope or fear is not only the probabil-
ity of the expected event, but its expected utility. This expected utility is a function
of the probability of a gain, the probability of a loss, and the importance of this
gain or loss. For example in playing Loto the expected gain is very huge while
the expected loss is small, so the expected utility is positive. Such a situation thus
results into a hope emotion whose intensity depends on the exact value of this ex-
pected utility. On the contrary when one bets a great amount of money one rather
feels fear of losing everything. Indeed, even if the probability to win can be sup-
posed to be the same as in Loto, the expected loss is important so that finally the
expected utility is this time negative. In this work we choose to be faithful to the
OCC typology, and thus we only consider probability with the same distribution as
in the original definition that we formalize.
4.3.2.3 Present or future
One could also object that our definition accounts for the present and not for the
future. Actually the object of hope (or fear) is not necessarily about the future. For
example an agent can ignore whether his mail has been delivered to the addressee,
and thus hope it has been so. However, he has already sent this mail and perhaps it
has even already been delivered. One can also hope that there remains some cake
when he comes back home.
If the proposition at hand is about future, it suffices to replace ϕ by Fϕ in the
definition. For example to express that i hopes that the rain will stop at some future
instant, we can write:
Hopei F¬rain
def
= Expect i F¬rain ∧Des i F¬rain
Moreover we can notice that Des i F¬rain is a logical consequence of Des i ¬rain.
Therefore it suffices that i prefers that it does not rain in general and expects that
rain will stop at some future instant to deduce that i hopes so.
Thus our definition accounts for any kind of hope, be it directed towards the
future, the present or the past.
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4.3.3 Discussion
Lazarus does not consider hope and fear as being opposite emotions. He defines
hope as “fearing the worst but yielding for better”, viz. the individual’s future ex-
pectations are unfavorable but not hopeless. He thus considers that hope is the
opposite of despair. He then distinguishes between fright (“concrete and sudden
danger of imminent physical harm”) and anxiety (“uncertain, existential threat”)
that involve particular threats (a physical injury for fright, an existential menace to
ego-identity for anxiety). Thus according to Lazarus fright is a kind of concrete
fear while anxiety is more abstract. We believe that fright and anxiety are partic-
ular cases of Ortony et al.’s fear emotion, depending on the type of desire that is
threatened by the prospected event.
4.4 Confirmation and disconfirmation emotions
These emotions correspond to the confirmation or disconfirmation of a prospect-
based emotion (hope or fear). Actually Ortony et al. classify them in the same
group as hope and fear. But for the sake of readability we expose them in a separate
section.
4.4.1 Confirmation emotions
Definition by OCC (Satisfaction and fears confirmed). The agent feels fear-
conrmed (resp. satisfaction) if he is displeased (resp. pleased) about the confir-
mation of the prospect of an undesirable (resp. desirable) event.
Our formal definition 3 (Satisfaction and fears confirmed).
Satisfaction i ϕ
def
= Bel i PExpect i ϕ ∧Des i ϕ ∧ Bel i ϕ
FearConfirmed i ϕ
def
= Bel i PExpect i ϕ ∧Des i ¬ϕ ∧ Bel i ϕ
Example by OCC. A candidate who hoped to get a job and nally gets it feels
satisfaction. An employee who feared to be red feels fear-confirmed when he is.
4.4.2 Disconfirmation emotions
Definition by OCC (Relief and disappointment). The agent feels relief (resp.
disappointment) if he is pleased (resp. displeased) about the disconfirmation of
the prospect of an undesirable (resp. desirable) event.
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Our formal definition 4 (Relief and disappointment).
Relief i ϕ
def
= Bel i PExpect i ¬ϕ ∧Des i ϕ ∧ Bel i ϕ
Disappointment i ϕ
def
= Bel i PExpect i ¬ϕ ∧Des i ¬ϕ ∧ Bel i ϕ
Example by OCC. A candidate who hoped to get a job and does not get it feels
disappointment. An employee who feared to be red will feel relief when he is not
red (Bele ¬f ).
4.4.3 Choices of formalization
4.4.3.1 Preservation of expectations
According to our definitions, we can prove (cf. Chapter 5) that:
Satisfaction i ϕ↔ Bel i PHopei ϕ ∧ Bel i ϕ
This reformulation makes clearer a problem raised by this definition: hope is never
abandoned. Actually if an agent i believes that anytime in the past he has hoped ϕ,
when he finally believes that ϕ is true he feels satisfied. This is not intuitive since
i can have changed his expectations after he hoped ϕ. For example let’s consider
someone who prefers sunny days. During the summer they are more probable
so he hopes for them, while during the winter they are less probable so he stops
hoping for them. Now if the weather is sunny one day during the winter he should
rather feel relieved than satisfied, since this is contrary to his current expectations.
Nevertheless our definitions also trigger satisfaction. This prevents us from proving
that relief and satisfaction about the same event are inconsistent.
A solution would be to use linear temporal logic with Until and Since opera-
tors. We could then write for example
Relief i ϕ
def
= Bel i P(¬Expect i ¬ϕ Since Expect i ϕ) ∧Des i ϕ ∧ Bel i ϕ
and similarly for the other confirmation and disconfirmation emotions. These new
definitions allow to entail the intuitive inconsistencies between confirmation and
disconfirmation emotions about the same event, and also solve the problem of
abandoned hope (or fear). Nevertheless we prefer the linear temporal logic S4.3,
because even if it is not expressive enough in this case, it ensures completeness and
soundness results. We thus keep our current definitions in spite of this imprecision.
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4.4.3.2 Disconfirmation and well-being
From these definitions, we can prove that both confirmation and disconfirmation
emotions entail the corresponding well-being emotions. It is intuitive for confirma-
tion emotions but not for disconfirmation emotions, viz. the implications
Relief i ϕ → Joy i ϕ and Disappointment i ϕ → Sadness i ϕ are not very intu-
itive. Indeed disconfirmation emotions rather seem to occur on a return to a normal
situation that was expected to change but that finally did not. Actually this nor-
mal situation should not necessarily be desirable or undesirable itself, but the logic
of Des imposes that it is. So finally this counter-intuitive property is due to the
simplification choice that we make to have a normal desire (cf. Chapter 3).
4.4.4 Discussion
Lazarus does not define confirmation-based emotions (satisfaction and fears con-
firmed). They seem to be included in more general emotions like joy and distress.
His theory thus seems to be less precise than the OCC typology on this point.
Among disconfirmation emotions Lazarus only defines relief (“a distressing
goal incongruent condition has changed for the better or gone away”), but not dis-
appointment. His definition for relief seems to be more generic than Ortony et al.’s
one. Indeed he does not impose that the individual was feeling fear, but only that he
was facing a goal incongruent situation, that in his theory can trigger any negative
emotion.
4.5 Fortune-of-others emotions
The emotion types in this group have eliciting conditions focused on the presumed
desirability for another agent. They use three local intensity variables: desirability
for other, deservingness, and liking. Desirability for other is the assessment by i
of how much the event is desirable for the other one (j). Deservingness represents
how much agent i believes that agent j deserved what occurred to him. It often
depends on liking, viz. i’s attitude towards j. We thus have to formalize these
variables.
4.5.1 Good-will fortune-of-others emotions
Definition by OCC (Happy for and sorry for). There are two good-will (or em-
pathetic) emotions: an agent feels happy for (resp. sorry for) another agent if he is
pleased (resp. displeased) about an event presumed to be desirable (resp. undesir-
able) for this agent.
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Our formal definition 5 (Happy for and sorry for).
HappyFor i,jϕ
def
= Bel i ϕ ∧ Probi FBel j ϕ ∧ Bel iDesj ϕ ∧Des i Bel j ϕ
SorryFor i,jϕ
def
= Bel i ϕ ∧ Probi FBel j ϕ ∧ Bel iDesj ¬ϕ ∧Des i ¬Bel j ϕ
Example by OCC. Fred (p. 95) feels happy for Mary when she wins a thou-
sand dollars, because he believes that this is desirable for her (Bel f Desmw) and
he has an interest in the well-being of his friends (in particular in this situation:
Belf Desmw → Desf Belmw). So we can deduce that it is also desirable for him
(Desf Belmw). Moreover it is probable for him that she knows or will know that
she won (Probf FBelmw)2.
A man i (p. 95) can feel sorry for the victims v of a natural disaster
(Bel i Belv disaster∧Bel iDesv ¬disaster) without even knowing them, because
he has an interest that people do not suffer undeservedly (Des i ¬Belv disaster).
4.5.2 Ill-will fortune-of-others emotions
Definition by OCC (Resentment and gloating). There are two ill-will emotions:
an agent feels resentment (resp. gloating) towards another agent if he is displeased
(resp. pleased) about an event presumed to be desirable (resp. undesirable) for this
agent.
Our formal definition 6 (Resentment and gloating).
Resentment i,jϕ
def
= Bel i ϕ ∧ Probi FBel j ϕ ∧ Bel iDesj ϕ ∧Des i ¬Bel j ϕ
Gloating i,jϕ
def
= Bel i ϕ ∧ Probi FBel j ϕ ∧ Bel iDesj ¬ϕ ∧Des i Bel j ϕ
Example by OCC. An employee e (p. 99) can feel resentment towards a colleague
c who received a large pay raise (Bel e pr, BeleDesc pr) because he thinks this
colleague is incompetent and thus does not deserve this raise (Des e ¬Bel c pr).
Finally, Nixon’s political opponents (p. 104) might have felt gloating about his
departure from ofce (Bel o Belnixon d, BeloDesnixon ¬d) because they thought it
was deserved (Deso Belnixon d).
2Fred may not feel happy for Mary if she was not to learn about her gain in the future. However,
even if she does not know yet that she won, Fred can feel happy for her just because he considers
it probable that she will learn it at a future moment, without being sure of that. For example, Mary
may have not seen the results yet, and Fred cannot be sure that she will not forget to check them.
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4.5.3 Choices of formalization
4.5.3.1 Desirability for other, liking and deservingness
First, we can represent desirability for other by a belief about the other’s desire:
Bel iDesj ϕ reads “agent i believes that ϕ is desirable for agent j”. Second, we
represent liking through non-logical global axioms. For example, when John likes
Mary this means that if John believes that Mary desires to be rich, then John desires
that Mary be rich, or rather: gets to know that she is rich (Bel johnDesmary rich→
Desjohn Belmary rich). Third, we simplify the concept of deservingness by iden-
tifying “i believes that j deserves ϕ” and “i desires that j believes ϕ”. Then i
can desire that j believes ϕ either because he believes that j desires ϕ and j is his
friend, or because he believes that j desires ¬ϕ and j is his enemy, or because he
believes that j deserved ϕ.
4.5.3.2 Should the other agent know about the event?
We also add a weak condition in the definition: it must be at least probable for
the agent i feeling the emotion that the other agent j learns about the event at
a moment in the future. Ortony et al. do not impose in their definition that the
other agent should know about this event presumably (un)desirable for him, but we
believe that one cannot be happy or sorry for another agent j about something that
j does not even know, and thus about what j is not even happy or sad himself.
Other authors (Ochs, Sadek, and Pelachaud, 2007) do not impose this condi-
tion in their empathetic emotions, but we believe that this can lead to unsuitable
emotions. In this case we are thus more precise than the original definition.
4.5.4 Discussion
Lazarus distinguishes between envy (“wanting what someone else has”) and jeal-
ousy (“resenting a third party for loss or threat to another’s affection” or favor).
These two emotions seem to be particular cases of the resentment emotions de-
fined by Ortony and colleagues. Elliott (1992) has implemented the OCC typology
and has also refined the resentment emotion into two emotions: envy is resentment
over a desired non-exclusive goal while jealousy is resentment over a desired mutu-
ally exclusive goal. Once again these are particular cases of the general resentment
emotion type defined by Ortony et al., depending on the mutual exclusivity or not
of the involved desire.
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4.6 Attribution emotions
The emotion types in this group have eliciting conditions focused on the approving
of an agent’s action. In addition to the appraisal variable of praiseworthiness they
use two local intensity variables. Strength of unit intervenes in self-agent emotions
to represent the degree to which the agent identifies himself with the author of the
action, allowing him to feel pride or shame when he is not directly the actor; for
example one can be proud of his son succeeding in a difficult examination, or of
his rugby team winning the championship. In this work we only focus on emotions
felt by the agent about his own actions, because this variable is to complex to be
represented in our framework. Expectation deviation accounts for the degree to
which the performed action differs from what is usually expected from the agent,
according to his social role or category3.
Notation. In the sequel, Emotion i(i:α,ϕ) (resp. Emotion i,j(j:α,ϕ)) abbreviates
Emotion i(Donei:α>, ϕ) (resp. Emotion i,j(Donej:α>, ϕ)) where Emotion is
the name of an emotion.
Remark 1. These emotions are about an action α that the agent believes to have
inuenced the proposition ϕ, viz. the agent believes that if he had not performed
action α, ϕ would probably be false now. Nevertheless, our language is not
expressive enough to represent this counterfactual reasoning, so we make the hy-
pothesis that the agent i believes that the parameters α and ϕ are linked in this
way. The following denitions do make sense only when this is the case.
4.6.1 Self-agent attribution emotions
Definition by OCC (Pride and shame). Self-agent emotions: an agent feels pride
(resp. shame) if he is approving (resp. disapproving) of his own praiseworthy (resp.
blameworthy) action.
Our formal definition 7 (Pride and shame).
Pridei (i:α,ϕ)
def
= Bel iDonei:α (Idl iHappens i:α ϕ∧
ProbiAfter i:α ¬ϕ) ∧ Bel i ϕ
Shamei (i:α,ϕ)
def
= Bel iDonei:α (Idl i ¬Happens i:α ϕ∧
ProbiAfter i:α ¬ϕ) ∧ Bel i ϕ
3In self-agent emotions, the agent refers to his stereotyped representation of himself.
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Example by OCC. A woman m feels pride (p. 137) of having saved the life of a
drowning child because she performed the action α (to jump into the water to try
to save him) with the successful result s (the child is safe): BelmDonem:α> ∧
Belm s
4
. Moreover she now believes that before the action, it was ideal to save the
child and she internalized this ideal (IdlmHappensm:α>), but she had not much
chances to succeed5 (ProbmAfterm:α ¬s).
A rich elegant lady l (p. 142) would feel shame if caught while stealing clothes
in an exclusive boutique (Shame l (α,>), where α is the action to steal; the result
is > here because this emotion does not depend on the success or failure of the
action but on its very performance) because she has performed an action that was
unideal for her6 (Idl l ¬Happens l:α>) and improbable to be performed by her
(Probl After l:α⊥) due to her social role.
4.6.2 Other-agent attribution emotions
Definition by OCC (Admiration and reproach). Emotions involving another
agent7: an agent feels admiration (resp. reproach) towards another agent if he
is approving (resp. disapproving) of this agent’s praiseworthy (resp. blameworthy)
action.
Our formal definition 8 (Admiration and reproach).
Admiration i,j(j:α,ϕ)
def
= Bel iDonej:α (Idl iHappensj:α ϕ∧
ProbiAfter j:α ¬ϕ) ∧ Bel i ϕ
Reproachi,j(j:α,ϕ)
def
= Bel iDonej:α (Idl i ¬Happensj:α ϕ∧
ProbiAfter j:α ¬ϕ) ∧ Bel i ϕ
Example by OCC. A physicist p’s colleagues c (p. 145) feel admiration towards
him for his Nobel-prize-winning work (Bel cDonep:α> ∧ Bel cw, where α is the
action to conduce experiments, with the result w of obtaining Nobel-prize-winning
4Actually, she also believes that she influenced this result by her action, viz. she believes that if
she had not jumped into the water the child could have drowned; as we said it before, we cannot
express this causal link in our language, so our account is incomplete in that respect.
5Thus, she would not feel pride after saving the child if she believes it was easy for her.
6Actually actions do not obligatorily follow moral values. The lady may have been driven by the
desire to possess the object, violating her ideals. But this example seems to be a borderline case,
since she could have bought the object instead.
7When i = j, these emotions correspond to the self-agent emotions (cf. Theorem 7).
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ndings) because they internalized this result as ideal8 (Idl cHappensp:αw) and
difcult (ProbcAfterp:α ¬w).
A man i may feel reproach towards a driver j (p. 145) who drives without
a valid license (Bel iDonej:δ >, where δ is the action to drive without a valid
license), because it is forbidden and he considers this obligation as being important
(Idl i ¬Happensj:δ >) and unexpected from a driver (Prob iAfter j:δ ⊥).
4.6.3 Choices of formalization
4.6.3.1 Does the agent appraise the very action or its result?
Our first problem when formalizing these emotions was that there seemed to exist
two types of pride, shame, or other attribution emotions: those concerning an ac-
tion, and those concerning its result. For example one can be proud of his action of
participating in the Olympic Games, or can be proud of the result of this action e.g.
winning the gold medal. For example an agent can also be ashamed of failing in an
easy exam (because he failed an easy action) or ashamed of stealing in a shop (be-
cause he performed a forbidden action). In a preceding publication (Adam et al.,
2006c) we accounted only for emotions concerning the performance of an action
and wrote:
Pridei(i:α)
def
= Bel iDonei:α (¬ProbiHappens i:α> ∧ Bel i Idl iHappens i:α>)
Then we tried to unify the two types of pride in one single definition. This emotion
now concerns both an action α and its result ϕ. Ortony et al.’s notion of expectation
deviation can account for the two cases: in one case what is expected is that one
succeeds in an easy action, in the other case what is expected is that one respects
the standards. Both cases can be expressed through our Expect operator.
We can notice that on the contrary we do not capture the attitude of pride (for
example someone can be proud of his nationality). Indeed this is a long-lasting
attitude that is not triggered by an action, whereas the emotion of pride is triggered
by a particular action and then decays.
4.6.3.2 Expectation deviation
We express this notion of expectation with the formula Probj After i:α ¬ϕ reading
“j considers it probable that after i performs α, ϕ is false”, viz. j expects i not
8Here, what is ideal is not the very execution of the action but its execution with this result.
Similarly, in the case of negative emotions, what is unideal is not the happening of the action, but its
happening with a given result: Idl i ¬Happensi:α ϕ. This is compatible with the fact that the action
itself could be ideal: Idl i Happensi:α >. For example, it is ideal to participate, but unideal to lose
when you are expected to win.
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to achieve ϕ as a result of his action, for example because it is difficult. The
deviation comes from the fact that after the execution of α, j believes that ϕ is
nevertheless true, contrarily to what he expected9. This prevents the agent from
feeling attribution emotions too often. Indeed, we often respect the law without
being proud, and we often violate standards without being ashamed. Therefore we
consider that the standards have to be internalized and accepted by the agent as
belonging to his values to make him feel attribution emotions related to them. This
makes it possible for an agent to feel no emotion, even concerning an (un)ideal
action, when this is not important for him. For example someone who likes to
wear strange (unideal) clothes would not feel ashamed about this if it is what he
desires to wear, but he would if he was forced to wear so.
4.6.3.3 Internalized standards
What is involved in our definitions is not a law (classically represented through
a deontic operator Obligs indexed by the institution that imposes the law) but an
internalized standard. What we call internalized standard is a norm or law that the
agent has accepted for himself, that he judges important. Thus our deontic operator
Idl i is indexed by the agent who has internalized this standard and considers it as
one of his own ideals. For example a mafia member can kill people without feeling
ashamed because he did not internalize the law forbidding to kill.
Indeed we do not feel emotions each time we respect or violate laws or stan-
dards, but only when these law are important for us. For example a girl who comes
to school with a too short skirt prohibited by the school rules does not feel ashamed
about this, because in her mind it is not important to wear appropriate clothes to go
to school (actually in her mind this skirt may be appropriate). Each individual thus
has his own internalized standards, stemming from the groups to which he belongs,
but different from the standards internalized by the other members of these groups.
We call these internalized standards the agent’s ideals and formalize them with our
modal operator Idl i .
4.6.3.4 Are ideals conscious before the action ?
Finally, we do not impose that the ideal was known at the moment of the action. For
example one can feel ashamed about having performed an action when he realize
that it was blameworthy, even if he ignored that while performing it. For example,
someone who visit Japan can ignore the standards that hold there. Now when he
greets someone by shaking hands, he ignores that this is not the standard salutation.
9What is unexpected is not just the performance of the action but also its result ϕ; actually, in the
case where ϕ is > it is the very performance of the action that is unexpected.
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When he later learns that he should have just bowed instead of shaking hands he
can feel ashamed about his action. Therefore we do not impose that the standards
are conscious at the moment of the action, but only that they are conscious when
the agent feels the emotion.
Ideally, we should not impose it either for the probability. For example one
can be unaware of the risks when he dives into the water to save a drowning child;
he thus feels pride only when he realizes that his action was very brave. But the
Probi operators are intrinsically epistemic (viz. semantically, probable worlds are
a subset of possible worlds compatible with the agent’s beliefs); so technically it is
difficult to avoid consciousness of probabilities in our present setting.
4.6.3.5 Whose is the ideal in other-agent emotions?
In self-agent emotions, the agent who performs the action upholds or violates one
of his own ideals. In other-agent emotions, the agent feeling the emotion believes
that the other agent’s action upholds or violates a standard. The problem is to
determine whose is the involved standard.
In this work we consider that an agent i feels an attribution emotion towards
another agent j if he believes that j has performed an action that upholds or violates
i’s own standards (and not j’s ones). For example the teacher who reproaches her
clothes to a student refers to his own internalized standards: he considers important
that students wear appropriate clothes at school. He can feel reproach towards a
student even if this student did not internalize this standard viz. does not consider
it important. That is, the teacher can feel reproach towards the student even if the
student does not feel shame about his action. Thus in our definitions the relevant
standards are always those of the agent who feels the emotion.
4.6.3.6 About group ideals
The standards stemming from several groups to which an individual belongs can
differ. Therefore he may potentially feel different emotions about a same action.
For example the school girl may feel ashamed in front of the teacher who re-
proaches her to wear such clothes, while she would feel pride in front of her friends
who admire her trendy skirt. A classical example involves a catholic soldier: the
standards in the army impose him to kill enemies while his religious standards for-
bid him to kill people. When killing an enemy he may thus feel shame in front of
a priest but certainly not in front of the other soldiers.
A solution would be to make precise the group that imposes the standard in the
operator Idl and thus also in the attribution emotion. An agent would thus feel an
attribution emotion towards a given group that imposes the involved standard. For
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example:
Pridei,G(α,ϕ)
def
= Bel i Donei:α (Idl i,GHappens i:α ϕ ∧ Probi After i:α ¬ϕ) ∧ Bel i ϕ
For the sake of simplicity we do not consider such group ideals for now. The study
of the properties of this new operator could be subject of later work.
4.6.4 Discussion
Lazarus has a similar definition for pride: “enhancement of one’s ego-identity by
taking credit for a valued object or achievement, either our own or that of some-
one or group with whom we identify”. He also considers what Ortony et al. call
strength of unit through this notion of identification with a person or a group.
Lazarus distinguishes between guilt (“having transgressed a moral imperative”)
that he characterizes as self-disgrace, and shame (“a failure to live up to an ego-
ideal”) that he characterizes as social disgrace. This distinction seems to match the
two cases that we envisaged: the shame of failing an action viz. of not reaching
the expected result matches Lazarus’ shame; the shame of performing a prohib-
ited action matches Lazarus’ guilt. We have unified these two cases in one single
definition.
Besides Lazarus does not define other-agent attribution emotions: admiration
and reproach. Once again his theory seems to cover less situations than does Ortony
et al.’s one, even if he describes some situations more precisely.
4.7 Well-being and attribution composed emotions
4.7.1 Composed emotions
Definition by OCC. These emotions occur when the agent appraises both the
consequences of the event and its agency. They are thus the result of a combination
of attribution emotions about an action α with result ϕ, and well-being emotions
about this result ϕ.
Our formal definition 9.
Gratification i (i:α,ϕ)
def
= Pridei (i:α,ϕ) ∧ Joy i ϕ
Remorsei (i:α,ϕ)
def
= Shamei (i:α,ϕ) ∧Distress i ϕ
Gratitudei,j(j:α,ϕ)
def
= Admiration i,j(j:α,ϕ) ∧ Joy i ϕ
Anger i,j(j:α,ϕ)
def
= Reproachi,j(j:α,ϕ) ∧Distress i ϕ
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Example by OCC. A woman i may feel gratitude (p. 148) towards the stranger j
who saved her child from drowning (Bel iDonej:α>∧Bel i s, where j:α is j’s ac-
tion to jump in the water, and s is the result: her child is safe). Indeed, i feels admi-
ration towards j because of j’s ideal but difcult (viz. before it, Prob iAfter j:α ¬s
held) action. Moreover the result of j’s action (Bel i s) is desirable for i (Des i s),
so i also feels joy about it (Joy i s).
Similarly, a woman w (p. 148) may feel anger towards her husband h who
forgets to buy the groceries (Belw Doneh:α>, where α is his action to go shop-
ping, and Belw ¬g, where g reads there are groceries for dinner), because w
reproaches this unideal result to h (it was not the expected result of the action:
Probw Afterh:α g), and she is also sad about it (Distressw ¬g) because she de-
sired to eat vegetables (Desw g).
The physicist p may feel gratification about winning the Nobel prize because
he performed a successful execution of action α (making research), achieving the
ideal result n (he receives the Nobel prize), and thus feels pride; and this result
is not only socially ideal but also desirable for him10 (Desp n), so pride combines
with joy.
Finally, a spy may feel remorse (p. 148) about having betrayed his country (ac-
tion ω) if he moreover caused undesirable damages (result d): Shame spy (ω, d) ∧
Distressspy d.
4.7.2 Discussion
Lazarus defines anger: “a demeaning offense against me and mine”. This is rather
in agreement with Ortony et al.. However he does not define the other composed
emotions of the OCC typology: gratitude, gratification, remorse.
If Ortony et al. define remorse, they do not consider regret, and neither does
Lazarus. Yet avoiding regrets is a powerful motor of action in decision theory.
4.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we thus formalized twenty emotions of the OCC typology while
staying as close as possible to their psychological definitions in (Ortony, Clore,
and Collins, 1988). To measure how much close we are to Ortony et al.’s defini-
tions we showed for each of our formal definitions that it could capture the author’s
illustrating example for this emotion. We have also discussed all our necessary
interpretations of Ortony et al.’s theory and all our choices of formalization on in-
tuitive examples that support them. Finally the next chapter exposes some intuitive
properties of emotions that our formal definitions allow to deduce, what validates
10This is not always true. For example, one can personally desire not to go to school, while it is
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them once more. Nevertheless we have to highlight here some shortcomings in our
account that are mainly due to limitations in the expressivity of our modal logic.
4.8.1 Limitations of our account of the OCC typology
4.8.1.1 Intensity of emotions, dynamics and blending
First our modal operators are not graded: they have no associated degree, because
it is a complex task to define a semantics for such operators (Laverny and Lang
(2004,2005a)). Thus our emotions are not quantitative either, viz. they have no
intensity. This is an important drawback since the intensity is essential to charac-
terize an emotion (Frijda et al., 1992). This prevents us from formalizing intensity
variations in the same type of emotion (for example: irritation, anger, rage), that
are yet crucial for an expressive agent. This also prevents us from managing the
temporal evolution of emotions, in particular their decay over time. Thus our emo-
tions persist as long as their conditions stay true. Thereby some emotions (like Joy
or Satisfaction ) can persist ad vitam eternam, which is not intuitive at all. Indeed
it has been established in psychology that after an emotion is triggered its inten-
sity decreases, and when it is below a threshold the emotion disappears. Finally,
we cannot manage emotional blending of several emotions that are simultaneously
triggered; Gershenson (1999) proposes an original solution to this issue.
We leave these problems for further work. When we implemented our model
(cf. Chapter 7) we made some concessions on the semantics in order to have graded
emotions. However in this chapter we only give the definition of an emotion but
we provide no way of computing its intensity.
4.8.1.2 About intensity variables
As a consequence, we cannot account for what Ortony et al. call intensity variables
that are supposed to influence only the intensity of a given emotion. Actually we
can only treat these variables in an all-or-nothing fashion. That is, when such a
variable appeared to be crucial, we integrated it in the definition of the emotion,
making it indispensable for the very triggering of the emotion. Otherwise we did
not take it into account at all in the definition, so that the emotion can exist with-
out it. For example expectation deviation appears in our definitions of attribution
emotions while it is only an intensity variable in the OCC typology. A qualita-
tive approximation could be to define several emotions in each of OCC’s emotion
types, each corresponding to a different degree of intensity and thus involving dif-
ferent intensity variables. But what we want to capture is the general emotion type,
and these particular emotions are just variations on it. Thus in this work we only
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give one definition corresponding to what we believe to be essential to the defined
emotion type.
4.8.1.3 Limitations due to the chosen modal operators
Another problem was to translate the complex concepts that can be expressed in
natural language into a limited set of modal operators. It may seem easy to invent
operators matching exactly the needed concepts, but it is not. Since we wanted to
use our logic to do proofs, we had to ensure correctness and completeness results
and thus to make some simplifications. First (cf. Chapter 3) we use linear temporal
logic S4.3 without Since and Until operators whose expressivity could yet have
been useful (cf. Section 4.4.3.1). Second we have no way of expressing exactly
the causal link between an action and its result. The logic Kt does not provide
operators expressing this link. The operator STIT is currently under investigation
(Chellas, 1992; Horty and Belnap, 1995b; Troquard, Trypuz, and Vieu, 2006) to fill
this gap. Meanwhile we had to approximate this link through making some sim-
plification hypothesis (cf. Remark 1). Finally this work currently excludes object-
based emotions: in future work a modal predicate logic could allow to characterize
the properties of objects and thus define the emotions triggered by their appraisal.
Under these simplifications and approximations we managed to formalize twenty
emotions of the OCC typology. We then compared on each group of emotions
Ortony et al.’s typology with Lazarus’ theory.
4.8.2 Comparison between Lazarus and OCC
Through this comparison, Lazarus first seems to offer a more precise account of
emotions. He uses more complex appraisal variables (for example he distinguishes
six types of ego-involvement) to make fine-grained differentiations between some
emotions that Ortony et al. gather in one single emotion type (e.g. guilt and shame,
envy and jealousy, fright and anxiety). But meanwhile he neglects some emotions
that are considered in the OCC typology (e.g. admiration, reproach, remorse, happy
for, gloating...) and that seem to be important. Finally we can say that the OCC
typology thus seems to be more adapted to design an expressive emotional agent.
Indeed what such an agent needs is to express adapted emotions in a great variety
of situations, viz. it needs to be robust. On the contrary Lazarus privileges precision
to robustness, so an agent with this theory could express very fine emotions in some
situations, and no emotion at all in some others. His account could thus be useful
only in a second step of analysis: if the agent’s emotions are not precise enough
in some cases we could refine our definitions by looking at Lazarus’ theory. We
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will thus check if we need such improvements by evaluating our formalization (cf.
Chapter 7).
To conclude this chapter we now present how we continue this work in the
following chapters.
4.8.3 Subsequent work
4.8.3.1 Formal properties of emotions
Provided our proposed formal definitions are accepted, the properties of emotions
can now be proved as theorems. In Chapter 5 we expose and prove some properties,
particularly relating to causal and temporal links between emotions.
4.8.3.2 Evaluation of the model
These properties along with the formalization of examples from Ortony et al.’s
book contribute to support the accuracy of our definitions and their faithfulness
to the theory. Beyond, we wanted to further assess our model and thus decided
to implement it in a BDI agent. This expressive agent was then submitted to the
evaluation of human who assessed the relevance and believability of his emotions
during a short scenario (cf. Chapter 7). This work has given encouraging results
and we plan to renew such experiments, in cooperation with psychologists, who
could take advantage of such a method to evaluate their theories.
4.8.3.3 Coping
Finally we can notice that this work only concerns the appraisal process, viz. the
process conducing to the triggering of emotions. But for psychologists, the emo-
tional mechanism not only comprises the appraisal process but also a coping pro-
cess accounting for the influence of emotions on behaviour. We are currently
working on the modeling of this second process in the same BDI formalism. In
Chapter 8 we present the current state of this still ongoing research.
To conclude, such a work opens various continuations that can be interesting
for several research fields. Embodied conversational agent designers will be inter-
ested in giving coping abilities to their agent to make their whole behaviour more
emotional and believable (cf. Chapter 8). Psychologists may find it interesting to
assess psychological theories thanks to an emotional agent (cf. Chapter 7). Fi-
nally philosophers or logicians may like the possibility to formally prove that some
properties hold or not for emotions. This is the object of the next chapter.
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Chapter 5
Formal properties of emotions
Deep in the human unconscious is a pervasive need for
a logical universe that makes sense. But the real
universe is always one step beyond logic.
Frank Herbert
5.1 Introduction
As we saw in the state of the art of psychological theories (Chapter 1), emotions
are a complex phenomenon that has always been subject to great debates while
research got along. Indeed, when concepts are defined informally their definition
and properties are always debatable. On the contrary a logical formalization of a
concept makes it unambiguous.
In this chapter we show how our sound and complete logical framework (cf.
Chapter 3) allows to reason about the properties of emotions. This is one step
further in disambiguating them, after the formal definitions proposed in Chapter 4
Indeed, provided that our formal definitions are accepted, we can prove some prop-
erties of emotions as theorems of our logic that thus are not debatable anymore.
The following sections expose and prove some properties of emotions, partic-
ularly referring to the causal and temporal links that exist or do not exist between
some of them. Some of these properties go beyond what Ortony et al. expose in
their book but they remain intuitive. Such a work once more supports the assets of
formal reasoning about emotions.
In the proofs, PL refers to the Propositional Logic, and ML refers to the
principles of normal modal logic (cf. Section 3.3.1).
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5.2 Prospect-based emotions and their confirmation
5.2.1 New definitions of confirmation and disconfirmation emotions
We wrote our definitions so that they are not redundant. We can prove that as they
are defined, confirmation and disconfirmation emotions are equivalent to a past
prospect-based emotion and a related belief.
Theorem 1 (New definitions of confirmation and disconfirmation emotions).
Satisfaction i ϕ↔ Bel i PHopei ϕ ∧ Bel i ϕ (a)
FearConfirmed i ϕ↔ Bel i PFear i ϕ ∧ Bel i ϕ (b)
Relief i ϕ↔ Bel i PFear i ¬ϕ ∧ Bel i ϕ (c)
Disappointment i ϕ↔ Bel i PHopei ¬ϕ ∧ Bel i ϕ (d)
To prove Theorem 1 we need the two following lemmas.
Lemma 1. Des i ϕ→ Bel iHDes i ϕ
Proof (of Lemma 1).
1. Des i ϕ→ HDes i ϕ (from Pers-Des i )
2. Bel iDes i ϕ→ Bel iHDes i ϕ (by RM-¤ for Bel i )
3. Des i ϕ→ Bel iDes i ϕ (from 4-MIX2)
4. Des i ϕ→ Bel iHDes i ϕ (from 2. and 3.)
Lemma 2. ` Bel i PDes i ϕ→ Des i ϕ.
Proof (of Lemma 2).
1. ` Des i ϕ→ GDes i ϕ (from (Pers-Des i ))
2. ` PDes i ϕ→ PGDes i ϕ (from 1. by ML )
3. ` PDes i ϕ→ Des i ϕ (from 2. by (CONV-HF))
4. ` Bel i PDes i ϕ→ Bel iDes i ϕ (from 3. by (RM-¤) for Bel i )
5. ` Bel iDes i ϕ→ Des i ϕ (from (5-MIX2) and (D-Bel i ))
6. ` Bel i PDes i ϕ→ Des i ϕ (from 4. and 5. by PL )
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Proof (of Theorem 1).
Case of (a).
We will rst prove that Satisfaction i ϕ→ Bel i PHopei ϕ ∧ Bel i ϕ.
1. Satisfaction i ϕ→ Bel i PExpect i ϕ ∧Des i ϕ ∧ Bel i ϕ
(by definition of Satisfaction )
2. Des i ϕ→ Bel iHDes i ϕ (from Lemma 1)
3. (PExpect i ϕ ∧HDes i ϕ) → P(Expect i ϕ ∧Des i ϕ)
(from theorem (3.1) for P )
4. Bel i (PExpect i ϕ ∧HDes i ϕ) → Bel i PHopei ϕ
(by RM-¤ for Bel i and definition of Hope )
5. Satisfaction i ϕ→ Bel i ϕ ∧ Bel i PHopei ϕ (from 1., 2. and 4.)
We will then prove that Bel i PHopei ϕ ∧ Bel i ϕ→ Satisfaction i ϕ.
1. Bel i PHopei ϕ ∧ Bel i ϕ→ Bel i PExpect i ϕ ∧ Bel i PDes i ϕ ∧ Bel i ϕ
(from definition of Hope )
2. Bel i PDes i ϕ→ Des i ϕ (from Lemma 2)
3. Bel i PHopei ϕ ∧ Bel i ϕ→ Satisfaction i ϕ
(from 1. and 2. by definition of Satisfaction )
The proof is similar for (b), (c) and (d).
5.2.2 Temporal link from prospect to confirmation
If an agent remembers that at a moment in the past he was feeling a prospect-based
emotion about ϕ, and if he does not ignore anymore if ϕ is true or false, then our
logic entails that he feels the corresponding confirmation emotion.
Theorem 2 (Temporal link from prospect to confirmation).
` Bel i PHopei ϕ ∧ (Bel i ϕ ∨ Bel i ¬ϕ) →
Satisfaction i ϕ ∨Disappointment i ¬ϕ
(a)
` Bel i PFear i ϕ ∧ (Bel i ϕ ∨ Bel i ¬ϕ) →
Relief i ϕ ∨ FearConfirmed i ¬ϕ
(b)
Sketch of proof (of Theorem 2). The proof trivially follows from the new def-
initions of conrmation and disconrmation emotions introduced in the previous
subsection.
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5.2.3 Inconsistency between confirmation and disconfirmation
Moreover, we can prove that an agent cannot feel simultaneously two emotions
concerning the confirmation and the disconfirmation of the same expectation.
Theorem 3 (Inconsistency between confirmation and disconfirmation).
` ¬(Satisfaction i ϕ ∧Disappointment i ¬ϕ) (a)
` ¬(FearConfirmed i ϕ ∧ Relief i ¬ϕ) (b)
Sketch of proof (of Theorem 3).
The proof immediately comes from the rationality axiom for belief.
Please note that on the contrary, we cannot prove inconsistencies between relief
and satisfaction, or between fear-confirmed and disappointment. This is because
Bel i PExpect i ¬ϕ and Bel i PExpect i ϕ are consistent, viz. the agent can have ex-
pected ϕ at one moment in the past and ¬ϕ at another moment1. We can only prove
that these two expectations cannot occur at the same moment (property (4.2)).
5.2.4 Link between confirmation and well-being emotions
We can prove that the positive confirmation emotions imply joy, and the negative
confirmation emotions imply distress. This is intuitive, and in agreement with
Ortony et al.’s definitions.
Theorem 4 (Link between confirmation and well-being emotions).
`Satisfaction i ϕ→ Joy i ϕ (a)
`FearConfirmed i ϕ→ Distress i ϕ (b)
`Relief i ϕ→ Joy i ϕ (c)
`Disappointment i ϕ→ Distress i ϕ (d)
Proof (of Theorem 4). Case of (a).
1. ` Satisfaction i ϕ→ Bel i ϕ ∧Des i ϕ (from def. of Satisfaction )
2. ` Satisfaction i ϕ→ Joy i ϕ (by definition of Joy )
The proof is similar for cases (b) to (d).
1Thus, our current definitions of confirmation and disconfirmation emotions may not be precise
enough to entail this intuitive inconsistency. Actually, in linear temporal logic with Until and Since
operators, we could write for example Relief i ϕ
def
= Bel i P(¬Expect i ¬ϕ Since Expect i ϕ) ∧
Desi ϕ ∧ Bel i ϕ. Yet, we prefer the linear temporal logic S4.3, because even if it is not expres-
sive enough in this case, it ensures completeness and soundness results.
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5.3 Fortunes-of-others emotions
5.3.1 From fortune-of-other emotion to image of other
We can prove that if the agent i feels a fortune-of-other emotion towards another
agent j about ϕ, then he have at least a probability about j feeling the correspond-
ing well-being emotion about ϕ at a moment in the future.
Theorem 5 (From fortune-of-other emotion to image of other).
`HappyFor i,jϕ→ Probi FJoyj ϕ (a)
`SorryFor i,jϕ→ Probi FDistressj ϕ (b)
`Resentment i,jϕ→ Probi FJoyj ϕ (c)
`Gloating i,jϕ→ Probi FDistressj ϕ (d)
Proof (of Theorem 5). Case of (a).
1. ` HappyFor i,jϕ→ Probi FBel j ϕ ∧ Bel iDesj ϕ
(from definition of HappyFor)
2. ` HappyFor i,jϕ→ Probi (FBel j ϕ ∧GDesj ϕ)
(by (Pers-Des i ) and (C-MIX))
3. ` HappyFor i,jϕ→ Probi F (Bel j ϕ ∧Desj ϕ) (by property (3.1) for G)
4. ` HappyFor i,jϕ→ Probi FJoyj ϕ (by definition of Joy )
The proof is similar for cases (b) to (d).
5.3.2 Consequences of fortunes-of-others emotions
If an agent i feels a fortune-of-other emotion towards another agent about ϕ, and i
is not sure that j will learn about the event ϕ, then i feels a corresponding prospect-
based emotion about j believing ϕ.
Theorem 6 (Consequences of fortunes-of-others emotions).
` HappyFor i,jϕ ∧ ¬Bel i FBel j ϕ→ Hopei FBel j ϕ (a)
` SorryFor i,jϕ ∧ ¬Bel i FBel j ϕ→ Fear i FBel j ϕ (b)
` Resentment i,jϕ ∧ ¬Bel i FBel j ϕ→ Fear i FBel j ϕ (c)
` Gloating i,jϕ ∧ ¬Bel i FBel j ϕ→ Hopei FBel j ϕ (d)
Proof (of Theorem 6). Case of (a).
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1. ` HappyFor i,jϕ→ Probi FBel j ϕ ∧Des i Bel j ϕ
(from definition of HappyFor)
2. ` HappyFor i,jϕ→ Probi FBel j ϕ ∧Des i FBel j ϕ
(by contraposition of (T-G), and (RM-¤) for Des i )
3. ` HappyFor i,jϕ ∧ ¬Bel i FBel j ϕ→
Probi FBel j ϕ ∧ ¬Bel i FBel j ϕ ∧Des i FBel j ϕ (by PL )
4. ` HappyFor i,jϕ ∧ ¬Bel i FBel j ϕ→
Expect i FBel j ϕ ∧Des i FBel j ϕ (by definition 1)
5. ` HappyFor i,jϕ ∧ ¬Bel i FBel j ϕ→ Hopei FBel j ϕ
(by definition of Hope )
The proof is similar for cases (b) to (d).
5.4 Attribution emotions
5.4.1 Other-agent emotions towards oneself
We can prove that an other-agent emotion towards oneself is equivalent to the cor-
responding self-agent emotion. This is rather intuitive, all the more Ortony et al.
introduce the term self-reproach for shame.
Theorem 7 (Other-agent emotions towards oneself).
` Admiration i,i(i:α,ϕ) ↔ Pride i (i:α,ϕ) (a)
` Reproachi,i(i:α,ϕ) ↔ Shame i (i:α,ϕ) (b)
Proof (of Theorem 7).
Case of (a). The proof comes immediately from the denitions of these two emo-
tions.
1. ` Admiration i,i(i:α,ϕ) ↔ Bel i Donei:α (¬Probi Happens i:α> ∧
Bel i Idl i Happens i:α>) (by definition of Admiration)
2. ` Admiration i,i(i:α,ϕ) ↔ Pride i (i:α,ϕ) (by definition of Pride)
The proof is similar for (b).
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5.4.2 Other-agent emotion does not force self-agent emotion
We can prove that if another agent j feels an attribution emotion towards an agent
i about a given action with a given result, then the agent i does not inevitably
feel the corresponding self-agent attribution emotion. That is, one can admire you
about a given action while you are not proud about it. For example a fireman who
extinguishes a fire may be admired by people watching the scene, while he believes
that he is only doing his job and thus does not feel pride.
Theorem 8 (Other-agent emotion does not force self-agent emotion).
6` Bel iAdmirationj,i(i:α,ϕ) → Pride i (i:α,ϕ) (a)
6` Bel iReproachj,i(i:α,ϕ) → Shame i (i:α,ϕ) (b)
Sketch of proof (of Theorem 8). It sufces to nd a counter-example, viz. a model
where the implication is not valid, viz. a model containing at least one world where
the implication is false.
Case of (b). By denition, Bel j Reproachi,j(j:α,ϕ) does not imply
Desj ¬Happensj:α ϕ. In a world where the rst formula is true and the second
one is false, the implication is false. For example, a teacher in a school can re-
proach to a student to wear unauthorised clothes, and tell this to him, without
making this student ashamed of wearing them.
5.4.3 Link between prospect and attribution emotions
Both prospect-based emotions and attribution emotions involve probabilities. We
thus get interested in their temporal links with each other. We can prove that if
an agent feels an attribution emotion about an action with a given result, and that
before this action he envisaged that it could happen with this result and had a
corresponding desire, then at this moment he felt a prospect-based emotion about
the performance of this action with this result (viz. about the success or failure of
the action w.r.t. the prospected result). We have the same theorem if the agent
feeling the emotion is different from the agent performing the action.
For example if an agent is proud of having succeeded in an exam, and if before
this exam he envisaged to succeed (and desired to do so), then he was fearing to
fail. This example matches the following theorem when α is the action to pass the
exam and ϕ represents the successful result.
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Theorem 9 (Link between prospect and attribution emotions).
` Pridei (i:α,ϕ) → Bel iDonei:α ((¬Bel i ¬Happens i:α ϕ∧
Des iHappens i:α ϕ) → Fear i ¬Happens i:α ϕ)
(a)
` Shamei (i:α,ϕ) → Bel iDonei:α ((¬Bel i ¬Happens i:α ϕ∧
Des i ¬Happens i:α ϕ) → Hopei ¬Happens i:α ϕ)
(b)
` Admiration i,j(j:α,ϕ) → Bel iDonej:α ((¬Bel i ¬Happensj:α ϕ∧
Des iHappensj:α ϕ) → Fear i ¬Happensj:α ϕ)
(c)
` Reproachi,j(j:α,ϕ) → Bel iDonej:α ((¬Bel i ¬Happensj:α ϕ∧
Des i ¬Happensj:α ϕ) → Hopei ¬Happensj:α ϕ)
(d)
We can notice that we have to impose that the agent had a corresponding desire
in order to make him feel fear or hope. Moral values (internalized ideals formalized
with our Idl operator) are not sufficient to trigger these emotions, since they can
be inconsistent with desires. For example one can desire to kill someone he hates
while his moral values tell him not to do so.
Proof (of Theorem 9). Case of (a).
1. ` Pride i (i:α,ϕ) → Bel iDonei:α (ProbiAfter i:α ¬ϕ)
(by definition of Pride)
2. ` Pride i (i:α,ϕ) → Bel iDonei:α (Probi ¬Happens i:α ϕ)
(by definition of Happens )
3. ` Pride i (i:α,ϕ) → Bel iDonei:α (¬Bel i ¬Happens i:α ϕ→
Expect i ¬Happens i:α ϕ) (by PL and definition 1)
4. ` Pride i (i:α,ϕ) → Bel iDonei:α (¬Bel i ¬Happens i:α ϕ ∧
Des iHappens i:α ϕ→ Fear i ¬Happens i:α ϕ)
(by PL and definition of Fear )
The proof is similar for (b), (c) and (d).
5.4.4 Link between attribution and prospect emotions
We can also prove a kind of converse of this theorem: if the agent fears (resp.
hopes) that he does not perform the action α with result ϕ, and that this perfor-
mance is ideal for him (resp. unideal), then after he performed α, if he believes
that ϕ is true then he feels pride (resp. shame). Actually, the agent was afraid to
fail (resp. he hoped to succeed). For example someone who passes an examination
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and has few chances to succeed would feel afraid of failing, and then if he succeeds
he would feel pride because it was difficult.
Theorem 10 (Link between attribution and prospect emotions). If α is an ac-
tion that the agent i believes to inuence the proposition ϕ (cf. remark 1), then:
` Fear i ¬Happens i:α ϕ ∧ Bel i Idl iHappens i:α ϕ→
After i:α (Bel i ϕ→ Pridei (i:α,ϕ))
(a)
` Hopei ¬Happens i:α ϕ ∧ Bel i Idl i ¬Happens i:α ϕ→
After i:α (Bel i ϕ→ Shamei (i:α,ϕ))
(b)
` Fear i ¬Happensj:α ϕ ∧ Bel i Idl j ¬Happensj:α ϕ→
After j:α (Bel i ϕ→ Admiration i,j(j:α,ϕ))
(c)
` Hopei ¬Happensj:α ϕ ∧ Bel i Idl j ¬Happensj:α ϕ→
After j:α (Bel i ϕ→ Reproachi,j(j:α,ϕ))
(d)
To prove Theorem 10 we need the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Doneα ¬Bel iAfterα⊥ ∧Doneα Bel i ϕ→ Bel iDoneα ϕ
To prove Lemma 3 we need the following lemma.
Lemma 4. if ϕ→ Afterα ψ then Doneα ϕ→ ψ
Proof (of Lemma 4).
1. ϕ→ Afterα ψ (by hypothesis)
2. DoneαAfterα ϕ→ ϕ (from contraposition of (CONV-BH))
3. Doneα ϕ→ DoneαAfterα ψ (from 1. by (RK-♦) for Doneα )
4. Doneα ϕ→ ψ (from 2. and 3.)
Proof (of Lemma 3).
1. Bel iAfterα ϕ ∧ ¬Bel iAfterα⊥ → Afterα Bel i ϕ (from (NF-Bel i ))
2. Bel iAfterαDoneα ϕ ∧ ¬Bel iAfterα⊥ → Afterα Bel iDoneα ϕ
(by instantiation of 1.)
3. ϕ→ AfterαDoneα ϕ (from (CONV-AD))
4. Bel i ϕ→ Bel iAfterαDoneα ϕ (from 3. by (RM-¤) for Bel i )
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5. Bel i ϕ ∧ ¬Bel iAfterα> → Afterα Bel iDoneα ϕ
(from 2. and 4. by PL )
6. Doneα (Bel i ϕ ∧ ¬Bel iAfterα>) → Bel iDoneα ϕ (by Lemma 4)
7. Doneα Φ ∧Doneα Ψ → Doneα (Φ ∧Ψ) (from (CD-DB))
8. Doneα ¬Bel iAfterα⊥ ∧Doneα Bel i ϕ→ Bel iDoneα ϕ
(from 6. and 7.)
Proof (of Theorem 10). Case of (a).
1. Fear i ¬Happens i:α ϕ→ ¬Bel i ¬Happens i:α ϕ
(by definition of Fear and definition 1)
2. Fear i ¬Happens i:α ϕ→ ¬Bel i ¬Happens i:α>
(from 1. by (RK-♦) for ¬Bel i ¬)
3. Fear i ¬Happens i:α ϕ→ ¬Bel iAfterα⊥
(from 2. by definition of Happens )
4. ` Fear i ¬Happens i:α ϕ ∧ Bel i Idl i Happens i:α ϕ→
Bel i (Fear i ¬Happens i:α ϕ ∧ Idl i Happens i:α ϕ ∧ ¬Bel i Afterα⊥)
(by Theorem 15, (5-Bel i ) and (C-¤) for Bel i )
5. ` Fear i ¬Happens i:α ϕ ∧ Bel i Idl i Happens i:α ϕ→ After i:α Donei:α Bel i
(Fear i ¬Happens i:α ϕ ∧ Idl i Happens i:α ϕ¬Bel i Afterα⊥)
(by (CONV-AD))
6. ` Fear i ¬Happens i:α ϕ ∧ Bel i Idl i Happens i:α ϕ→ After i:α Bel i Donei:α
(Fear i ¬Happens i:α ϕ ∧ Idl i Happens i:α ϕ) (by Lemma 3)
7. ` Fear i ¬Happens i:α ϕ ∧ Bel i Idl i Happens i:α ϕ→ After i:α (Bel i ϕ→
Bel i Donei:α (Fear i ¬Happens i:α ϕ ∧ Idl i Happens i:α ϕ) ∧ Bel i ϕ)
8. ` Fear i ¬Happens i:α ϕ ∧ Bel i Idl i Happens i:α ϕ→ After i:α (Bel i ϕ→
Bel i Donei:α (Probi After i:α ¬ϕ ∧ Idl i Happens i:α ϕ) ∧ Bel i ϕ)
(by definitions of Fear and Happens )
9. ` Fear i ¬Happens i:α ϕ ∧ Bel i Idl i Happens i:α ϕ→
After i:α (Bel i ϕ→ Pridei (i:α,ϕ)) (by definition of Pride)
The proof is similar for (b), (c), and (d).
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5.5 Inconsistencies between some emotions
We can prove several inconsistencies between pairs of emotions.
5.5.1 Polar inconsistencies
First, we can prove the inconsistency between opposite emotions about the same
proposition (polar opposites), viz. between the positive and the negative emotion of
the same group. This is in agreement with the psychological definitions.
Theorem 11 (Polar inconsistencies).
` ¬(Joy i ϕ ∧Distress i ϕ)
` ¬(Hopei ϕ ∧ Fear i ϕ)
` ¬(Satisfaction i ϕ ∧ FearConfirmed i ϕ)
` ¬(Relief i ϕ ∧Disappointment i ϕ)
` ¬(HappyFor i,jϕ ∧ SorryFor i,jϕ)
` ¬(Resentment i,jϕ ∧Gloating i,jϕ)
` ¬(Pridei (i:α,ϕ) ∧ Shame i (i:α,ϕ))
` ¬(Admiration i,j(j:α,ϕ) ∧ Reproach i,j(j:α,ϕ))
` ¬(Gratification i (i:α,ϕ) ∧ Remorse i (i:α,ϕ))
` ¬(Gratitude i,j(j:α,ϕ) ∧Anger i,j(j:α,ϕ))
Sketch of proof (of Theorem 11). This follows in particular from the rationality
axioms (D) for our operators Bel i , Des i , Probi and Idl i .
5.5.2 Non simultaneity of hope and fear
Due to the properties of our probability operator, hope is not only inconsistent with
fear about the same ϕ but also with fear about ¬ϕ. Actually, depending on which
one is more probable between ϕ and ¬ϕ, the agent feels either hope or fear. Thus
these two emotions cannot occur simultaneously.
Theorem 12 (Non simultaneity of hope and fear).
` ¬(Hopei ϕ ∧ Fear i ¬ϕ)
Sketch of proof (of Theorem 12). This is because by denitions Hope i ϕ implies
Probi ϕ while Fear i ¬ϕ implies Probi ¬ϕ, which cannot simultaneously be the
case due to the consistency of expectations (property (4.2)).
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5.5.3 Inconsistency between good-will and ill-will emotions
Moreover, an agent can not feel simultaneously a good-will and an ill-will emotion
towards the same agent about the same issue. This expresses that the other agent is
either a friend or an enemy but not both.
Theorem 13 (Inconsistency between good-will and ill-will emotions).
` ¬(HappyFor i,jϕ ∧ Resentment i,jϕ) (a)
` ¬(SorryFor i,jϕ ∧Gloating i,jϕ) (b)
` ¬(HappyFor i,jϕ ∧Gloating i,jϕ) (c)
` ¬(SorryFor i,jϕ ∧ Resentment i,jϕ) (d)
Sketch of proof (of Theorem 13). The proof for cases (a) and (b) follows from the
rationality of Des i . The proof for cases (c) and (d) follows from Lemma 5.
Lemma 5. ¬(Bel iDesj ϕ ∧ Bel iDesj ¬ϕ)
Proof (of Lemma 5).
1. ` Desj ϕ→ ¬Desj ¬ϕ (from (D-Des i ))
2. ` Bel iDesj ϕ→ Bel i ¬Desj ¬ϕ (by (RM-¤) for Bel i )
3. ` Bel iDesj ϕ→ ¬Bel iDesj ¬ϕ (by (D-Bel i ))
4. ` ¬(Bel iDesj ϕ ∧ Bel iDesj ¬ϕ) (by PL )
5.5.4 Temporal inconsistency between prospect and confirmation
We can prove that the agent cannot feel simultaneously a prospect-based emotion
and a confirmation or disconfirmation emotion about the same object. Actually
there must be a temporal step between prospect and confirmation, since the agent
gets new beliefs that can be contrary to his expectations.
Theorem 14 (Temporal inconsistency between prospect and confirmation).
` ¬(Hopei ϕ ∧Disappointment i ¬ϕ) (a)
` ¬(Hopei ϕ ∧ Satisfaction i ϕ) (b)
` ¬(Fear i ϕ ∧ Relief i ¬ϕ) (c)
` ¬(Hopei ϕ ∧ FearConfirmed i ϕ) (d)
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Sketch of proof (of Theorem 14).
Case of (a). The proof comes from the fact that Hope i ϕ entails Probi ϕ and thus
entails ¬Bel i ¬ϕ, while Disappointment i ϕ entails Bel i ¬ϕ. The proof is similar
for (c).
Case of (b). The proof comes from the fact that Hope i ϕ entails Expect i ϕ and thus
entails ¬Bel i ϕ while Satisfaction i ϕ entails Bel i ϕ. The proof is similar for (d).
5.6 Other interesting properties
5.6.1 Emotional awareness
Our formalism allows us to prove that an agent is aware of his emotions.
Theorem 15 (Emotional awareness). The following formulas
Emotion iϕ↔ Bel i Emotion iϕ
¬Emotion iϕ↔ Bel i ¬Emotion iϕ
are valid for all Emotion i among the twenty emotions dened above.
Sketch of proof (of Theorem 15). This follows in particular from the introspection
axioms for our operators Bel i , Probi , Expect i .
5.6.2 Emotions and ego-involvement
According to Lazarus (1991), only the situations that are relevant to the individ-
ual’s well-being can trigger an emotion. If we consider that a situation is relevant
to an agent’s well-being if it involves one of this agent’s desires or values, this is in
agreement with the following theorem. Indeed, if the agent has no desire nor ideal,
no situation is relevant to him, and thus no situation can trigger an emotion. Be-
sides, desires and moral values are part of what Lazarus calls “ego-involvement”.
Theorem 16 (Emotions and ego-involvement). An agent who has neither desires
nor ideals cannot feel any emotion.
Sketch of proof (of Theorem 16). The proof trivially follows from the denitions
of emotions, that all necessarily entail either a desire (for the event-based ones) or
an ideal (for the agent-based ones). Composed emotions entail both a desire and
an ideal.
133
5.7 Conclusion
This work contributes to show the interest of BDI logics to formalize emotions.
First, there already exist lots of work about these logics in the agent community
and thus such a model is ready to be used in many existing agents. Moreover we
showed that provided our formal definitions are accepted, we can prove a lot of in-
tuitive properties of emotions. Only a logical formalism can give such unequivocal
results about phenomenons that are not always clearly analysed in the psychologi-
cal literature.
However, BDI logics are not only a tool for making demonstrations. They also
are a powerful mean of describing an agent reasoning. In the next chapter we detail
two applications where our model is integrated into a BDI agent, and we show what
advantages the agents get from using such a model of emotions.
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Part III
Applications and continuations
There is no re like passion, there is no shark like hatred,
there is no snare like folly, there is no torrent like greed
Buddha
Chapter 6
Applications
I have always wished that my computer
would be as easy to use as my telephone.
My wish has come true.
I no longer know how to use my telephone.
(Bjarne Stroustrup)
6.1 Introduction
Emotional agents get more and more applications (cf. Chapter 2) in such various
fields as video games, aided-learning, virtual training environments, pedagogical
agents, embodied conversational agents, life-like characters... In this chapter, we
expose some applications that we explored for our model of emotions. These ap-
plications were designed at a time where our model was not as rich as it is now, so
they do not cover all the emotions that we defined in Chapter 4. Nevertheless they
illustrate that such a logical model can be used not only to reason abstractly about
emotions but also to develop emotional agents for concrete applications. Here we
expose two of the many possible ones: an intelligent agent who is aware of the
user’s emotions in order to take care of him in an Ambient Intelligence applica-
tion; and a conversational agent who expresses his emotions during dialogue to
appear more believable in a virtual world for training.
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6.2 Application 1: an emotionally aware agent for Ambi-
ent Intelligence
Ambient Intelligence is the art of designing intelligent environments, viz. environ-
ments that can adapt their behavior to their user, to his specific goals, needs... at
every moment, in order to insure his well-being in a non-intrusive and nearly in-
visible way. Here, we want to design a BDI agent that can manage these tasks, and
thus has to know about the user’s emotions.
Agent designers have investigated different methods to know about the user’s
emotion when he does not express it directly. Prendinger and Ishizuka (2005) use
the results of Picard (1997) to deduce the user’s emotion label from monitoring his
physiological signals and gaze direction. This method allows to detect in real-time
the least changes in the subject’s emotions, but it is quite intrusive, disobeying an
important principle of ambient intelligence. Another method is explored by Jaques
et al. (2004). Their pedagogical agent deduces its pupil’s emotion by construing
events from his point of view (thanks to a user model), via an appraisal function
based on the OCC typology. Carofiglio and Rosis (2005) use the same method in a
persuasive agent that takes the user’s emotion into account when trying to convince
him to adopt a difficult behaviour like changing his eating habits or stopping smok-
ing. This method only provides a subjective view of the user’s emotional state, but
is quite efficient when associated with a good model of his mental attitudes, and
most important it is not intrusive at all. Besides, this method also allows to reason
about emotions, for example to understand their causes. It is thus better adapted to
the problematic of Ambient Intelligence.
Once the agent knows about the user’s emotion he can help him to cope with
this emotion if it is negative (cf. Chapter 8). In psychology (Lazarus and Folkman,
1984) coping is the agent’s choice of a strategy aiming at suppressing or decreasing
a negative emotion that he feels (for example by downplaying or totally suppressing
its causes). We consider here that an emotional agent for Ambient Intelligence can
help the user in this task.
Finally we believe that for an agent integrated in an Ambient Intelligence Sys-
tem (AmIS), a computational model of emotions is useful in the following cases:
• (C1) to compute the user’s emotion triggered by an external event (as in
(Jaques et al., 2004)) but also:
• (C2) to anticipate the emotional effect of its possible actions on the user
– either to choose an action in order to produce an intended emotional
effect (C2a)
– or to decide between actions with comparable physical effects (C2b);
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• (C3) to understand the causes of an emotion that the user seems to express
through his observable behavior. This explanation is made:
– either directly when all necessary information is known (C3a)
– or through inferring some hypothesis about the user’s beliefs (C3b).
To know the emotion felt by the user and the causes of this emotion is fun-
damental to act in a really adapted way.
In this first application we use our model of emotions to describe the behaviour
of an agent integrated in an AmIS controlling an intelligent house taking care of its
dweller by handling his emotions1. We demonstrate the power of our framework
on five different scenarios corresponding to the five cases (identified above) where
the agent needs emotions. In each case we consider the home managing AmIS to
be administrated by agent m, who can possibly receive help from other agents of
the AmIS. Let h be a human dweller of this house.
6.2.1 Case (C1) : appraisal of an external event from the user’s point
of view.
By definition, as soon as agent m believes that h’s mental state validates the condi-
tions composing a given emotion, m believes that h feels this emotion. For exam-
ple, let’s consider the agent m with the following knowledge base KB concerning
the user h.
Initial Knowledge Base.
• Belm Belh sunny
• BelmDesh sunny
We can then prove that m believes h to feel joy about the proposition sunny .
Deduction. ` KB → Belm Joyh sunny
In this case the definition instantly follows from the definition of joy.
Proof.
1. ` KB → (Belm sunny ∧Desm sunny)
1Please notice that this application was designed at a time where our model only comprised
event-based emotions, so only these emotions are used in the following. Moreover we did not have
an account of coping yet, so the possible coping strategies are only mentioned but there are no formal
proofs about them.
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2. ` KB → Belm Joyh sunny (from 1. by definition of joy)
Thus, if m believes that h believes that the sun is shining (viz. Belm Belh sunny)
and m also believes that this is desirable for h (BelmDesh sunny) then by defini-
tion m believes that h feels joy about this (viz. Belh Joym sunny).
Once the agent knows about the user’s emotion, he can use coping strategies
to help the user to cope with it (cf. Chapter 8). Here, the considered emotion is
positive, so m can aim at maintaining it. Emotions can also be taken into account
to modulate the agent’s behaviour towards the user, for example the agent should
choose the right moment to tell bad news to h.
6.2.2 Case (C2a) : pre-evaluation of the emotional effect of an agent’s
action on the user, to produce an intended emotional effect.
In some cases, emotional impact can be part of a plan, for example, when the
production or removal of some emotion of the addressee of the action accounts
for the intended effect (commonly named Rational Effect in the agent community
(FIPA (Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents), 2002)). For example, coping
strategies can be considered as actions with (indirect) effects on the user’s emotions
(cf. Chapter 8).
Let’s suppose that m knows that h feels sadness because it is raining (and thus
he cannot take a walk). We can also suppose that agent m desires that h does not
feel any negative emotion about any object, in particular he desires that h is not sad
about the weather.
Initial Knowledge Base.
• Belm Sadnessh raining
• Desm ¬Sadnessh raining
To reach this intended emotional effect of suppressing this emotion, the agent
has several strategies that are close to coping strategies, for example informing h
that it is not raining anymore as soon as m learns it2. However we do not deal
with the planning aspect here so we cannot prove which action m will perform in
this situation. The influence of emotions on the agent’s actions through the use of
coping strategies has been subject to ulterior investigations (cf. Chapter 8).
2m could also try to focus h’s attention on something else. This case (yet uncovered here) needs
a handling of activation degrees accounting for the accessibility of the belief to the conscious. See
John Anderson’s works in cognitive psychology (Anderson and Lebiere, 1998).
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6.2.3 Case (C2b) : pre-evaluation of the emotional effect of an agent’s
action on the user, to select an action.
It can also be useful to anticipate the emotional impact of an action when various
actions with the same relevant informative or physical effect have different emo-
tional effects. These effects are a selection criterion of the action among the other
possible actions, if they all allow to reach the physical or informative goal at hand.
For example let’s suppose thatm believes that h desires to play chess and considers
three possible opponents: John, Peter and Paul. m also believes that h only expects
John to come (and neither Peter nor Paul), whilem believes that John cannot come.
Finally m believes that h does not believe that he can play chess for now.
Initial Knowledge Base (KB1 at instant 1).
• (H1) Belm BelhG((JohnComes∨PaulComes∨PeterComes) ↔ canPlay)
• (H2) BelmDesh canPlay
• (H3) Belh ¬Belm canPlay
• (H4) Belm Belh ¬PaulComes
• (H5) Belm Belh ¬PeterComes
• (H6) Belm Expecth JohnComes
• (H7) Belm ¬JohnComes
m can deduce that h is hoping to play chess.
Deduction (from KB1).
` KB → BelmHopeh canPlay
Proof (1).
Due to the denition of hope, and since KB1 trivially entails BelmDesh canPlay
and Belm ¬Belh canPlay , it sufces to prove that ` KB → Probh canPlay .
1. ` (Probh JohnComes ∧ Belh (JohnComes → canPlay)) →
Probh (JohnComes ∧ (JohnComes → canPlay)) (by C-MIX)
2. ` (Probh JohnComes ∧ Belh (JohnComes → canPlay)) →
Probh canPlay (by RM-Probi )
3. ` Belm (Probh JohnComes ∧ Belh (JohnComes → canPlay)) →
Belm Probh canPlay (by RM-¤ for Belm )
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4. ` KB → Belm (Probh JohnComes ∧ Belh (JohnComes → canPlay))
5. ` KB → Belm Probh canPlay (from 4. and 3.)
m now considers the action α to inform h that John cannot come to play chess
with him. We suppose that he believes that this action would not be a complete
surprise for h3. We also suppose that m is about to inform h that John does not
come, and m believes that after this action h will believe this.
Initial Knowledge Base.
• (H8) BelmHappensα Belh ¬JohnComes
• (H9) Belm ¬Belh ¬Happensα>
Then we can prove that m can deduce that after the performance of this action h
will feel disappointed about not being able to play chess anymore.
Deduction.
` KB → BelmAfterm:αDisappointmenth ¬canPlay
Proof.
1. ` KB → BelmAfterα Belh ¬JohnComes (from H8 by CD-HA)
2. ` KB → BelmAfterα Belh ¬canPlay (from 1., H1, H4 and H5)
3. ` KB → BelmAfterαDesh canPlay
(from B2 by Pers-Des i and GA-MIX)
4. ` KB → Belm Belh Expecth canPlay (from proof (1) and H3)
5. ` KB → Belm BelhAfterαDonealpha Expecth canPlay
(from 4. by CONV-AD)
6. ` KB → BelmAfterα BelhDoneα Expecth canPlay ∨ BelhAfterα⊥
(from 5. by NF-Bel i )
7. ` KB → BelmAfterα BelhDoneα Expecth canPlay (from 6. by H9)
8. ` KB → BelmAfterα Belh PExpecth canPlay (from 7. by HB-MIX)
3Actually this could be deduced from contextual information. Indeed this is a relevant information
so h believes that m should inform him if it is true. Moreover h only expects John to come so he
envisages that he could not come.
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9. ` KB → BelmAfterαDisappointmenth ¬canPlay
(from 2., 3. and 8. by definition of Disappointment )
Since disappointment is a negative emotion m should avoid to trigger it. Another
possible action in this situation is to find an alternative partner so that h can still
play chess even if John does not come. This way h would not be disappointed
when he learns that John cannot come.
Now m knows that both Peter and Paul might be willing to come to play chess
with h too, and must choose the partner that will best fit h’s likings. Indeed the
action to invite Paul and the action to invite Peter have the same physical effect, viz.
to allow h to play chess, but they can have different emotional effect. For example
let’s suppose that m believes that h likes that Paul visits him, but is indifferent to
Peter visiting him.
Initial Knowledge Base.
• BelmDesh PaulComes
• Belm ¬Desh PeterComes
• Belm Belh (PaulComes → canPlay)
• Belm Belh (PeterComes → canPlay)
We can then prove in the same way that when m informs h that another chess part-
ner comes home, h revises his beliefs and he feels satisfied about playing chess.
Moreover when he learns that the partner is Paul he also feels joy about Paul visit-
ing him, while if he learns that the partner is Peter he is indifferent to that.
If m pursues a strategy of maximizing h’s positive emotions then m will rather ask
Paul to come than Peter (but this cannot be deduced in our logic since we do not
have planning rules).
6.2.4 Case (C3a) observation and explanation of behavior.
Sometimes the observation of the user’s behaviour can help the agent to determine
what emotion among several possible ones is effectively felt by the user.
For example we suppose that in a sunny morning, m believes that h has to
present his work at a meeting today but is not prepared yet. Moreover, his world
knowledge tells m that when h is well-prepared he expects his meeting to go well,
while when he is not prepared he expects it to go wrong. m also believes that h
desires to perform well, and desires the weather to be sunny.
Initial Knowledge Base.
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• Belm (Belh prepared → ExpecthmeetingOk)
• Belm (Belh ¬prepared → Expecth ¬meetingOk)
• BelmDeshmeetingOk
• Belm Belh ¬prepared
• Belm Belh sunny
• BelmDesh sunny
From this initial knowledge base and his model of emotions, m can deduce
two different emotions. You can notice that if m did not know about h’s likings he
could deduce no emotion from the same information.
Deduction.
• Belm Joyh sunny
• Belm Fearh ¬meetingOk
Now h enters the kitchen and is visibly stressed (we suppose that m has some
behavioural laws allowing to interpret h’s behaviour and deduce an emotion from
it). m can match h’s inferred possible emotions with the emotion expressed by his
behaviour. Since the stress expressed by h matches the fear of failing the meeting
computed by m, m deduces that h is currently more focused on his meeting than
on the weather.
Such an information is very useful for m who can now adapt his behaviour to
h’s needs. For example he may propose to display documents on the kitchen wall
to allow h to revise the subject of the meeting while eating breakfast. Moreover
such help would also decrease h’s fear: once he believes that he is well prepared
for the meeting h would not feel fear anymore.
Actually, ifm had not known before that h was not prepared, he could yet have
inferred some information from the observation of his behaviour. This is detailed
in the next case.
6.2.5 Case (C3b) : observation of behavior and explanation hypothe-
sis.
Often the agent’s knowledge is not sufficient to determine the object of the user’s
emotion. In this case, the agent has to observe the user’s behaviour and to generate
some hypothesis so that the inferred emotion matches the expressed emotion.
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For example h comes home in the evening (after his meeting) and m observes
that he looks sad. Yet, m does not know why h is sad so we write that h is believed
to be sad about an unknown proposition P 4. To be useful to the user, mmust know
the object of his sadness so he will now explore his knowledge base and try to find
information matching his observation.
We suppose thatm knows that h had a meeting, that failing this meeting would
be undesirable for him, and that h knows if his meeting has gone wrong or well
while m does not.
Initial Knowledge Base.
• (H1) Belm (BelhmeetingOk ∨ Belh ¬meetingOk)
• (H2) BelmDeshmeetingOk
• (H3) ¬BelmmeetingOk ∧ ¬Belm ¬meetingOk
No information in this knowledge base allows m to trigger sadness, viz. he
knows no formula that is undesirable but believed to be true and that would thus
match the definition of sadness. Nevertheless he can deduce from it and his emo-
tional definitions the following implications.
Initial Knowledge Base.
• (H4) Belm (BelhmeetingOk → JoyhmeetingOk)
• (H5) Belm (Belh ¬meetingOk → Sadnessh ¬meetingOk)
One of the two premises is inevitably true due to belief (H1) in the user model.
However m cannot know which one is true and thus has to generate a hypothesis.
He thus either suppose that the meeting was good or that it was bad5. To check
the validity of his hypothesis he then uses his observations of h’s behaviour. Since
h exposes sadness, the validated hypothesis is that he failed his meeting, and the
object of the expressed sadness can now be instantiated by an abductive process
that we do not specify here.
Note also that abductive inference is not valid, contrarily to deductive infer-
ence; therefore there might be other explanations of h’s sadness.
Deduction.
• ` KB → Belm Belh ¬meetingOk
4This is an expression involving a quantification of the form Belm ∃P(Sadnessh P). As our
logic is propositional we suppose that this is handled by some meta-reasoning here.
5He could also ask the user whether the meeting was good or not, but this would be more intrusive.
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• ` KB → Belm Sadnessh ¬meetingOk
Thereby m could propose an adapted reaction, for example try to cheer h up
or propose him some relaxation services, and particularly avoid to mention the
meeting tonight.
6.2.6 Conclusion
This application shows how a BDI model of emotions can allow an agent to reason
about the user’s emotion. Indeed we have sketched how the five example cases of
the introduction can be handled in our framework. Such a reasoning can be useful
in Ambient Intelligence as in our example, but also in Human-Computer Interfaces
or pedagogical agents. Only a cognitive theory of emotions allows such reasoning
about the antecedents of emotions. BDI logics are then particularly adapted to
allow an agent to perform this reasoning.
This early application does not handle coping in a formal way yet (in particular
we lack Choice and Intend operators) so we have omitted some proofs in our
examples. For example in case (C2a) agent m desires that h does not feel sad-
ness about the bad weather. A coping strategy expressed as an action law could
allow to infer that as soon as m believes that the rain has stopped, m intends to
inform h about that. Such a law can be expressed by the following global axiom:
Belm Sadnessh ϕ∧Desm ¬Sadnessh ϕ∧Belm ¬ϕ→ Intendm Belh ¬ϕ reading
“ifm believes that h feels sad about ϕwhereas himself knows that ϕ is wrong, then
he will adopt the intention to inform h about this”. This intention should lead the
agent to inform the user about the weather as soon as it changes, but we do not deal
with the planning aspect here. The formalization of coping in our BDI framework
has been subject to later and still ongoing work (cf. Chapter 8).
6.3 Application 2: emotional dialogue between agents
6.3.1 Introduction
Our logical model of emotions accounts for their cognitive triggering, viz. it defines
which kinds of mental attitudes constitute the causes of emotions. In this applica-
tion we focus on how emotions are triggered during dialogue, i.e. we consider
emotions triggered by an utterance, both for the speaker and the hearer. However,
we do not account for the expression of these emotions (through expressive speech
acts for example) nor for their effect on the subsequent dialogue (for example mod-
ifying the construction of the dialogue).
A dialogue can be viewed as a sequence of speech acts (Austin, 1962; Searle,
1969; Searle and Vanderveken, 1985) realized by each utterance. Such speech acts
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being particular actions they can then be considered as fitting the action branch of
the OCC typology. They are thus appraised depending on the conversational norms
that the interlocutors must obey (for example Grice’s maxims (Grice, 1957)). But
this is not sufficient to wholly appraise a speech act, since it conveys some infor-
mation about the world that must also be appraised. For example, let’s imagine a
boy who breaks a precious vase and confesses it to his father. If his father only
appraises the speech act itself of confessing the fault, he would be proud of his
son being brave and honest. But he would certainly also appraise the information
“your precious vase is now broken” (what we call the informational content here)
and feel sad.
Thus receiving a speech act is another way to observe one’s environment and
to know about relevant stimuli. We consider the reception of a speech act as an
indirect perception of a stimulus (described in its informational content, even if the
speech act is not an assertive) that can fit any of the three branches of the OCC
typology.
Actually we restrict our account here to the events described by assertions and
queries. Indeed this application was designed at a time where our model only de-
scribed eight event-based emotions. Thus we do not account here for the appraisal
of a speech act w.r.t. the conversational norms, nor for the appraisal of actions or
objects described by a speech act.
In this chapter we will thus analyse an example of emotional dialogue between
two avatars6. The context is a virtual world for the training of firemen.
6.3.2 Speech act semantics
In the agent communication language (ACL) area, semantics for speech acts is
generally in terms of their preconditions and effects. The preconditions describe
the conditions that must be true to perform the speech act, and the effects describe
the consequences of the speech act on the addressee’s mental attitudes. In the
ACL area, the most important standard to describe the semantics of speech acts is
FIPA-ACL (FIPA (Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents), 2002). In FIPA-
ACL the Feasibility Preconditions and Rational Effect of various speech acts are
described in terms of the agents’ mental attitudes and actions. Thus this semantics
can be integrated more easily with our formalization of emotions. The rational
effect describes the desired and rationally-expectable perlocutionary effect of the
utterance. Under sincerity and competence hypotheses, the rational effect is true
6We have implemented a platform for generating such dialogues between two conversational
agents who accompany their speech acts and answer those of the speaker by expressing eight event-
based emotions. This platform called GALAAD was presented at a french workshop (Adam and
Evrard, 2005)
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after each performance of the speech act. For the sake of simplicity, as we are not
concerned by the dialogue formalization itself, we make such hypotheses.
We suppose here that the performance of a speech act “activates” the mental
attitudes involved in its preconditions and effects. We do not formally handle ac-
tivation but we suppose that it propagates to mental attitudes concerning the same
proposition ϕ. For example if a fireman informs his chief that there are victims in a
fire, this activates the chiefs’s related desire that there are no victims. Following the
schematic theories of emotions (cf. Section 1.2.3.3), we assume that the emotions
whose definition involves these activated mental attitudes are then also “activated”
by the performance of the speech act. We suppose that the emotions expressed
with the speech act are those that are activated like this. Similarly the reception of
a speech act adds new mental attitudes or activates old ones in the hearer’s knowl-
edge base. These mental attitudes then activate an emotion that corresponds to the
agent’s reaction to the received speech act.
In the short dialogue that we will formalize in the next section we only need
two speech acts of the FIPA library: Inform and QueryIf. The associated effects
and preconditions considered in this work are an adaptation of those of FIPA-ACL:
actually we weaken the preconditions of these two speech acts to match the needs
of our application. The following paragraphs describe this weakened semantics of
speech acts.
6.3.2.1 Inform
The speech act used by i to inform j that ϕ is true is denoted: 〈i, Inform, j, ϕ〉.
Precondition. To inform an agent j that ϕ is true an agent i must believe that ϕ
is true, and must not believe that j knows if ϕ is true7. Finally:
Precond(〈i, Inform, j, ϕ〉)
def
= Bel i ϕ ∧ ¬Bel i Bel j ϕ ∧ ¬Bel i Bel j ¬ϕ
Effect. When an agent i informs an agent j that ϕ is true the rational effect is
that j believes ϕ. So:
Effect(〈i, Inform, j, ϕ〉)
def
= Bel j ϕ
6.3.2.2 Query-if
The speech act used by i to query j if ϕ is true is denoted: 〈i,QueryIf, j, ϕ〉.
7The FIPA semantics also imposes that i must not believe that j is uncertain about ϕ but we do
not impose this condition. Indeed i can confirm what j is uncertain about.
148
Precondition. To ask j if ϕ is true, agent i must not know whether ϕ is true and
must believe that j can answer his query8. So:
Precond(〈i,QueryIf, j, ϕ〉)
def
= ¬Bel i ϕ ∧ ¬Bel i ¬ϕ ∧ Bel i (Bel j ϕ ∨ Bel j ¬ϕ)
Effect. When an agent i asks j if ϕ is true the rational effect is that j informs i
whether ϕ is true or not. So9:
Effect(〈i,QueryIf, j, ϕ〉)
def
= Done(〈i, Inform, j, ϕ〉) ∨Done(〈i, Inform, j,¬ϕ〉)
Now we show how we predict emotions triggered during a simple example
of dialogue. We here suppose that the perception of the utterance is sound and
complete, and that agents are sincere and competent. Thus, rational effects are
systematically produced.
6.3.3 The example dialogue between firemen
We have been involved in a project with ergonomists (cf. (El Jed et al., 2005) or
(El Jed, 2006)) aiming at developing a virtual training environment for firemen.
The following dialogue example is typical of interactions between firemen during
an intervention, but it has been simplified for the sake of readability. It involves
a fireman f who is asked by his chief c about the situation in a hotel. The chief
only knows about the initial situation: he sent a team to this hotel one hour ago
because it was blazing. He does not know how things are going now, so he asks
his fireman by radio. This scenario is simple but it illustrates the triggering or
activation of some emotions after the performance of some speech acts. Here we
are only interested in the emotions triggered by the appraisal of the informational
content of the speech act so we only have to consider speech acts related to an
event.
We use the following propositions: fire means that the hotel is blazing; victims
means that there are some victims. We associate each speech act with the emotion
expressed by the speaker while performing this speech act (EE ), and with the
emotion felt by the hearer in reaction to this speech act (TE ).
8The FIPA semantics also imposes that i must not even be uncertain about ϕ but we do not impose
this condition that seems to be too strong. Indeed i can ask for a kind of confirmation about ϕ if he
is uncertain about it. Moreover the FIPA semantics imposes that i must not believe that j already
intends to inform him if ϕ is true or false. In order to simplify and since we have no modal operator
for intention we do not impose this condition. Besides an agent could ask a question even if he
believes that the interlocutor already intends to inform him, for example to get a quicker answer.
9We note Done(α)
def
= Doneα > which reads “α has just been done”.
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• Chief asks: “Did you manage to extinguish the fire?”
α1 = 〈c,QueryIf, f,¬fire〉
EE : Hopec ¬fire
TE : Distressf fire
• Fireman answers: “No, not yet.”
α2 = 〈f, Inform, c,fire〉
EE : Distressf fire
TE : Disappointment c fire
• Chief asks: “Are there any casualties?”
α3 = 〈c,QueryIf, f, victims〉
EE : Fear c victims
TE : Joyf ¬victims
• Fireman answers: “No, there are none.”
α4 = 〈f, Inform, c,¬victims〉
EE : Joyf ¬victims
TE : Relief c ¬victims
6.3.4 Analysis of this dialogue
We can suppose that all the firemen prefer that the fire is extinguished and that there
are no victims. Moreover the chief fireman considers probable that the hotel is still
blazing but that there are no victims since there were no clients at this period. The
fireman knows that the hotel is still blazing and that there are no victims.
Initial Knowledge Base (KBc of chief c).
• Desc ¬fire
• Desc ¬victims
• Expectc fire
• Expectc ¬victims
• Bel c (Belf fire ∨ Belf ¬fire)
• Bel c (Belf victims ∨ Belf ¬victims)
Initial Knowledge Base (KBf of fireman f ).
• Desf ¬fire
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• Desf ¬victims
• Belf fire
• Belf ¬victims
We can notice that these two agents already feel emotions in this initial situa-
tion: KBc entails Hopec ¬fire ∧ Fear c victims , and KBf entails Distressf fire ∧
Joyf ¬victims . But what interests us here is which emotion they will express to
accompany the performed speech acts.
6.3.4.1 Step 1: query about the fire
Chief asks: “Did you manage to extinguish the fire?”
α1 = 〈c,QueryIf, f,¬fire〉
EE : Hopec α1¬fire
TE : Distressf α1fire
When the chief asks this question he activates the preconditions of its act:
¬Bel c fire and¬Bel c ¬fire . This second belief is part of the definition of Expect c fire
that is thus also activated. Then this expectation is part of the definition of the emo-
tion Fear c fire that is thus activated. No other emotion triggered by c’s knowledge
base is activated by the performance of this speech act.
Activated Mental Attitudes and Emotions (for c after step 1).
• Expectc fire
• Desc ¬fire
• Fear c fire
Finally while performing his speech act the chief feels fear that the hotel is still
blazing.
The rational effect of this speech act on the fireman is that he informs his chief
whether fire is true. The precondition for the performance of this speech act is that
f believes that ϕ is true. This mental attitude is thus activated, and consequently
the emotion Distressf fire that involves this belief in its definition is also activated.
Activated Mental Attitudes and Emotions (for f after step 1).
• Belf fire
• Desf ¬fire
• Distressf fire
Finally the fireman emotionally reacts to this speech act by expressing his sadness
that the fire is not extinguished yet.
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6.3.4.2 Step 2: answer about the fire
Fireman answers: “No, not yet.”
α2 = 〈f, Inform, c,fire〉
.Distressf α2fire
.Disappointment c α2fire
As we said in the previous step the performance of the informative speech act
about fire activates f ’s sadness that the fire is not yet extinguished.
The rational effect of this speech act on the chief is that he believes that the fire
is not extinguished. Since this situation was expected before the fireman’s answer,
the chief feels fear confirmed. This emotion is not activated by the speech act
(the chief did not feel it before), but it is created by the new belief added by the
reception of the speech act.
Activated Mental Attitudes and Emotions (of c after step 2).
• Bel c fire
• Desc ¬fire
• Bel cDoneα2 (Expectc ¬fire)
Proof (of the emotion felt by c after step 2).
1. KB ` Bel cDoneα2 (Expectc ¬fire)
2. KB ` Bel c ¬Beforeα2 ¬Expectc ¬fire (from 1. by definition of Before )
3. KB ` Bel c ¬H¬Expectc ¬fire (from 2. by converse of (HB-MIX))
4. KB ` Bel c PExpectc ¬fire (from 3. by definition of P )
5. KB ` Bel c fire ∧Desc ¬fire
6. KB ` FearConfirmed c fire (from 4. and 5. by def. of FearConfirmed )
6.3.4.3 Step 3: query about the victims
Chief asks: “Are there any casualties?”
α3 = 〈c,QueryIf, f, victims〉
.Fear c α3victims
.Joyf α3¬victims
As in step 1, this query activates c’s mental attitudes related to its preconditions.
So similarly we find that this speech act activates c’s emotion of hope that there are
no victims.
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Activated Mental Attitudes and Emotions (of c after step 3).
• Expectc ¬victims
• Desc ¬victims
• Hopec ¬victims
We can notice that this emotion was already felt by c before the performance of his
query, but in our sense it is the emotion activated by the performance of this speech
act, and thus it is the emotion that c expresses with his query.
When the fireman receives this query, the rational effect is that he answers it.
Thus it activates the precondition of his answer viz. his belief that there are no
victims. This belief matches his desire so finally the fireman’s emotional reaction
to the received query is joy about the fact that there are no victims.
Activated Mental Attitudes and Emotions (of f after step 3).
• Belf ¬victims
• Desf ¬victims
• Joyf ¬victims
6.3.4.4 Step 4: answer about the victims
Fireman answers: “No, there are none.”
α4 = 〈f, Inform, c,¬victims〉
.Joyf α4¬victims
.Relief c α4¬victims
As in the previous step, the performance of an informative speech act that there
are no victims activates f ’s joy about this. So f ’s speech act is accompanied by the
expression of Joyf ¬victims .
The rational effect of this speech act on the chief is that he believes that there
are no victims. This new belief triggers a new emotion of satisfaction. Indeed this
situation matches the chief’s past expectations.
Activated Mental Attitudes and Emotions (of c after step 4).
• Bel c ¬victims
• Desc ¬victims
• Bel c PExpectc ¬victims
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• Satisfactionc ¬victims
Thus the chief’s emotional reaction to the fireman’s answer is satisfaction about
the received information.
6.3.5 Conclusion
In this application we have shown that our BDI formalization of emotions can
be combined with a BDI semantics of speech acts to account for the emotions
triggered during dialogue. This account is incomplete for now because this is an
early application where we made some simplifications and hypothesis, but it can
easily be extended to other cases. Emotions in reaction to the description of an
action are triggered similarly to emotions in reaction to the description of an event:
the rational effect is in terms of a belief about an action, and this belief can match
the definition of an emotion and then activate it. Emotions in reaction to speech acts
considered as actions depend on conversational norms that we have not formalized.
This could be an interesting future field of research.
Moreover this account is restricted to the expression of emotions during dia-
logue, but for now these emotions have no influence on the subsequent dialogue.
We believe that this influence should be expressed in terms of coping strategies,
viz. the efforts that an individual makes to manage his emotions. A natural contin-
uation of this work would thus be to formalize these coping strategies in our BDI
framework ((cf. Chapter 8)).
6.4 Conclusion
We have already discussed the advantages of a logical model of emotions. This
chapter shows that it is not only useful to do formal proofs of the properties of
emotions, but that it is also functioning and ready to be implemented and used in
agents for various purposes. We have only explored two of them, but we believe
that there exist much more (cf. Chapter 2).
Besides these two applications highlight that our model of emotions is incom-
plete yet. We have formalized the triggering of emotions, but not their influence
on behaviour. Thus the previous examples could only be half-formalized. Our first
attempt to fill this lack by formalizing coping strategies is exposed in Chapter 8.
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Chapter 7
Implementation and evaluation
A man should never be ashamed to own he has been
in the wrong, which is but saying, in other words,
that he is wiser today than he was yesterday.
(Alexander Pope, poet)
7.1 Introduction
As we showed it in the introduction of this thesis, the agent community researchers
design more and more emotional agents, in particular embodied conversational
agents (cf. Chapter 2). To ensure the relevance of the expressed emotions in the
context of interaction (and thus preserve the believability of the agent) they refer
to psychological theories as a basis for their model (cf. Chapter 1), and more par-
ticularly to the OCC typology (Ortony, Clore, and Collins, 1988)). We believe that
the main reason for this wide-spreading is the simplicity of this typology, making
it very understandable by computer scientists. However, we observe that from a
psychological point of view nothing proves that this theory is better than the other
ones. In a context where we try to model agents that are as believable and realistic
as possible, this question yet is essential to answer, especially since psychological
theories sometimes noticeably disagree about which emotions to consider and how
to define them (cf. Chapter 1).
In this chapter, we thus want to assess the relevance of the emotions that a
BDI agent can express if it is endowed with an emotional model built on our for-
malization of the OCC typology. To do that we implement our BDI framework of
OCC’s emotions in a software agent named PLEIAD (Prolog Emotional Intelligent
Agents Designer)1. PLEIAD expresses the emotions that he “feels” in response to
1PLEIAD was first presented at the French workshop WACA’2006, cf. (Adam, 2006). The results
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stimuli sent by the user. From now on, we highlight that PLEIAD experimentally
integrates the managing of numerical degrees associated with mental attitudes, and
of numerical intensity degrees associated with emotions. We believe that this does
not impede this implementation to validate our logical model since the names of
the emotions triggered are predicted by the logical model, and only their intensity
is computed apart from it. We then run PLEIAD on a short scenario and ask some
people to evaluate the relevance of the emotions expressed by the agent w.r.t. the
emotions that they would have felt in the same situation, or w.r.t. the emotions that
are commonly admissible in this situation. Our aim is:
• to test the predictions of our theoretical model in comparison to the users’
expectations;
• to test the predictions of the OCC typology itself in comparison to these
expectations.
We will first describe the implementation of agent PLEIAD (Section 7.2), then
expose the modalities of our evaluation (Section 7.3), and finally discuss the re-
sults of the evaluations and give our conclusions about our model and about its
psychological basis (Section 7.4).
7.2 PLEIAD: implementation
In this section we describe the implementation of our logical framework in the
PLEIAD agent, in particular the concessions made for the implementation. We
also detail the different modules composing our agent’s architecture.
7.2.1 Concessions to the logical theory
Compared to the original theory, we made some changes. First, as mentioned in
the introduction, we associated degrees with every mental attitudes of the agent, in
order to deduce an intensity for each triggered emotion. These numerical values
were lacking in our logical framework because it is very hard to give a formal se-
mantics of graduated mental attitudes (e.g. (Laverny and Lang, 2005b)). However,
they undeniably increase the expressive realism of the agent (cf. Section 7.2.5).
Second, we made a concession concerning the completeness of the logic in
order to simplify its implementation: we do not handle all logical connectors, so
mental attitudes mainly refer to atomic formulas. Moreover we only implemented
the more useful axioms so that the implemented axiomatics is not complete. In
of this evaluation will be published in a French journal (Adam, Herzig, and Longin, 2007).
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particular, we did not integrated the positive and negative introspection axioms for
belief (Axioms 4-Bel i and 5-Bel i page 93), probability (Axioms 4-MIX1 and 5-
MIX1 page 96) and desire (Axioms 4-MIX2 and 5-MIX2 page 96) to prevent the
logical prover to loop infinitely.
Finally, the prover itself is not complete, since it is written in Prolog, so that
some valid formulas could not be inferred, but in the standard functioning of our
agent this appeared to be sufficient.
7.2.2 Interface
The interface of PLEIAD is shown on figure 7.1. It allows to create an agent by
describing his mental attitudes: beliefs, desires, norms, expectations... and to use
him in a simulation where he emotionally answers to the stimuli he is sent. The
interface is set up of the following items:
• nine frames giving information about the agent and the simulation:
– the name of the agent;
– a textual description of his current emotion;
– a picture expressing his current emotion;
– the instant of simulation;
– the agent’s beliefs;
– the agent’s ideals;
– the agent’s expectations;
– the agent’s desires;
– the agent’s focus of attention;
• four menus:
– the Main menu allows to set the debug mode (to see what happens
in the Prolog threads called by PLEIAD) and to launch the evaluation
scenario;
– the Designer menu allows to create an agent and to modify him by
adding or removing mental attitudes from his knowledge base. This
menu will also allow to manage personalities and social roles;
– the Simulation menu allows to launch or reset the simulation, to send
various types of stimuli to the agent, to modify his focus, and to make
him use some coping strategies;
– the View menu allows the user to select additional information to be
displayed in satellite windows (all emotions, past beliefs, acquaintances).
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Figure 7.1: PLEIAD interface
7.2.3 Architecture
Our agent architecture uses a knowledge base (KB) containing graduated mental
attitudes (cf. Section 7.2.5) also associated with an activation degree (or focus de-
gree, cf. Section 7.2.4). The user can send stimuli (actions or events) to the agent
by specifying their name and effects, that are directly added to the agent’s beliefs.
The perception module is thus transparent for now, since each stimulus is per-
ceived entirely and correctly2. A logical prover continuously fills the KB with all
the mental attitudes deductible from the mapping of some axioms on its content.
For now the axiomatics is incomplete to prevent loops, but this Prolog is sufficient
in spite of its incompleteness. An activation managing module generates automatic
modifications of focus like temporal decay. The emotional module uses the formal
definitions presented in Chapter 4 to deduce all the emotions (associated with an
intensity degree) that the agent should “feel” in this situation according to the OCC
typology. Finally, a selection module specifies which one of these emotions will be
expressed by the expression module3. We do not handle facial and bodily anima-
tion, so our expression module only displays textual information about the emotion
and a smiley to illustrate it.
2Later, we could envisage to model the influence of emotions on perception and thus the agent
could have an incomplete or distorted perception of stimuli.
3The expression module could also take an emotional vector and display a blended facial expres-
sion (e.g. (Ochs et al., 2005)).
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Figure 7.2: PLEIAD architecture
7.2.4 The activation module
According to Anderson (Anderson, 1990; Anderson, 1993; Anderson and Lebiere,
1998; Anderson and Lebiere, 2003; Anderson et al., 2004), activation is a notion
determining the accessibility to the conscious of a knowledge unit, or chunk. At
a given instant, the activation degree of a chunk depends on the individual’s back-
ground (past experiences) proportionately to its subjective utility at this instant. It
is computed as the sum of a basic activation and an associative activation. The basic
activation represents the past utility of the chunk viz. its recency and frequency of
use; it decreases logarithmically along time. The associative activation represents
the relevance of the chunk in the current context (viz. w.r.t. the current goal) and
depends on the activation degrees of related chunks4. This theory is implemented
in the cognitive architecture ACT-R (Lebiere and Anderson, 1993).
In PLEIAD, we associate a focus degree with the mental attitudes (beliefs, de-
sires...) in the agent’s KB. The focus is a simplified notion of activation in Ander-
son’s sense since it involves no association network linking propositions together,
so that its value only depends on what Anderson calls the basic activation. The
focus degree also represents the availability of a mental attitude for cognitive pro-
cesses. In our implementation focus refer to propositions (noted p), and all men-
tal attitudes referring to the same proposition (e.g. Bel i p and Des i p) are equally
available. We make this reductive choice to simplify the triggering of emotions:
4A chunk is linked to other chunks if it was necessary when these other chunks were part of the
individual’s goal.
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once a proposition is available all the terms referring to it in the definition of an
emotion are available so this emotion can be triggered.
An empirical initial focus degree is attributed to mental attitudes of the initial
knowledge base by the designer of the agent. Then, the perceived stimuli get max-
imal focus (in PLEIAD it is fixed to 1). Like in ACT-R this focus degree then
decreases along time depending on an empirical factor: at each time step the fo-
cus degree is multiplied by a given alleviation factor. The focus degree intervenes
in the computation of the intensity of an emotion, depending on the activation of
its object. Thus this emotional intensity naturally decreases along time while the
agent little by little forgets or pay less attention to the object of the emotion.
This way, we can formalize two simple reasoning strategies in Forgas’ sense
in his work about the Affect Infusion Model (Forgas, 1995). According to him,
there exists several reasoning strategies among which the individual chooses w.r.t.
the context to minimize his efforts. We propose that depending on his current
emotion the agent has the choice between two strategies: either he uses his full
KB to reason, what is more efficient but also more expensive, or he uses only the
most available chunks (those whose focus degree overhauls a given threshold) to
possibly get a quicker answer but running the risk to get nothing or something
false. However, our model does not explain the choice between these two possible
strategies: for now our agent always uses the first strategy.
7.2.5 Emotional intensity
To increase the realism of the emotion expressed by our agent, we wanted to as-
sociate this emotion with a gradual intensity degree. Indeed for human beings, to
be a little irritated is very different from being really angry. Moreover, the im-
portance of intensity for the expression of emotions and the determination of their
influence was already highlighted before, along with the fact that this factor is yet
often weirdly ignored.
“One of the more curious aspects of emotion research indeed is its lack
of attention to the fact that emotions vary in intensity. The failure of
emotion theorists to address questions concerning emotion intensity
is all the more puzzling because intensity is such a salient feature of
emotions. Our phenomenal experience acknowledges this fact, as does
our behavior and our language; so how is it that our science essentially
ignores it? And ignore it, it does.”
(Frijda et al., 1992)
According to Lorini and colleagues (Castelfranchi and Lorini, 2003), the de-
gree and dynamics of the emotions arising from the composition of mental attitudes
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directly depend on the degree and dynamics of these mental attitudes. They thus
associate a subjective certainty degree with the agent’s beliefs and an importance
degree to his goals, and then compute the intensity of various expectation-based
emotions depending on these degrees. In the same way, we also associate degrees
with the agent’s mental attitudes: a degree of certainty of beliefs, a degree of im-
portance of desires, goals, and standards, a degree of friendship or hostility with
acquaintances. We then compute the intensity degree of an emotion as a function
(empirically chosen as a product) of the degrees associated with each composing
mental attitude and of the activation degree of its object (cf. Section 7.2.4). Thus,
the intensity of an emotion decreases over time along with the activation of its ob-
ject. For example the intensity of Joy i ϕ is computed as the product of the degree
of belief associated with Bel i ϕ, of the degree of desire associated with Des i ϕ,
and of the activation degree associated with ϕ. Actually the condition of an emo-
tion can remain true (indeed we made the hypothesis that desires persist) but its
intensity decreases along with the agent’s focus on its eliciting situation.
We translated the formal definitions of emotions from the BDI logic to Prolog
and added the computation of their intensity. All numerical degrees are comprised
between 0 and 1. The following example illustrates this process for the joy emo-
tion:
• BDI formula: Joy i ϕ
def
= Bel i ϕ ∧Des i ϕ
• Prolog predicate meaning that the agent I feels joy with degree D about
proposition Phi at time T
cond_emotion(I, joy , [Phi], D, T ) : − infocus(I, Phi,Deg , T ),
believe(I, Phi,D1, T ),
desire(I, Phi,D2),
D is D1 ∗D2 ∗Deg .
The evaluations confirmed the importance of this intensity degree associated
with the emotion, although its numerical expression was not very meaningful for
human users.
7.2.6 Emotional expression
The emotional module computes a vector of the emotions induced by the agent’s
KB and his reasoning principles at a given moment. From the psychological point
of view it is fully plausible to feel several emotions simultaneously, even when
these emotions are ambivalent viz. one is positive while the other is negative (about
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this see (Larsen et al., 2004)). PLEIAD thus generates all emotions felt by the
agent at a given moment, associated with an intensity degree. These emotions can
be visualized in a satellite window through the View menu.
This emotional vector is then intended to be sent to an expression module able
to express it, like a facial or body animation engine. Some authors allow their
agent to display complex facial expressions resulting from the blending of several
emotions (Ochs et al., 2005). They would thus find useful to receive the whole
emotional vector generated by PLEIAD. However such an expression module is
out of our skills so we choose to give only textual information about the emotion
along with an illustrative smiley. In this setting and for the sake of simplicity we
make the hypothesis that our agent can only express one emotion at a given instant.
The selection module thus selects the most appropriate emotion in the gen-
erated vector. For now this appropriateness only depends on the intensity of the
emotion and on its complexity. The notion of complexity accounts for the differ-
ence in the OCC typology between simple emotions and composed emotions: we
consider that the composed emotions are more complex since that convey more in-
formation than their constituent emotions. Concretely we choose the object of the
most intense emotion and then select the most complex emotion referring to this
object. Actually the selection of the most appropriate emotion should depend on
many other parameters that we do not account for here: context (some emotions
are inhibited in front of some people, for example one should not get angry against
his boss), culture, personality...
7.3 Evaluation
Under the hypothesis that our formal model is faithful to a given psychological
theory, its faithful implementation allows an evaluation of this underlying psycho-
logical theory. Indeed, there exist various psychological theories of emotions, often
disagreeing on their definitions. The implementation of our logical model in the
agent PLEIAD thus enables to assess not only our BDI model but also its underly-
ing theory: the OCC typology. This section describes the course of evaluations.
7.3.1 Experimental method
PLEIAD provides a test mode where the modifications of the knowledge base are
constrained by a scenario predefined by the designer of the agent. The user can
only choose between some options at each step of the scenario to influence the
continuation viz. the agent’s KB and thus his/her emotions. At each step an emotion
is expressed and the user can fill in a questionnaire about its characteristics. At each
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step the user is asked the following questions about this emotion:
• Was it foreseeable? (would the user have felt the same emotion in this situa-
tion ?)
• Is it coherent? (can the user understand that someone feels this emotion in
the same situation or does he think it to be strange?)
The user can also indicate which emotion he would have felt in this situation if it
is different from the generated one, and give some comments.
Figure 7.3: PLEIAD questionnaire
We have submitted an interactive scenario to fifteen people and gathered the
questionnaires they filled in about the seven emotions triggered during this sce-
nario. Since the judges were not numerous enough to make significative statistics,
we mainly exploited their comments to analyse the believability of the expressed
emotions and to collect the required improvements.
The scenario that was used during this first evaluation only involves the twelve
event-based emotions from the OCC typology. It is detailed in the next paragraph.
We intend to make other evaluations with new scenarios involving all the twenty
emotions that we formalized.
7.3.2 Scenario
A woman c desires to be hired at an interesting job. The condition to get this job
is to get an interview so she also desires to get one. The scenario starts when she
sends her curriculum vitæ to the firm, and is set in seven steps.
163
7.3.2.1 Step 1: chances to get an interview
The first option allows to choose if she considers her CV to be good or bad or if she
has no view: the corresponding belief is added to her knowledge base. Moreover
she has some world law knowledge allowing to infer her chances to get an interview
with such a CV. She also desires to get this interview.
Initial Knowledge Base.
• either Bel c goodcv or Bel c ¬goodcv or no belief about it
• Bel c goodcv → Expectc getInterview
• Bel c ¬goodcv → Expectc ¬getInterview
• Desc getInterview
A prospect-based emotion is thus generated about her chances to get an interview.
If she has no belief about her CV she can infer no expectation and thus no prospect-
based emotion.
Deduction. Either KB ` Hopec getInterview or KB ` Fear c ¬getInterview or
KB infers no emotion.
7.3.2.2 Step 2: convocation for an interview
At the next step, she is convoked for an interview. In our explicit implementation
of time, this event increases the current instant value by 1. The desires persist and
the agent remembers her past beliefs and expectations.
Initial Knowledge Base.
• either Bel c PExpectc getInterview or Bel c PExpectc ¬getInterview or no
past expectation about the interview
• Desc getInterview
• Bel c interview
This knowledge base and the definitions of emotions allow to trigger a confirmation-
based emotion referring to this convocation.
Deduction. EitherKB ` Satisfactionc getInterview orKB ` Relief c getInterview
or KB infers no emotion.
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7.3.2.3 Step 3: chances to succeed in the interview
The candidate c then focuses on her chances to succeed in her interview. She
desires to succeed. An option allows the user to choose if she is rather optimistic,
pessimistic, or neutral.
Initial Knowledge Base.
• either Expectc succeedInterview or Expect c ¬succeedInterview or no ex-
pectation
• Desc succeedInterview
The third emotion thus refers to the prospect of passing successfully the interview.
Deduction. EitherKB ` Hopec succeedInterview orKB ` Fear c succeedInterview
or KB infers no emotion.
7.3.2.4 Step 4: after the interview
At the next step, the user can choose if the woman failed her interview or made it
a success. The candidate remembers her past expectations (before the interview)
and her desire persists.
Initial Knowledge Base.
• Bel c ¬succeedInterview / Bel c succeedInterview
• Desc succeedInterview
• Bel c PExpectc succeedInterview / Bel c PExpectc ¬succeedInterview
Depending on the configuration of the past expectation and the corresponding
current belief, one of the four possible confirmation-based emotions is triggered.
Deduction.
• Either Satisfactionc succeedInterview
• or Relief c succeedInterview
• or Disappointment c ¬succeedInterview
• or FearConfirmed c ¬succeedInterview .
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7.3.2.5 Step 5: chances to get the job
The applicant then focuses on her chances to get the job. Some world law knowl-
edge allows her to infer expectations about her chances from her beliefs about her
success or fail in the interview. Once again she can have no belief and then infer
no expectation: in this case she would feel no emotion about getting the job.
Initial Knowledge Base.
• Bel c ¬succeedInterview / Bel c succeedInterview
• Bel c succeedInterview → Expect c cGetsJob
• Bel c ¬succeedInterview → Expect c ¬cGetsJob
A new prospect-based emotion is thus generated about this new prospected event:
getting the job.
Deduction. EitherKB ` Hopec cGetsJob orKB ` Fear c cGetsJob orKB infers
no emotion about this.
7.3.2.6 Step 6: results, to be hired or not to be
The user can now choose if the postulant is hired or not.
Initial Knowledge Base.
• Bel c cGetsJob / Bel c ¬cGetsJob
• Desc cGetsJob
• Bel c PExpectc cGetsJob / Bel c PExpectc ¬cGetsJob
A confirmation-based emotion among the four possible ones is thus generated
about this event.
7.3.2.7 Step 7: about another candidate
Finally, the candidate focuses on another postulant a, who either got the job that
she missed or was refused if she got it. c believes that a desires to get the job. The
user can then choose if a is a friend, an enemy or a stranger: the corresponding
desire5 is added to c’s KB.
5We use the same global axioms as in Section 4.5.3.1 to infer the term of the definition corre-
sponding to the desire concerning the other agent.
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Initial Knowledge Base.
• Bel c ¬cGetsJob ∧ Bel c aGetsJob ∧ Bel c Bela aGetsJob /
Bel c cGetsJob ∧ Bel c ¬aGetsJob ∧ Bel c Bela ¬aGetsJob
• Desc ¬Bela ¬aGetsJob / Desc Bela ¬aGetsJob / no desire about a
A fortune-of-other emotion is then triggered toward the other applicant. If a is
a friend it is a good-will emotion, if a is an enemy it is an ill-will emotion, and if a
is a stranger (viz. a is indifferent to c) c has no desire about him and thus feels no
emotion towards him.
Deduction.
• Either HappyFor c,aaGetsJob
• or SorryFor c,a¬aGetsJob
• or Resentment c,aaGetsJob
• or Gloatingc,a¬aGetsJob
• or KB infers no emotion.
The next section presents the conclusions that we drew from this evaluation.
7.4 Results
PLEIAD allows us to evaluate our system on three levels.
• First we can evaluate the implementation: is it faithful to our logical model?
Does PLEIAD always express the emotions that we expected it to express
according to our definitions?
• Second if the implementation is supposed to be faithful, we can evaluate
our logical formalization? Are there some cases where the OCC typology
says that a given emotion should occur but where our formalization of the
situation is such that this emotion is not triggered? Why?
• Finally when our formalization is not responsible for the difference between
the emotion expressed by PLEIAD and the emotion expected by the users,
we can evaluate the OCC typology itself.
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The triggered emotions are globally well accepted by the users, and they con-
sider the agent as being rather believable, even if they found that some emotions
were hardly relevant or really aberrant. We thus brought to light several problems,
as well in our formalism or our interface as in the OCC theory. We discuss in
details these problems in the following paragraphs.
7.4.1 The persistence of emotions seems to be unrealistic
When the received stimulus (the last event that occurred) does not trigger any new
emotion, we do not express a neutral answer to this stimulus. Indeed, our selection
module chooses an emotion by considering its intensity and complexity, but not
its recency. Moreover, emotions persist for some time after their triggering. Thus
when no new emotion is triggered by a stimulus, the agent expresses an old emotion
that still persists. But this way, he seems to be answering to the new stimulus with
an unappropriate emotion, while it is not really the case: actually, he does not
answer to this stimulus at all, and just keeps on expressing the same emotion as
before.
In a first version of our work (Adam and Evrard, 2005) the agent always ex-
pressed the emotion corresponding to the last perceived stimulus, even if it was
neutral, but this led to brutal changes in his emotion at every new event. This prob-
lem was already highlighted by Frijda et Moffat (Moffat, Frijda, and Phaf, 1993).
We thus considered that a possible solution was to express the new emotion only
when it was more intense than the current one. But the evaluations showed that
it was not very believable. The agent should probably express either a complex
blending of several emotions, or an emotional sequence: first the emotion related
to the stimulus, and then the previous one if it was more intense.
7.4.2 The status of surprise
Several users said that they would rather feel surprise in some situations with which
the OCC typology associates disconfirmation emotions (relief or disappointment)
or even well-being emotions. Actually, the emotion of surprise is not described in
the OCC typology, while many categorial models of emotions consider it as a basic
emotion (e.g. (Ekman, 1992b)). Indeed Ortony, Clore, and Collins consider that an
emotion is a valenced reaction and thus it should be a valenced feeling. According
to them surprise is a “cognitive state” constituent of disconfirmation emotions, that
also integrate the realization or not of a desire that creates the valenced reaction.
In our work we choosed to faithfully formalize the OCC typology so we did not
formalize surprise as an emotion.
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If we try to give a BDI definition for surprise it could be as follows:
Surpriseiϕ
def
= Bel i ϕ ∧ Bel i PExpect i ¬ϕ
This reads “agent i believes that ϕ is now true while he was expecting it to be
false”. This definition of surprise is a component of our definitions of relief and
disappointment, OCC’s positive and negative disconfirmation emotions. Thereby
relief would be a good surprise while disappointment would be a bad one. However
when the unexpected event involves no desire the agent would feel surprise anyway.
This is also contrary to Lazarus’ view on appraisal: according to him, a stimulus
must be relevant to the individual’s well-being (viz. in our formalization it should
match one of the agent’s desires) in order to trigger an emotion. Finally the status
of surprise as an emotion seems to be at least debatable.
7.4.3 Perception of fortunes-of-others emotions
In some cases the users considered the generated emotion as completely inaccurate.
For instance, when the woman learns that she is refused and that the person hired is
an enemy, we trigger a resentment emotion, corresponding to the OCC definition:
the agent is displeased by an event believed to be desirable for another agent (here
the appraised event is the hiring of the enemy). Yet in this situation several users
expected the candidate to be angry, while for OCC this emotion is the result of
a blending of sadness (here it is the case, the candidate is sad at not being hired)
and reproach. According to OCC, reproach arises when the agent disapproves of
a blameworthy action, an action that does not respect norms, so it can not arise
here, since the enemy has the right to apply for the job, and even the right to get it.
According to this definition, the anger felt by the users seems to be wrong.
Lazarus proposes a refinement of the resentment emotion: when others get
something that he also wanted and did not get, the individual can feel either envy, or
jealousy if this desired resource is mutually exclusive. In the situation where there
is just one job to get, the resource is mutually exclusive, and the candidate could
feel jealousy towards her rival, friend or enemy. But this is still not anger. Then the
difference could be explained by the difficulty to label one’s own emotions: were
the users able to get the postulant’s point of view and determine the emotion that
they would have felt? Our next experimentation will be conducted in collaboration
with psychologists to answer this problem.
7.4.4 A lack of precision in complex emotions
Another emotion that was not well accepted is “compassion” (sorry for) triggered
when the candidate gets the job but learns that a friend of hers missed it. By
169
appraising this event that is undesirable for her friend she feels sorry for him. Yet
she is involved in this failure since she is the one who got the job and thus who
took it away from him. Some users thus expected her to be embarrassed towards
her friend. This emotion is close to the shame of the OCC typology (with a weak
intensity) that could arise from the evaluation of her action of applying for the job
if this action was blameworthy. There are two reasons explaining that we did not
trigger shame in this situation.
First, from the candidate’s point of view we choose to represent her hiring as an
event, since it was under the responsibility of the recruiter rather than hers, and the
recruiter does not belong to the agent’s acquaintances. This formalization prevents
action-based emotions in the sense of Ortony, Clore, and Collins (like shame or
remorse) to occur.
Moreover, we did not consider the action of applying for the job as violating
any global standard. Such a standard would make the agent feel shame at being
hired in any context, what is not relevant. Instead, we would like the postulant to
be ashamed towards her friend for getting the job he also wanted, but to be proud of
getting it when she is with her family. One lead is to formalize group-parameterized
standards, viz. standards that hold for an agent member of a group when he faces
this group, but do not hold for the same agent facing another group. For example,
a man who is a worshipper but works as a soldier: his work makes him kill people
while his religion forbids it, so when he kills an enemy he is ashamed towards his
religious community, but not towards other soldiers. Thereby, coming back to our
scenario, we could consider that among a group of friends, some implicit standard
advises not to try to get something that a friend is desiring too. If this standard
held for the candidate, it could explain an emotion of shame in the sense of Ortony,
Clore, and Collins towards her friend, while allowing an emotion of pride towards
her family.
Finally we can notice that the OCC typology defines remorse as a blending of
sadness and shame. In this case the blending is more subtle since the candidate
is happy of being hired, but caused a friend to be sad of not being hired, and this
action finally makes her sad. We could define a new emotion of embarrassment as
a combination of these elements: for j a friend of i,
Discomfort i,j(i:α,ϕ)
def
= Shamei (i:α,ϕ) ∧ Joy i ϕ ∧ Bel i Sadnessj ϕ
We could also have a look at Lazarus’ theory, that makes a fine-grained distinction
between shame and guilt. This could help us to characterize the exact emotion felt
by the human users in this complex situation.
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7.4.5 About hope, fear, and probability
A chronic problem raised by the users is the confusion between hope and fear.
In which case does the agent fear ϕ and in which case does he hope ¬ϕ? The
distinction seems to be a matter of probabilities. In some cases people find more
realistic to feel hope (resp. fear) when the desirable (resp. undesirable) event is few
probable (e.g. to hope winning Loto, or to fear being hit while crossing the road; it
would seem strange to fear losing or to hope crossing safely). Lazarus defined hope
in this way (“fearing the worst but yearning for better” (Lazarus, 1991, p.282)).
Nevertheless Ortony, Clore, and Collins define hope (resp. fear) as the prospect
of a desirable (resp. undesirable) event, with the intensity of hope proportional (in
particular) to the likelihood of the event. In this setting one would always feel
both hope and fear with complementary degrees: for example one would feel a
strong hope and a weak fear (resp. a weak hope and a strong fear) when a desir-
able (resp. undesirable) event is deemed probable. We thus translated the notion of
“prospect” with the Expect operator meaning that the agent considers more proba-
ble the situation where the event happens than the situation where it does not. This
prevents from feeling both hope and fear since their definitions are mutually exclu-
sive. Besides this definition is the opposite (in terms of probabilities) of Lazarus’
definition that we used in a previous version of this work (Adam et al., 2006a;
Adam et al., 2006b). This disagreement shows the difficulty of distinguishing be-
tween these two emotions.
The users also said that these two emotions should not arise when the event is
too probable, or not enough probable. This comment is in agreement with Ortony,
Clore, and Collins who also notice that if the undesirable event is too probable then
the emotion is not fear anymore but rather dread. This restriction is captured by the
term ¬Bel i ¬ϕ in our definition of Expect i ϕ, that excludes propositions that the
agent believes to be true. Yet it seems that not everybody has the same perception
of probabilities: what is important here is the subjective probability of an event that
can be different from one person to another. So the problem was that we did not
give to the agent the same probabilities of events than the ones “computed” by the
users.
7.4.6 About the interface
These evaluations also showed some problems in the ergonomics of the interface.
In particular, the object of an emotion is not clearly indicated and users often do
not read it and then consider an emotion to be wrong when it is only referring
to another object than the one that they are thinking about. This can skew some
results, in particular when the emotion is induced by a change of focus that is not
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perceived by the user.
Moreover, the intensity of the emotion is given by a numerical degree but this
does not seem to be appropriate: this number is not read by the user. We thus
changed it to a qualitative degree among three possible semantic values: “few”,
“rather”, and “very”. We have simplified the interface (cf. Figure 7.4) to give all
and only the necessary information in a more comprehensible way, especially for
users who do not master Prolog. Thereby, we display “the candidate is very worried
about the prospect of not getting an interview” instead of “emotion(employee,fear,not(entretien),0.8,0)”.
Figure 7.4: PLEIAD simplified interface
These simplifications will allow us to conduct new experiments with users who
are not computer specialist. We want to conduct these experimentations with the
help of psychologists to ensure better expertise. We will also provide more dif-
ferent scenarios. Yet, this first experimentation always gave encouraging results.
The expressed emotions are evaluated as globally relevant, and the users’ com-
ments helped us to identify some problems, either in the OCC typology or in our
formalization of it.
7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented the implementation of our logical formalism into a
software agent who emotionally answers to stimuli, and we exposed this agent to
the critics of human judges to draw conclusions about both the OCC typology and
our formalization of it. The results of this first evaluation open plentiful improve-
ment prospects, at least for the part depending on us, viz. our own formalization of
the OCC typology. Our agent could allow to compare several formalisations of this
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typology, provided they are expressed in the same logic. But in addition, it also al-
lows to compare the predictions of several psychological theories of emotions, by
formalizing them in the same logic.
In particular, we look toward Lazarus’ appraisal theory, which often appeared
to be more subtle or more exact during evaluations. However, this theory is far
more complex than the OCC typology, partly because it was not designed for an
implementation by Artificial Intelligence researchers. It involves complex concepts
of responsibility, ego-involvement... that will be hard to formalize in our logic, and
that seems to be hard to formalize in a formalism that is not too complex. To
formalize Lazarus’ theory, Gratch and Marsella (2004a) have created their own
complex structure for representing the agent’s mental state, by adapting various
existing formalisms (cf. Chapter 2). A simpler possibility is to represent responsi-
bility through the concept of agency that we can integrate in our BDI logic thanks
to the STIT operator (seeing-to-it-that, (Horty and Belnap, 1995a)), that we already
began to study (cf. (Herzig and Troquard, 2006; Broersen, Herzig, and Troquard,
2006)).
However, we have to ask the question of the ratio between the profit taken in
terms of expressivity, believability... and the additional costs produced by using
such a theory. Is it necessary for an agent to express subtle differences between
guilt and shame, or between jealousy and envy, that Lazarus underlines? This
highly depends on the application for which the agent is intended (cf. Chapter 2).
Eventually, the “ideal” emotional theory for these agents could be a compromise
between several theories, sometimes using simple but sufficient notions and some-
times using more complex ones for some critical emotions. But in any case, since
researchers are currently for different reasons trying to make their agents as be-
lievable as possible, we believe that they cannot afford to ignore more complex
psychological theories than the classical OCC typology. Moreover, psychology it-
self may take profit from such researches and in particular from the possibility to
evaluate the theories, in order to better understand human emotions.
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Chapter 8
Towards a formalization of the
coping process
Emotion turning back on itself, and not
leading on to thought or action,
is the element of madness.
(John Sterling)
8.1 Introduction
Emotion takes an increasingly important place in the design of agents for various
applications (cf. Chapter 2): Ambient Intelligence, believable agents for virtual
worlds or video games, emotionally aware agents for tutoring (pedagogical agents),
assistance (interfaces agents) or entertainment (virtual companions).
Existing computer science research on emotion (including ours) mainly fo-
cuses on the triggering and expression of emotions (Pelachaud et al., 2002; Meyer,
2004). Most of the time, researchers provide an implementation of the OCC ty-
pology. Nevertheless this typology only describes appraisal (the process assessing
the agent’s environment to trigger an appropriate emotion), a process that is only
part of the human emotional process. Indeed, Lazarus showed that a second pro-
cess complements appraisal: coping. In the sense of Lazarus and Folkman (1984),
coping represents the conscious attempts of the individual to manage threatening
stimuli pointed out by intense negative emotions triggered by the appraisal pro-
cess. Very few models of this second process exist (Dastani and Meyer, 2006;
Gratch and Marsella, 2004a; Marsella and Gratch, 2003), while several psychologi-
cal studies endorse the crucial influence of emotions on behaviour (Damasio, 1994;
Forgas, 1995).
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Yet, as we showed in two applications (cf. Chapter 6), agents with coping abil-
ities could be useful in several application domains. For example, Embodied Con-
versational Agents would not only express their emotion with a facial expression
or vocal modifications; they would change their whole dialogic behaviour depend-
ing on their emotions. Indeed, we believe that some human dialogic behaviours
are manifestations of coping processes: telling lies, interrupting one’s interlocutor,
refusing to answer... Standard models of dialogue are unable to explain such kinds
of “irrational” but realistic dialogues, since they assume (too) strong and restric-
tive rationality hypotheses that do not match human reasoning. A model of coping
strategies could fill this gap. Another example is Ambient Intelligence: in our case
study (cf. Chapter 6) the intelligent agent who takes care of the user through re-
sponding to his emotions actually deploys coping strategies for him, to help him
manage his negative emotions.
In this chapter we thus propose our first attempt to formalize some coping
strategies. This work is still ongoing so the results presented here are preliminary.
Our aim is not to provide a full-fledged model of the coping process, but rather to
disambiguate the concepts involved in the implementation of an emotional agent
in order to be able to reason about them. We have already shown the advantages of
BDI logics to disambiguate complex concepts (cf. Chapter 4) and to reason about
their properties (cf. Chapter 5). Given the complexity of the emotional process
and the limited expressivity of BDI logics compared to natural language, such a
model is inevitably simplistic but it offers undeniable assets. We thus build on our
BDI framework designed to formalize appraisal (cf. Chapter 3) and extend it to
account for the coping process. In particular we need modal operators of choice
and intention that are not present in this formalism.
Actually, we adapt the COPE model (Carver, Scheier, and Weintraub, 1989)
that proposes a set of fifteen coping strategies. We then consider these coping
strategies as actions whose preconditions and effects are expressed in terms of the
agents’ mental attitudes (beliefs, desires and intentions). For the sake of simplicity,
in this first attempt we restrain to coping strategies concerning event-based emo-
tions. We are not interested here in the decision process leading to the choice of
one particular coping strategy, but only in the effect of the chosen strategy on the
agent’s mental attitudes. Emotions thus affect the agent’s subsequent behaviour in
two ways: directly through the choice and application of a coping strategy, and in-
directly through the modification of the mental attitudes involved in his reasoning.
We start off with an introduction of the psychological concept of coping (Sec-
tion 8.2). We then proceed with the description of the semantics and axiomatic
of the new operators that we add in our logical framework (Section 8.3). We will
then propose a logical account of some coping strategies in this framework (Sec-
tion 8.4), and illustrate their actual use on an example from a training simulation
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for firemen (Section 8.5). Finally we will discuss some existing formalizations of
coping strategies, namely Gratch and Marsella’s EMA agent, Elliott’s Affective
Reasoner, and Meyer’s agent language (Section 8.6).
8.2 The psychological concept of coping
Since the state of the art of this thesis was mainly dedicated to appraisal, we quickly
introduce here the psychological concept of coping that we want to formalize.
Lazarus and Folkman (1984) quote two origins of the concept of coping: the
darwinian theory of stress and control in animals, defining coping as acts control-
ling aversive situations to lower psychological and physiological perturbations; and
psychoanalytic ego psychology, defining coping as realistic and flexible thoughts
and acts that solve problems and reduce stress. But for Lazarus, what is important
in coping is not the result but the efforts, that differentiate coping from automatic
adaptive processes like action tendencies or reflexes. He thus gives a new definition
of coping: “constantly changing cognitive and behavioral efforts to manage spe-
cific external and/or internal demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the
resources of the person” (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984). Coping thus has to do with
the mastering or minimization of stressful situations. Lazarus then distinguishes
two kinds of coping: problem-focused coping is oriented toward the management
of the problem creating the stress, and is more probable when appraisal indicates
a possible solution to this problem; emotion-focused coping is oriented toward the
regulation of the emotional response to the situation, and is more probable when
appraisal indicates no solution to the problem.
Carver, Scheier, and Weintraub (1989) propose the COPE model, that includes
a set of fifteen coping strategies. In the following we only discuss and formalize
the strategies that we judged the most useful for an agent.
• Active coping consists in directly acting against the stressor;
• Seeking emotional social support consists in trying to get moral support
(sympathy, understanding) from other people;
• Positive reinterpretation and growth consists in reinterpreting the situation
by finding some positive aspects in it;
• Resignation/acceptance consists in accepting the reality and move forward;
• Focus on and venting of emotions consists in focusing on one’s emotion
and evacuate it;
• Denial is an immature strategy, trying to refuse the reality of the stressor;
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• Mental disengagement consists in engaging in other activities in order to
divert from the stressor.
8.3 Extension of our logical framework
As said before we build on our logical framework (cf. Chapter 3) and extend it by
a Choice operator (realistic preference) in order to define intention as in (Herzig
and Longin, 2004).
8.3.1 Semantics
We add in R a new structure C : AGT → (W → 2W ) which associates each agent
i ∈ AGT and possible world w ∈ W with the set Ci(w) of preferred worlds of
agent i in w. All these accessibility relations Ci are serial, transitive and euclidian.
We associate a modal operator to this mapping: Choice i ϕ reads “agent i
prefers worlds where ϕ is true”. The truth condition is standard for this opera-
tor: for i ∈ AGT , w ° Choice i ϕ iff w′ ° ϕ for every w′ ∈ C (w).
We have the following additional introspection constraint: if w ∈ Bi(w′) then
Ci(w) = Ci(w
′) ensuring that agents are aware of their choices. We also impose
a strong realism constraint: Ci(w) ⊆ Bi(w) ensuring that viz. all preferred worlds
are also compatible with belief.
8.3.2 Axiomatics
The Choice i operators are defined in the standard KD45 logic (see (Hintikka,
1962; Chellas, 1980; Herzig and Longin, 2004) or Chapter 3). The only relation-
ship between belief and choice is the following axiom of strong realism.
Bel i ϕ→ Choicei ϕ (Real-Choice i )
We also have an introspection principle represented by the following mix axiom:
Choicei ϕ↔ Bel iChoicei ϕ (Introsp-Choice i )
We then follow Herzig and Longin (2004) to define achievement goals and future
directed intentions.
Definition 2 (Achievement goal). Agent i has ϕ as an achievement goal iff i does
not believe that ϕ is currently true, and in each of his preferred worlds i will believe
ϕ some time. Thus:
AGoal i ϕ
def
= Choicei FBel i ϕ ∧ ¬Bel i ϕ (DefAGoal i )
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Definition 3 (Future directed intention). Agent i intends that ϕ iff i has ϕ as an
achievement goal and i does not believe that he will believe ϕ some day. Thus:
Intend i ϕ
def
= AGoal i ϕ ∧ ¬Bel i FBel i ϕ (DefIntend i )
This logic is still sound and complete.
Finally, we consider that we can build on a planning process that we do not
detail here. Roughly speaking, if agent i intends that ϕ be true, and he believes that
after α ϕ will be true, then he intends that α be performed. Thus:
¬Bel iDoneα> ∧ Bel iAfterα ϕ ∧ Intend i ϕ→ Intend iDoneα> (PLANα,ϕ)
We can now proceed with formalizing coping strategies in this enriched logical
framework.
8.4 Formalization of some coping strategies
As we stated in the introduction, we restrain here our account of coping strategies
to event-based emotions. Indeed, the definitions of these emotions (cf. Chapter 4)
all use weak or strong belief and a corresponding individual desire. Our coping
strategies will modify these mental attitudes to drop the agent’s emotion. We be-
lieve that action-based emotions may imply other specific coping strategies like
“shifting responsibility” (Gratch and Marsella, 2004a). Moreover the social ideals
underlying these emotions may not be as easy to change as individual preferences.
We thus let the study of coping strategies against action-based emotions for future
work.
According to Lazarus and Folkman (1984), coping strategies only apply to stressful
situations, so we are finally only interested in the negative event-based emotions.
Definition 4 (Negative event-based emotion). An event-based emotion is negative
if the involved desire is contradicted or threatened, viz. it is in contradiction with
a belief or an expectation.
The negative event-based emotions of the OCC typology are: sadness, fear, fears-
conrmed, disappointment, sorry for, and resentment.
However we do not assume a direct correspondence between one emotion and
one fixed strategy (contrarily to Dastani and Meyer (2006)). On the contrary we
suppose that there is a complex decision process taking the emotion and the context
into account to determine the most efficient strategy to drop this emotion. We
consider that this process is beyond the scope of our account.
In the next subsections we will formalize some coping strategies as particular
actions schemes, and describe their conditions and effects in our logical language.
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8.4.1 Formal language
Let STRA = {ActiveCoping, Denial, SeekESupport, Focus&Venting, Resign,
PosReinterp, MentalDisengage} be a subset of action names from ACT corre-
sponding to coping strategies.
Let EMO− = {Distress,Disappointment, Fear, FearConfirmed, SorryFor,
Resentment} be the set of negative event-based emotions. Coping strategies can
only apply to emotions Ei,kϕ where E ∈ EMO−. Ei,kϕ is the emotion felt by
agent i about ϕ w.r.t. agent k1. Following the psychological literature we call ϕ the
“stressor”.
A coping action α is a 4-uple 〈s, i, Ei,kϕ,ψ〉 where i is the agent applying the
coping strategy s ∈ STRA to the emotion Ei,kϕ thanks to the means ψ. The
means is part of the specification of the strategy. When the means is not needed ψ
is >: we omit it and we write 〈s, i, Ei,kϕ〉.
We now give the general action laws of coping strategies.
8.4.2 Action laws
Action laws are made up of executability laws and effect laws. The former describe
what must be true before the execution of an action (called the precondition of the
action); the latter describe what will be true after the execution of this action (called
the effect of the action). In the case of coping actions, preconditions and effects
are described in terms of mental attitudes.
To be executable, a coping action must satisfy three conditions: a basic condi-
tion (BC ) common to all strategies, a control condition (CC ) determining which
kind of strategy will be applied, and an additional condition (AC ) specific to each
strategy and constraining its means.
Global axiom 1 (executability laws). A coping action α executed by agent i
is happening next iff all its conditions are satised and i prefers that α be per-
formed (Lorini, Herzig, and Castelfranchi, 2006). Thus, for a coping action i:α =
〈s, i, Ei,kϕ,ψ〉
Happens i:α> ↔ BC (Ei,kϕ) ∧ CC (s,Ei,kϕ)∧
AC (i:α) ∧ Choice iHappens i:α>
(EXECα)
Definition 5 (basic condition). Only an agent who feels a negative emotion can
cope with it. Thus the basic condition to use any strategy is that the agent believes
to feel a negative emotion Ei,kϕ where E ∈ EMO−:
BC (Ei,kϕ)
def
= Bel i Ei,kϕ (DefBC )
1k is not necessarily different from i. When i is k we will sometimes write Ei ϕ.
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According to Lazarus and Folkman (1984) there are two types of strategies:
problem-focused ones, that he considers more likely against a controllable stressor,
and emotion-focused ones, more likely otherwise. We capture this distinction in an
all-or-nothing way: if the stressor is controllable the agent will only use problem-
focused strategies, whereas if it is not he will only use emotion-focused ones.
We consider that a stressor ϕ is controllable by agent i iff i envisages a pos-
sibility to change in the future the fact that ϕ is true. Conversely, the stressor is
uncontrollable iff agent i believes that henceforth he will believe ϕ to be true. This
distinction is not exhaustive: the problem can be neither fully controllable nor fully
uncontrollable. The following control condition specifies how the agent i selects a
type of coping strategy (problem-focused or emotion-focused).
Definition 6 (control condition). Thus the control condition of problem-focused
coping strategies is that the object of the emotion is controllable; and the control
condition of emotion-focused strategies is that the object of the emotion is uncon-
trollable2. So:
CC (s,Ei,kϕ)
def
={
¬Bel i ¬FBel i ¬ϕ if s = ActiveCoping
Bel iGBel i ϕ else
(DefCC )
We can prove that both control conditions are mutually inconsistent. Thus this con-
dition is really a choice criterion that allows the agent to determine which category
of coping strategies he can use.
To select a particular coping action in the selected category, the agent still has
to check some additional conditions that are specific to each coping strategy. These
conditions are specified in the next section.
Notation. We note AC (α) the additional condition of the coping action α and
Effect(α) its effect.
Global axiom 2 (effect laws). Effect laws are dened by instances of the following
effect laws scheme:
Afterα Effect(α) (EFFECTα)
where Effect(α) denotes the effect of the action α.
In the rest of this section we describe the additional condition and the effect of
each coping action that we define. Thus action laws will be completely defined for
all coping actions.
2Since the definitions of prospect-based emotions do not involve beliefs but only expectations,
this strategy is not applicable to fear.
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8.4.3 Formalization of coping actions
We have here selected seven strategies among those of the COPE model (Carver,
Scheier, and Weintraub, 1989). We recall that a coping action consists in a cop-
ing strategy associated with an optional constraint type of means, instantiated by
the decision process depending on the specific context. It is important to under-
stand that a coping strategy with a different type of means makes no sense in our
formalism.
Active coping
For the agent to apply an ActiveCoping strategy, he must believe that there is at
least one possibility to change (in the future) the fact that ϕ is true (this matches
the control condition). Since the agent’s goal when applying such a strategy is to
make ϕ false, it is not necessary for him to apply it if he considers that ϕ could
become false later without acting for that. So the agent will use active coping only
if he believes that there exists at least one possibility for him that henceforth he
never believes ϕ to be false. This sets up the additional condition of this strategy.
The effect of its application is that the agent adopts the realistic preference that in
the future he will believe ϕ to be false. Thus:
AC (〈ActiveCoping, i, Ei,kϕ〉)
def
= ¬Bel i ¬G¬Bel i ¬ϕ
Effect(〈ActiveCoping, i, Ei,kϕ〉)
def
= Choicei FBel i ¬ϕ
We can prove that After 〈ActiveCoping,i,Ei,kϕ〉 (Bel i ϕ→ Intend i ¬ϕ). (That is: if i
still believes ϕ to be true, he will act in order to make it false.)
Denial
Denial operates by refusing the reality of the stressor, supporting this assumption
by some proof; thus the means of denial is a formula ψ which is believed to entail
¬ϕ (viz. Bel iG(ψ → ¬ϕ)). These constraints on the formula ψ constitute the
additional condition of denial. The effect of this strategy is to add the belief that ψ
is true in the purpose of deducing ¬ϕ. Thus, formally:
AC (〈Denial, i, Ei,kϕ,ψ〉)
def
= Bel iG(ψ → ¬ϕ)
Effect(〈Denial, i, Ei,kϕ,ψ〉)
def
= Bel i ψ
We can easily prove that: After 〈Denial,i,Ei,kϕ,ψ〉 Bel i ¬ϕ, so after the performance
of the denial strategy agent i is not stressed anymore.
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Seeking emotional support
SeekESupport (viz. seeking emotional support) operates by looking for the com-
passion of a friendly agent j who can see the situation; thus its means is Bel i Bel j ϕ,
and its condition is that the agent j is believed to be friendly. By friendly we mean
that agent j should dislike that his friend i believes something undesirable for him
(viz. Bel iDesj ¬Bel i ϕ): this is the additional condition of this strategy. Its effect
is that agent i, believing that j is friendly, will adopt the intention to obtain his
compassion3 (viz. Intend i SorryFor j,iϕ). To achieve this intention i may have to
communicate and explain his emotion to j.
AC (〈SeekESupport, i, Sadnessiϕ,Bel i Bel j ϕ〉)
def
= Bel iDesj ¬Bel i ϕ
Effect(〈SeekESupport, i, Sadnessiϕ,Bel i Bel j ϕ〉)
def
= Intend i SorryFor j,iϕ
Focus on and venting
Focus&Venting operates by looking for the attention of any agent j attending the
situation; thus its means is the same as for the previous strategy (viz. Bel i Bel j ϕ).
This strategy is similar to seeking emotional support, but it has no conditions and
can be applied to any emotion. Its effect is that the agent i adopts the intention to
communicate his emotion to j. This effect is a little weaker than the previous one
since i is not sure to obtain compassion from an agent who is not believed to be
friendly.
AC (〈Focus&Venting, i, Ei,kϕ,Bel i Bel j ϕ〉)
def
= >
Effect(〈Focus&Venting, i, Ei,kϕ,Bel i Bel j ϕ〉)
def
= Intend i Bel j Ei,kϕ
Resignation
Resign (viz. resignation) has no particular means, nor any condition. It is the sim-
plest strategy, consisting in accepting the situation. Actually, to simulate how the
agent can get used to the situation over time, we make him drop his contradicted
desire4 immediately. This is an approximation of a long-term process, which leads
to the disappearance of the negative emotion.
AC (〈Resign, i, Ei,kϕ〉)
def
= >
Effect(〈Resign, i, Ei,kϕ〉)
def
= ¬Des i ¬ϕ
3SorryFor i,jϕ
def
= Bel i ϕ ∧ Probi FBel j ϕ ∧ Bel i Desj ¬ϕ ∧Desi ¬Bel j ϕ (cf. Chapter 4)
4In all negative event-based emotions Ei,kϕ except fortunes-of-others ones, the contradicted de-
sire is Desi ¬ϕ. In fortunes-of-others emotions the contradicted desire is Des i ¬Bel j ϕ.
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We can prove that after execution of this strategy, agent i no longer believes that
he feels the negative emotion Ei,kϕ. Formally, After 〈Resign,i,Ei,kϕ〉 ¬Bel i Ei,kϕ is
provable. Note that such an abandoning of a desire requires to drop our hypothesis
that desires are eternal (Axiom (Pers-Des i ) page 97).
Positive reinterpretation
PosReinterp (viz. positive reinterpretation) operates by finding a positive aspect
in the stressor; so its means is a formula ψ such that ψ is a not undesirable con-
sequence of the stressor. This constraint on the formula ψ sets up the additional
condition of positive reinterpretation (viz. ¬Des i ¬ψ). The effect of this strategy is
that the formula ψ becomes desirable. Thus the negative emotion about ϕ will be
replaced by a positive one about ψ.
AC (〈PosReinterp, i, Ei,kϕ,ψ〉)
def
= Bel iG(ϕ→ ψ) ∧ ¬Des i ¬ψ
Effect(〈PosReinterp, i, Ei,kϕ,ψ〉)
def
= Des i ψ
We can prove that Bel i ϕ → After 〈PosReinterp,i,Ei,kϕ,ψ〉 Joy i ψ. In other words, if
agent i believes ϕ then after the execution of this strategy he believes ψ and feels
joy about it. We notice that we need the full belief about ϕ to make this strategy
efficient, so it will not work on prospect-based emotions (viz. fear). Again, note
that such a coping strategy conflicts with our simplifying hypothesis that desires
are persistent.
Mental disengagement
MentalDisengage (viz. mental disengagement) operates by engaging in an action
to take mind off stressor; thus its means is Happens i:α ϕ, and its condition is that
the effect ψ of this action α is believed to be false for now but is desirable for
i. The effect of this strategy is that the agent adopts the intention to perform this
disengaging action. As a consequence this will trigger in the future a positive
emotion about the effect of this action.
AC (〈MentalDisengage, i, Ei,kϕ,Happens i:α>〉)
def
=
Bel i ¬ψ ∧ Bel iAfterα ψ ∧Des i ψ
Effect(〈MentalDisengage, i, Ei,kϕ,Happens i:α>〉)
def
= Intend iHappens i:α>
We can prove that after this strategy the agent feels joy about ψ, viz. formally
After 〈MentalDisengage,i,Ei,kϕ,Happensi:α >〉 Joy i ψ.
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In the next section we illustrate our formalism on an example showing for each
strategy how its means is instantiated, how its conditions are verified, and how it
influences the agent’s mental attitudes and emotions.
8.5 Application on an example
We consider the agent m who is the manager of a hotel. We use our definitions (cf.
Chapter 4) to compute his emotions in a given situation, and then show how the
strategies formalized in the previous section work against his negative emotions.
8.5.1 Initial situation 1
For the agent to use a problem-focused coping strategy, we need to place him in a
situation where the stressor is believed to be controllable, viz. not definitive. We
thus consider the manager of the hotel discovering that a fire has started in his hotel
(Belm burning), and we suppose that:
• his hotel could be destroyed
Probm destroyed (H1)
• it is undesirable for him
Desm ¬destroyed (H2)
• he envisages a possibility that his hotel will not be destroyed by the fire
¬Belm ¬FBel i ¬destroyed (H3)
According to our definitions (H1) and (H2) entail that the manager feels fear about
the destruction of his hotel and he is conscious of this emotion.
Fearm destroyed
Belm Fearm destroyed
By definition of EMO−, Fear is a negative emotion. So according to
(DefBC ), this knowledge base entails that BC (Fearm destroyed) holds: the agent
can use any coping strategy against this emotion. Moreover (H3) entails that
CC (ActiveCoping,Fearm destroyed) hold so m may use only problem-focused
coping strategies. Among these strategies we only formalized active coping.
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8.5.2 Initial situation 2
For the agent to use emotion focused strategies, we now have to send him a stressor
that he cannot control. We thus consider that:
• his hotel is destroyed by the fire and this is undesirable for him
BelmGBelm destroyed (H4)
Desm ¬destroyed (H5)
(H5) entails 5 that Desm ¬Gdestroyed . Following our definitions of emotions the
manager feels sadness about this destruction and he is aware of that:
Sadnessm destroyed
Belm Sadnessm destroyed
Since Sadness is a negative emotion, it follows from this that the basic condition
BC (Sadnessm destroyed) holds. Moreover (H4) entails that the control condition
DefCC is true for any emotion-focused strategy s ∈ STRA\{ActiveCoping}. The
manager may thus apply emotion-focused coping strategies. We will now discuss
the context in which each strategy can be applied, and its effects on the manager’s
sadness.
8.5.2.1 Denial
This strategy consists in finding an argument to support that the stressor ϕ (be-
lieved to be true for now) is actually false. In this situation, the manager wants
to deny the destruction of his hotel and thus searches an argument. The manager
believes that if the firemen extinguished the fire in time, his hotel is not destroyed
(viz. BelmG(extingInTime → ¬destroyed). The additional condition for the
manager to deny the destruction of his hotel through the hypothesis extingInTime
thus holds:
AC (〈Denial,m, Sadnessmdestroyed , extingInTime〉)
def
=
BelmG(extingInTime → ¬destroyed)
Thus the manager may apply this particular strategy in this situation. If he exe-
cutes this coping action, the effect is to reinforce his weak belief that the fire was
extinguished in time:
Effect(〈Denial,m, Sadnessmdestroyed , extingInTime〉)
def
= Belm extingInTime
5From Axiom (T-G) (page 94) and modal principles for Desm
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Thus he can deduce that his hotel is not destroyed (Belm ¬destroyed ). He is thus
denying the reality, trying to convince himself that the firemen must have extin-
guished the fire in time and saved his hotel. As an immediate effect, his sadness
will disappear since he no longer believes that the stressor is real. Then he will
probably have to use some strategies to prevent himself from seeing the reality,
like avoiding talking to people and looking at his hotel for a while.
8.5.2.2 Seeking emotional support
In the same initial situation, we suppose that one of the manager’s friends j
passes by the hotel. As he is a friend of m, he is believed to dislike that some-
thing undesirable occurs to the manager, in particular the destruction of his ho-
tel (viz. BelmDesj ¬Belm destroyed ). The additional condition for m to seek
emotional support from agent j seeing the scene (the means of the strategy is
Belm Bel j destroyed ) thus holds.
AC (〈SeekESupport,m, Sadnessmdestroyed ,Belm Bel j destroyed〉)
def
=
BelmDesj ¬Belm destroyed
So the manager can apply this strategy, and as an effect he adopts the intention to
receive compassion from agent j.
Effect(〈SeekESupport,m, Sadnessmdestroyed ,Belm Bel j destroyed〉)
def
=
Intendm SorryFor j,mdestroyed
To achieve this intention he will probably engage in a dialogue with j and use
expressive dialog acts, but to receive compassion he must explain the cause of his
sadness to his interlocutor.
8.5.2.3 Focus on and venting
This strategy is weaker than the previous one, since it has no additional condition,
but it applies to all negative emotions. In any case, the manager can always use this
strategy on an agent j attending his situation. The effect is that m adopts the inten-
tion to let j know about his emotion (Intendm Bel j Sadnessm destroyed ). As for
SeekESupport he can communicate his sadness verbally (engaging in dialogue to
tell that he is sad and to explain his problem). However since he is not looking for
compassion, he does not need to explain the cause of his emotion, so non-verbal
venting of emotion (crying) would be sufficient.
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8.5.2.4 Acceptation and resignation
The manager can also accept the situation and resign himself, through abandoning
his contradicted desire. This strategy has no additional condition. As a result of its
application, the manager drops his contradicted desire, viz. he tries to get used to
the destruction of his hotel in order not to consider it undesirable anymore.
Effect(〈Resign,m, Sadnessmdestroyed〉)
def
= ¬Des i ¬destroyed
By this way, his sadness disappears.
Actually, it may take some time to abandon a desire and detach oneself from the
situation, but as a simplification we formalize the effect of this strategy as being
immediate. This strategy is difficult to apply in a situation where the threatened
desire is quite an important one, and the manager would probably not choose such
a strategy in this case. But as we said before, the effective choice of a strategy by
the decision process is out of the scope of this work.
8.5.2.5 Positive reinterpretation
In the same initial situation, we consider that the manager believes that the
destruction of his hotel is an opportunity to rebuild it (BelmG(destroyed →
canRebuild)), and that this is not undesirable for him (¬Desm ¬canRebuild ). The
additional condition for the manager to positively reinterpret the destruction of his
hotel thus holds with canRebuild as the means of the strategy.
AC (〈PosReinterp,m, Sadnessmdestroyed , canRebuild〉)
def
=
BelmG(destroyed → canRebuild) ∧ ¬Desm ¬canRebuild
As an effect of the execution of this coping action, the manager now considers it
desirable to rebuild his hotel (Desm canRebuild ), for example because it will be
more beautiful than before.
Effect(〈PosReinterp,m, Sadnessmdestroyed , canRebuild〉)
def
=
Desm canRebuild
He then reinterprets the event through the light of this positive consequence and
abandon his contradicted desire (¬Desm ¬destroyed )6. Actually, the positive
emotion triggered by the possibility to rebuild a better hotel makes him forget
his sadness about the destruction. As a consequence he will probably engage in
actions to rebuild his hotel.
6Thus this strategy is a special kind of acceptation.
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8.5.2.6 Mental disengagement
In the same initial situation, we consider that the manager likes running because it
makes him feel good (Belm Afterm:run feelsGood ∧Desm feelsGood). The additional
condition for mental disengagement of the destruction of the hotel through running
thus holds.
AC (〈MentalDisengage,m, Sadnessmdestroyed ,Donem:run >〉)
def
=
BelmAfterm:run feelsGood ∧Desm feelsGood
Actually, mental disengagement is an attempt to perform another satisfying action,
with the aim that it triggers positive emotions that divert the individual from the
current negative one. As a result of the strategy, the manager will adopt the inten-
tion to run.
Effect(〈MentalDisengage,m, Sadnessmdestroyed ,Donem:run >〉)
def
=
IntendmHappensm:run >
Finally he will probably perform this action if all its conditions are true.
8.6 Discussion of other formalizations of coping
Meyer (2006, cf. Section 2.6.2) describes the triggering of four emotions relative to
the agent’s plans and goals, and the influence of the agent’s emotions on its actions,
following Oatley and Jenkins’ theory of emotions (1996, cf. Section 1.2.1.1). He
makes a correspondence between each emotion and one kind of action tendency
(in the sense of Frijda (1986), for example anger induces aggression). Our ap-
proach differs from Meyer’s one in several points. First, we do not represent the
same phenomena. Following Lazarus, action tendencies are innately programmed
reflexes, and thus unconscious, whereas coping strategies are conscious efforts to
adapt to one’s emotion. Moreover, each emotion corresponds to exactly one action
tendency, while coping strategies can apply to several emotions, depending on the
particular context. Second, our approach differs in its style, since Meyer provides
the syntax and semantics of a programming language, aiming at immediately im-
plementing these agents, whereas we are mainly interested in axiomatizing these
agents’ coping strategies in a BDI logic.
Gratch and Marsella (2004a, cf. Section 2.3.5) do not propose a logical account
of psychological emotional processes but an implementation in the EMA agent.
This agent’s mental state is represented by a complex structure inspired from plan-
ning: the Causal Interpretation. The appraisal process triggers several emotions,
189
and the most intense one provides a coping opportunity. The different strategies
are then assessed w.r.t. their coping potential, and the agent chooses and applies
his preferred one. The implemented strategies are also inspired from the COPE
model (Carver, Scheier, and Weintraub, 1989): planning, positive reinterpretation,
acceptance, denial, mental disengagement, shift blame. Their effect on the Causal
Interpretation is mainly expressed in terms of intention dropping or modification
of utility or probability values. The authors regret to have a too direct link between
appraisal and coping, while psychology underlines the complexity of this link. Yet
in our work we do not handle this link at all. Finally the EMA agent is a functional
implementation (Gratch and Marsella, 2004b), but it builds on a complex mental
structure that the authors believe to be needed to represent the essential concepts
involved in the description of appraisal and coping. On the contrary we believe
that our logic of belief, intention, desire, probability, action and time also allows
to represent all these concepts, in a more standard way since many agents build
on a BDI architecture. Though such a logic makes it difficult to manage intensity
degrees and to express causality (cf. Chapter 4).
Elliott’s Affective Reasoner (1992, cf. Section 2.3.2) is a collection of pro-
grams simulating the emotional behaviour of humans. The agent can feel twenty-
four emotions computed according to the OCC typology. Then, he disposes of a
database containing several types of actions (e.g. somatic, behavioural, commu-
nicative, evaluative) among which he chooses depending on his personality and
emotions. Some of these actions appear to be coping strategies (e.g. suppression,
repression, communicating) while others are unconscious physiological manifes-
tations of emotions (somatic actions), unintentional effects of emotions (obsessive
attentional focus), action tendencies (behavioural responses), or reappraisals. El-
liott thus implements some coping actions in his Affective Reasoner but he seems
not to distinguish them from other types of behaviours, despite of psychological
evidence supporting this distinction (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984). In our work,
we only account for coping actions, as defined by Lazarus, and listed in the COPE
model. Moreover, we do not account for the selection of a coping action because
we believe that the correspondence is far more complex than a one-to-one pairing
with the agent’s emotion and personality. Finally, an implementation like the Af-
fective Reasoner imposes to make some concessions, in particular to be less faithful
to psychology. On the contrary, we tried to propose a psychologically sound logi-
cal account of coping strategies but our logic may be very complex (due to revision
actions in particular) and difficult to implement.
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8.7 Conclusion
We started this chapter by noticing that the close relationship between appraisal
and coping, the two parts of the human emotional process, while being endorsed
by the psychological literature, is rather neglected in virtual agents. Indeed, many
researchers are interested in the triggering of emotions by an appraisal process, but
very few manage their subsequent influence on their agent’s behaviour. For exam-
ple Meyer considers this influence through a formalization of the action tendencies,
which is quite different from the coping process. Gratch and Marsella may have
been the first ones to integrate appraisal and coping in an agent. To do so, they
introduced a complex representation of the agent’s mental state, that they believe
to be necessary to express all the concepts needed to describe the emotional pro-
cess. On the contrary we showed that BDI logics are expressive enough to describe
emotional processes, viz. both appraisal (cf. Chapter 4) and coping (in this chapter).
We thus believe that our logical framework allows to formalize the coping process
in a simpler way than Gratch and Marsella’s Causal Interpretation.
We proposed to represent coping strategies as actions, whose conditions and
effects are expressed in terms of the agent’s mental attitudes, and represented in
a BDI logic. We believe that this well-known framework offers interesting prop-
erties, mainly its reusability in a large amount of existing BDI agents. The appli-
cation domain for such agents mainly consists in designing human-like characters
for virtual worlds: a plausible emotional model can increase their believability and
thus improve the user’s immersion in the virtual world. The ability to reason about
another agent’s emotions also opens applications in Ambient Intelligence, where
such emotional agents could detect a human’s emotions and help him to cope with
them by proposing or executing coping strategies (cf. Chapter 6).
We would like to mention some shortcomings of our model. First, we do not
formalize all coping strategies, but only those we believe to be most interesting for
intelligent agents, and only concerning event-based emotions. Second, we do not
manage the intensity and dynamics of emotions, a too big problem to be solved
here, and thus we assume that the execution of a coping strategy simply makes
the emotion disappear, instead of making its intensity decrease. Third, we only
sketched the formal deductions in this chapter, and did not fully work out the
belief change and belief preservation mechanisms at work. In particular, coping
necessitates to abandon our preservation axioms for desires.
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This preliminary account has been recently published in a slightly updated ver-
sion (Adam and Longin, 2007). Now our short-term prospects consist in extending
this model to account for agent-based emotions of the OCC typology. In a longer-
term prospect we envisage to implement this model in an embodied conversational
agent, in order to simulate some dialogic behaviours that are often observed in
human-human interactions, but are not captured by actual models of dialogue (for
example, why do people change subject suddenly, or refuse to answer a question or
to believe obviousness). Indeed, we believe that such kinds of irrational behaviours
follow from the use of coping strategies.
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Conclusion
It is difcult to say what is impossible, for the
dream of yesterday is the hope of today
and the reality of tomorrow.
(Robert H. Goddard)
This thesis relates a multi-disciplinary project, starting from the understanding
of the psychological definition of emotions, proceeding with their formalization
and the deduction of their properties, and leading to their integration in imple-
mented agents. This thesis brings multiple contributions. First it offers to the agent
community a formal model of a rich set of emotions. Our formal definitions of
emotions are intended to be as realistic as possible through different means: they
are faithful to the psychological definitions and can capture the antecedent situ-
ations described in the original theory; they also allow to prove some intuitive
properties of emotions; and finally human users were asked to assess the relevance
of the emotions expressed by an agent using these definitions. This formal model
of emotions thus enables researchers to integrate emotions in their agents without
having to interpret and formalize a psychological theory by themselves. Indeed this
is a difficult task that should be done once and for all and then reused when needed.
That is why we also intended our formalisation to be as generic as possible, through
using a well-known framework: BDI logics.
Second, this thesis highlights that BDI logics are a powerful tool to disam-
biguate complex concepts and reason about their properties. Indeed we were able
to give formal thus unambiguous definitions of twenty emotions, and to prove the-
orems about their links with each other. BDI logics are often criticized and con-
sidered to be only a tool (or even a toy) for making formal but abstract proofs.
Nevertheless these logics also allow to describe the architecture of an agent. We
explored two different applications for our model (conversational agents and Am-
bient Intelligence) and even implemented it in a BDI agent.
However our applications remain incomplete since our formalism also is. In-
deed, the human emotional process is made up of two components: appraisal,
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leading to the triggering of emotions, and coping, leading to a subsequent adap-
tive modification of behaviour. In this thesis we only formalize appraisal so the
triggered emotions have no influence on the agent’s subsequent behaviour. That’s
why in the last chapter we provide an insight on our ongoing research about coping.
Actually we try to formalize it in the same BDI framework. This line of research is
still less explored than the triggering or the expression of emotions. So this thesis
also opens interesting future prospects.
Our work can now be improved on several points. A first local enhancement
relates to our covering of the OCC typology: we cannot formalize its object-based
branch in our current logic. More globally, the limited expressivity of BDI logics
(compared to natural language) entails that several aspects of emotions remain un-
explored in our model. First, we do not compute the intensity of emotions. This
prevents us from managing their decay over time or their blending. Second we
do not describe their interaction with each other, viz. how several emotions com-
bine to create mood, and how mood or other emotions can bias the triggering of a
new emotion. Indeed this is linked with the respective intensities of the involved
emotions. Third we could only approximate the link between an action and its ef-
fects, since no modal operator is currently completely axiomatized to account for
this link. Moreover we did not investigate the concept of group emotions, that we
believe would need the introduction of non standard operators to represent group
mental attitudes. For instance we are currently trying to formalize group beliefs
(Tuomela, 1992; Gaudou, Herzig, and Longin, 2007) and plan to do so with group
ideals. Finally, the study of the complexity of our logic is out of the scope of this
work.
More globally, we restricted our account to the cognitive aspect of emotions.
However we said in the introduction that emotions are a multi-facet phenomenon:
so we neglected the biological, physiological, or sociocultural aspects. One of
these neglected aspects is the influence of culture and social norms on the expres-
sion or inhibition of the triggered emotions. Indeed there is a great variety of
emotional expressivity across cultures. And we have only touched upon the prob-
lem of coping, that is yet crucial to be formalized in order to provide a complete
account of human emotions.
Despite these limitations, our evaluation shows that the emotions that our model
can simulate are perceived to be quite believable. Now we assume that believabil-
ity is an aspect of a general property of interaction systems: they must inspire trust.
Castelfranchi, Falcone, and Marzo (2006) show that users must trust in a system to
use it. We are currently involved in a project about trust whose aim is to formal-
ize this concept of trust into a BDI logic. This should allow to disambiguate this
notion and automatically reason about it. This model would then be implemented
in an agent and tested. Like this thesis, this is again a multi-disciplinary project
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starting from a philosophical and sociological analysis of a concept and leading to
its formalization and its use in an implemented system.
Finally this work is just a first step on the long path leading to the understand-
ing of emotions. This path needs to be collectively explored by researchers from
as various views as psychology, computer science, biology, sociology... This col-
laboration may seem difficult for now, but that is what it costs to understand what
makes us human.
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Part IV
Appendix
Appendix A
Summary of axiomatics
¤(ϕ→ ψ) → (¤ϕ→ ¤ψ) (K-¤)
ϕ
¤ϕ
(RN-¤)
ϕ→ ψ
¤ϕ→ ¤ψ
(RM-¤)
(¤A ∧¤B) → ¤(A ∧B) (C-¤)
(¤A ∧ ♦B) → ♦(A ∧B)
A→ B
♦A→ ♦B
(RK-♦)
Happensα ϕ→ Afterβ ϕ (CD-HA)
Doneα ϕ→ Beforeβ ϕ (CD-DB)
ϕ→ AfterαDoneα ϕ (CONV-AD)
ϕ→ BeforeαHappensα ϕ (CONV-BH)
Bel i ϕ→ ¬Bel i ¬ϕ (D-Bel i )
Bel i ϕ→ Bel i Bel i ϕ (4-Bel i )
¬Bel i ϕ→ Bel i ¬Bel i ϕ (5-Bel i )
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Gϕ→ ϕ (T-G)
(Fϕ ∧ Fψ) → F (ϕ ∧ Fψ) ∨ F (ψ ∧ Fϕ) (3-F )
Gϕ→ GGϕ (4-G)
Hϕ→ ϕ (T-H )
(Pϕ ∧ Pψ) → P(ϕ ∧ Pψ) ∨ P(ψ ∧ Pϕ) (3-P )
Hϕ→ HHϕ (4-H )
ϕ→ GPϕ (CONV-GP)
ϕ→ HFϕ (CONV-HF)
ϕ→ ψ
Probi ϕ→ Probi ψ
(RM-Probi )
ϕ
Probi ϕ
(RN-Probi )
Probi ϕ→ ¬Probi ¬ϕ (D-Probi )
Des i ϕ→ ¬Des i ¬ϕ (D-Des i )
Idl i ϕ→ ¬Idl i ¬ϕ (D-Idl i )
Probi ϕ→ Bel i Probi ϕ (4-MIX1)
¬Probi ϕ→ Bel i ¬Probi ϕ (5-MIX1)
Des i ϕ→ Bel iDes i ϕ (4-MIX2)
¬Des i ϕ→ Bel i ¬Des i ϕ (5-MIX2)
Doneα> → Bel iDoneα> (4-MIX3)
¬Doneα> → Bel i ¬Doneα> (5-MIX3)
(Bel i ϕ ∧ Probi ψ) → Probi (ϕ ∧ ψ) (C-MIX)
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Bel i ϕ→ Probi ϕ
Probi ϕ→ ¬Bel i ¬ϕ
Gϕ→ Afterα ϕ (GA-MIX)
Hϕ→ Beforeα ϕ (HB-MIX)
Des i ϕ→ GDes i ϕ (Pers-Des i )
¬Des i ϕ→ G¬Des i ϕ (Pers-¬Des i )
Idl i ϕ→ GIdl i ϕ (Pers-Idl i )
¬Idl i ϕ→ G¬Idl i ϕ (Pers-¬Idl i )
Bel iAfterα ϕ ∧ ¬Bel iAfterα⊥ → Afterα Bel i ϕ (NF-Bel i )
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Appendix B
Summary of formal denitions of
emotions
Formal definition (Well-being emotions).
Joy i ϕ
def
= Bel i ϕ ∧Des i ϕ
Distress i ϕ
def
= Bel i ϕ ∧Des i ¬ϕ
Formal definition (Prospect-based emotions).
Hopei ϕ
def
= Expect i ϕ ∧Des i ϕ
Fear i ϕ
def
= Expect i ϕ ∧Des i ¬ϕ
Formal definition (Confirmation emotions).
Satisfaction i ϕ
def
= Bel i PExpect i ϕ ∧Des i ϕ ∧ Bel i ϕ
FearConfirmed i ϕ
def
= Bel i PExpect i ϕ ∧Des i ¬ϕ ∧ Bel i ϕ
Formal definition (Disconfirmation emotions).
Relief i ϕ
def
= Bel i PExpect i ¬ϕ ∧Des i ϕ ∧ Bel i ϕ
Disappointment i ϕ
def
= Bel i PExpect i ¬ϕ ∧Des i ¬ϕ ∧ Bel i ϕ
Formal definition (Good-will fortunes-of-others emotions).
HappyFor i,jϕ
def
= Bel i ϕ ∧ Probi FBel j ϕ ∧ Bel iDesj ϕ ∧Des i Bel j ϕ
SorryFor i,jϕ
def
= Bel i ϕ ∧ Probi FBel j ϕ ∧ Bel iDesj ¬ϕ ∧Des i ¬Bel j ϕ
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Formal definition (Ill-will fortunes-of-others emotions).
Resentment i,jϕ
def
= Bel i ϕ ∧ Probi FBel j ϕ ∧ Bel iDesj ϕ ∧Des i ¬Bel j ϕ
Gloating i,jϕ
def
= Bel i ϕ ∧ Probi FBel j ϕ ∧ Bel iDesj ¬ϕ ∧Des i Bel j ϕ
Formal definition (Self-agent attribution emotions).
Pridei (i:α,ϕ)
def
= Bel iDonei:α (Idl iHappens i:α ϕ∧
ProbiAfter i:α ¬ϕ) ∧ Bel i ϕ
Shamei (i:α,ϕ)
def
= Bel iDonei:α (Idl i ¬Happens i:α ϕ∧
ProbiAfter i:α ¬ϕ) ∧ Bel i ϕ
Formal definition (Other agent attribution emotions).
Admiration i,j(j:α,ϕ)
def
= Bel iDonej:α (Idl iHappensj:α ϕ∧
ProbiAfter j:α ¬ϕ) ∧ Bel i ϕ
Reproachi,j(j:α,ϕ)
def
= Bel iDonej:α (Idl i ¬Happensj:α ϕ∧
ProbiAfter j:α ¬ϕ) ∧ Bel i ϕ
Formal definition (Composed emotions).
Gratification i (i:α,ϕ)
def
= Pridei (i:α,ϕ) ∧ Joy i ϕ
Remorsei (i:α,ϕ)
def
= Shamei (i:α,ϕ) ∧Distress i ϕ
Gratitudei,j(j:α,ϕ)
def
= Admiration i,j(j:α,ϕ) ∧ Joy i ϕ
Anger i,j(j:α,ϕ)
def
= Reproach i,j(j:α,ϕ) ∧Distress i ϕ
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Appendix C
RØsumØ de la thŁse en français
Introduction
Nous humains ressentons des émotions tous les jours, presque à chaque minute,
pas toujours consciemment. Nos émotions jouent un rôle crucial dans nos vies et
nos relations avec les autres. Elles peuvent être manipulées par des publicités qui
veulent nous faire acheter, par des hommes politiques qui veulent nous faire voter
pour eux, ou par des personnes voulant nous séduire. Elles peuvent nous faire agir
impulsivement, ce que nous regrettons ensuite. Elles peuvent nous compliquer la
vie et interférer avec notre travail en nous perturbant. Nous cherchons souvent à
les cacher, pour respecter des normes sociales ou pour ne pas révéler ce que nous
pensons. Finalement, nous croyons en général devoir contrôler nos émotions pour
être rationnels ou pour être performants. D’ailleurs, de plus en plus d’athlètes ont
recours à des préparateurs mentaux qui leur apprennent à contrôler leurs émotions.
En fait de plus en plus de gens font appel à ce genre de coaches, ou lisent des livres
supposés les aider à contrôler les émotions indésirables.
Cependant il est d’autant plus difficile de contrôler ses émotions que nous ne les
comprenons même pas. En fait nous ne savons même pas exactement ce qu’est une
émotion, nous serions incapables d’en donner une définition claire. Et pourtant,
beaucoup de sciences ont tenté d’établir une telle définition, mais la difficulté vient
du fait que les émotions sont un phénomène complexe associant différents types
de réactions interdépendantes, relevant de différentes sciences : la physiologie, la
psychologie, la biologie... Ainsi chacune de ces sciences ne peut donner qu’une
définition partielle d’un aspect des émotions.
La recherche d’une définition des émotions n’a longtemps intéressé que les
philosophes, qui les voyaient comme des instincts nuisibles (passions, (Descartes,
1649)), opposés à la raison (Spinoza, 1994), dont l’homme doit se débarrasser
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(catharsis, (Aristotle, 2003)). Puis la biologie a montré que les émotions étaient
des réflexes utiles pour la survie, hérités au cours de l’évolution (Darwin, 1872),
et a proposé des classifications des émotions basiques. La physiologie a ensuite
tenté d’expliquer les mécanismes émotionnels, et plusieurs théories ont émergé, en
désaccord sur le centre émotionnel qu’elles identifiaient (Lange and James, 1967;
Cannon, 1927). La psychologie accepte le rôle adaptatif des émotions dans la
vie humaine et propose diverses théories pour expliquer leur déclenchement d’un
point de vue cognitif (Schacter and Singer, 1962; Arnold, 1950). La sociologie
s’intéresse plus particulièrement à la construction sociale des émotion et à leur
rôle dans le maintien de la cohésion d’un groupe (Averill, 1980; Durkheim, 1961).
Cependant, malgré la profusion de théories soutenant le rôle essentiel des émo-
tions pour les individus comme pour la société, l’informatique néglige toujours ce
phénomène. Pour le développement d’agents rationnels, les émotions sont jugées
trop complexes et non pertinentes.
Heureusement, les progrès des neurosciences (Damasio, 1994) leur ont apporté
des preuves plus tangibles du rôle des émotions dans le comportement intelligent,
la prise de décision, la planification, la communication sociale, et toutes ces ca-
pacités humaines supposées rationnelles : nous humains ne pouvons pas raison-
ner si nous ne ressentons pas d’émotions. Bates (1994) introduit alors le concept
d’agents “crédibles” (believable agents), des agents qui donnent l’illusion d’être vi-
vants, comme les personnages de dessins animés, et il montre que les émotions sont
cruciales dans la création de tels agents. Enfin Picard (1997) est la première infor-
maticienne à argumenter que les agents virtuels ont besoin d’être dotés d’émotions
pas seulement pour être crédibles, mais aussi pour être vraiment intelligents et pour
interagir de manière naturelle et amicale avec les humains. Elle introduit le concept
d’Affective Computing et l’informatique commence alors à réellement s’intéresser
aux émotions. La communauté agent commence à créer des agents émotionnels
pour diverses applications : interfaces homme-machine intuitives, agents crédibles
pour peupler les mondes virtuels, agents pédagogiques intelligents... Ces agents
doivent non seulement exprimer des émotions, mais aussi percevoir et comprendre
celles de l’utilisateur pour adapter leur comportement en conséquence. Bien sûr ce
qu’on appelle émotions pour ces agents ne correspond pas exactement à ce que sont
les émotions humaines. Les Ømotions virtuelles données aux agents virtuels sont
plutôt des sortes d’étiquettes permettant de décrire un état particulier qui affecte
leur comportement (Picard, 1997) : quand un agent est dans cet état il exprime
un comportement cohérent avec l’émotion associée, même s’il ne “ressent” pas
vraiment cette émotion comme nous la ressentons.
Ainsi la création d’agents émotionnels ne peut se faire que par une coopération
entre l’informatique et la psychologie (Gratch and Marsella, 2005). L’informatique
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doit absolument s’inspirer des théories psychologiques qui ont déjà essayé de dé-
coder les émotions depuis des décennies. La plupart des créateurs d’agents, à la
recherche d’une théorie compréhensible et adaptée à leurs besoins, se basent sur
la typologie des émotions d’Ortony, Clore, and Collins (1988) qui était prévue
pour être utilisée dans des applications d’Intelligence Artificielle. Mais chacun
en procure ensuite sa propre formalisation ou implémentation, souvent partielle,
spécialement conçue pour ses agents.
Au contraire nous pensons que comprendre et formaliser une théorie est un
travail conséquent qui devrait être fait une fois pour toutes, puis réutilisé par tous
les créateurs d’agents pour leur éviter de perdre du temps et de l’énergie à repartir
de zéro. De plus les implémentations directes d’une théorie dans un agent sont
spécifiques au domaine d’application de cet agent et ne sont pas réutilisables dans
d’autres agents ou pour d’autres applications. Il est donc important de passer par
une phase de formalisation qui propose un modèle générique réutilisable. Nous
pensons que les logiques formelles permettent de créer de tels modèles.
En effet, les émotions sont un phénomène complexe dont la définition est sou-
vent abstraite, ambiguë, subjective et non consensuelle. Les logiques formelles of-
frent un vocabulaire universel à la sémantique claire qui permet aux informaticiens
de désambiguïser ces concepts. Elles permettent aussi de raisonner, de planifier et
d’expliquer le comportement des agents. La formalisation logique d’un phénomène
peut même révéler des problèmes non intuitifs. Les logiques BDI, viz. les logiques
de la croyance (Belief ), du désir (Desire) et de l’intention (Intention) (Cohen and
Levesque (1990), Rao and Georgeff (1991, 1992), Sadek (1992), Herzig and Lon-
gin (2004), Wooldridge (2000)) se basent sur la philosophie du langage, de l’esprit
et de l’action (cf. Bratman (1987), Searle (1969, 1983)). Elles proposent de mod-
éliser les agents grâce à des concepts comme l’action et les attitudes mentales
(croyances, buts, intentions, choix...). Ce cadre est communément utilisé dans la
communauté agent et offre des propriétés intéressantes : grand pouvoir explicatif,
vérifiabilité formelle, cadre théorique rigoureux et bien établi (à la fois du point de
vue de la philosophie et de la logique formelle).
Par ailleurs, Searle (1983) soutient que les émotions sont des attitudes men-
tales particulières et peuvent être exprimées en termes de croyances et de désirs,
ce qui encourage l’idée d’utiliser les logiques BDI pour les représenter. Pour-
tant, il y a encore peu de travaux au sujet des émotions dans la communauté des
logiciens. Par exemple Meyer (2004) propose un langage basé sur les logiques
BDI pour la description d’agents émotionnels, et Ochs et al. (2005) procure des
définitions de quelques émotions en utilisant un formalisme BDI particulier, la
théorie de l’interaction rationnelle de Sadek (1992). Mais ces modèles ne profitent
pas de tous les avantages des logiques BDI. En particulier ils s’intéressent plus
à l’implémentation de leur modèle dans un agent qu’aux possibilités de raison-
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nement formel qu’il offre. De plus ils ne sont pas toujours très fidèles aux théories
psychologiques sous-jacentes, et ne proposent qu’un jeu assez restreint d’émotions.
C’est pourquoi l’objectif de cette thèse est de fournir un modèle logique générique
des émotions, et plus particulièrement de leur aspect cognitif au détriment des as-
pects biologiques ou physiologiques. Notre modèle se voudra fidèle à la psycholo-
gie, proposera un grand nombre d’émotions, et aura une axiomatique correcte et
complète pour permettre de déduire des propriétés des émotions. Cependant notre
modèle ne devra pas être réduit à cet usage théorique, nous l’exploiterons donc
dans des applications pratiques et l’implémenterons dans un agent à architecture
BDI. Cet agent devra alors exposer des émotions crédibles en réponse aux stimuli,
ce que nous évaluerons.
Ce mémoire est structuré en trois parties. La première partie est consacrée à
l’état de l’art, du point de vue de la psychologiqe puis de l’informatique. Nous
introduirons un historique des principales théories psychologiques des émotions,
avant d’expliquer quelle théorie nous choisissons de formaliser et pourquoi (Chap-
ter 1). Nous exposerons alors quelques travaux qui ont déclenché l’intérêt de
l’informatique pour les émotions, et décrirons quelques applications d’Intelligence
Artificielle impliquant des agents émotionnels (Chapter 2).
La deuxième partie constitue le coeur de ce travail, viz. notre formalisation
des émotions. Nous introduirons notre formalisme BDI particulier, donnerons
sa sémantique et son axiomatique et prouverons sa correction et sa complétude
(Chapter 3). Nous formaliserons alors vingt émotions en termes des opérateurs
modaux ainsi introduits ; nous discuterons nos choix de formalisation ainsi que les
différences entre plusieurs théories psychologiques décrivant la même émotion ou
des émotions proches (Chapter 4). Une fois ces définitions acceptées, notre logique
nous permettra de prouver quelques propriétés intuitives des émotions (Chapter 5).
Cela soutient la justesse de nos définitions ainsi que la puissance des logiques BDI
pour désambiguïser des concepts complexes.
Finalement la troisième partie exposera quelques applications concrètes et travaux
en cours qui découlent de cette formalisation. En particulier nous avons mené
quelques petites études de cas dans le domaine de l’Intelligence Ambiante et du
dialogue machine-machine (Chapter 6). Nous décrirons ensuite l’implémentation
de notre formalisme dans l’agent PLEIAD et son utilisation pour évaluer la crédi-
bilité des émotions générées (Chapter 7). Finalement nous exposerons des résultats
préliminaires au sujet de la formalisation dans la même logique du processus cop-
ing, qui décrit comment un agent pourrait adapter son comportement pour gérer
ses émotions négatives (Chapter 8).
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C.1 Les émotions en psychologie
Dans ce chapitre, nous commençons par présenter un historique de l’évolution des
théories psychologiques. Nous distinguons alors deux grandes tendances dans ces
théories. La première tendance en psychologie des émotions a été de chercher à
identifier un nombre limité d’émotions, et d’essayer de les classer. C’est seulement
plus tard que des théories ont été élaborées pour tenter d’expliquer le fonction-
nement des émotions. Les théories appartenant à ces deux tendances ne répondent
pas aux mêmes questions ; en fait la plupart des théories s’intéressent principale-
ment à une seule de ces grandes questions, et ne donnent pas de réponse explicite
à la deuxième.
Parmi les théories qui s’intéressent plus particulièrement à la classification
des émotions, on trouve deux tendances opposées : différents types d’approches
considèrent (pour différentes raisons) qu’il existe un nombre limité d’émotions
basiques ; au contraire quelques théories dites continues s’opposent à ce point de
vue (cf. Section 1.2.1).
Les théories qui s’intéressent plutôt au fonctionnement des émotions ne don-
nent pas forcément de réponse à cette question de l’existence d’émotions basiques.
Elles cherchent à répondre à plusieurs autres questions : comment les émotions
sont-elles déclenchées ? quelle est leur influence sur le comportement ? en partic-
ulier est-ce que les émotions déclenchent ou sont déclenchées par les modifications
physiologiques ? est-ce que la cognition joue un rôle dans le déclenchement des
émotions ? Les théories physiologiques (cf. Section 1.2.2) et cognitives (cf. Sec-
tion 1.2.3) ont des points de vue opposés sur cette dernière question.
Dans la suite du chapitre nous décrivons quelques théories représentant chacun
de ces courants de recherche.
C.1.1 Approches intéressées par la classification des émotions
Deux grandes tendances s’opposent au sein de ce courant de recherche sur la
classification des émotions. La première suppose qu’il existe un nombre limité
d’émotions basiques, alors que la deuxième considère les émotions comme une
fonction continue de deux ou trois dimensions. En fait Ekman (1999a) repère trois
définitions différentes de la notion d’émotion basique :
• des émotions adaptatives en relation avec une théorie évolutionniste : les
émotions basiques sont celles qui ont été conçues au cours de l’évolution
pour répondre à des problèmes de survie spécifiques, et sont maintenant des
réponses innées programmées dans les individus (e.g. Darwin, Ekman, Oat-
ley and Johnson-Laird);
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• des émotions discrètes qui diffèrent les unes des autres de manière impor-
tante, mais pas forcément en rapport avec une théorie évolutionniste (e.g.
Tomkins, Izard) ; c’est à cette hypothèse que s’opposent les théories contin-
ues qui considèrent que les émotions sont toutes similaires en essence et ne
diffèrent que par les valeurs de quelques dimensions comme l’intensité ou la
valence (e.g. Lang, Russell);
• des “building blocks” : ceci est la point de vue de Plutchik, qui compare
les émotions basiques aux couleurs primaires, pouvant se combiner pour
construire les émotions complexes ; ce point de vue est en contradiction
avec la notion évolutionniste d’émotion basique selon laquelle deux émo-
tions basiques ne peuvent pas coexister en même temps.
À une époque où les émotions n’intéressaient que la philosophie, qui les con-
sidéraient comme irrationnelle, Darwin (1872) a proposé la première théorie mod-
erne des émotions. Plusieurs chercheurs ont ensuite pris sa suite et proposé d’autres
théories évolutionnistes. Par exemple Ekman (1992b; 1992a; 1999a; 1999b) se
base sur les expressions faciales pour distinguer six émotions de base. Toutes ces
théories partagent l’hypothèse que les humains ont hérité au cours de l’évolution
d’un petit nombre d’émotions basiques à valeur adaptative et communicative, de-
venus des réflexes innés, sans composante cognitive. Sur ce point ces théories
s’opposent donc aux théories cognitives que nous détaillerons plus tard. Les théories
évolutionnistes supposent aussi toutes que ce sont les émotions qui déclenchent des
modifications physiologiques à but adaptatif. Sur ce point elles diffèrent des autres
théories discrètes. De plus les théories évolutionnistes diffèrent les unes des autres
au sujet des émotions particulières qu’elles considèrent comme étant basiques.
D’autres théories s’accordent sur l’existence d’un nombre limité d’émotions
basiques, sans supposer qu’elles auraient été héritées au cours de l’évolution. Ces
théories discrètes s’opposent aux théories continues selon lesquelles les émotions
sont des phénomènes tous similaires, ne variant que par la valeur de certaines di-
mensions. De plus Tomkins et Izard supposent que les émotions sont déclenchées
par la perception des modifications physiologiques de l’individu, au contraire des
théories évolutionnistes.
Finalement il existe de nombreuses théories discrètes, qui s’accordent toutes
sur l’existence d’émotions basiques, mais qui n’ont pu s’accorder sur la définition
même d’une émotion basique. Ainsi il n’existe encore aucun consensus sur la na-
ture, le nombre et l’identité des émotions qui seraient basiques (cf. Table 1.12).
Ce manque de consensus a rendu les chercheurs d’autres branches très sceptiques
quant à l’existence d’émotions basiques, menant à de grands débats à ce sujet.
Actuellement les points de vue diffèrent encore sur la structure de l’espace émo-
tionnel. En même temps, d’autres types de théories se focalisent sur d’autres as-
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pects des émotions sans répondre à cette question. Ce sont les théories plutôt in-
téressées par le déclenchement des émotions et leur fonctionnement.
C.1.2 Approches intéressées par le fonctionnement des émotions
Nous avons séparés ces approches en deux tendances : les théories physiologiques
(Section 1.2.2) qui soulignent le rôle des modifications physiologiques dans le dé-
clenchement des émotions, et les théories cognitives (Section 1.2.3) qui soulignent
la primauté de la cognition dans le déclenchement des émotions.
Les approches physiologiques considèrent que l’activation physiologique est
l’unique origine des émotions. Elles supposent que les stimuli déclenchent une
activation physiologique (qui peut concerner les viscères, le centre vasomoteur,
ou le thalamus, selon les théories) qui crée les émotions. Mais des expériences
ultérieures ont montré que l’activation seule n’était pas suffisant pour différencier
les émotions les unes des autres. Des chercheurs font alors l’hypothèse que cette
activation doit être cognitivement interprétée pour déclencher une émotion parti-
culière (Schacter and Singer, Valins). Ainsi apparaissent les premières théories
cognitives. Puis Arnold introduit le concept d’évaluation cognitive (“appraisal”),
un processus d’évaluation non pas de l’activation physiologique mais du stimulus,
par rapport à divers critères. De nombreux chercheurs proposent alors des théories
de l’évaluation cognitive comprenant des ensembles de critères différents (Frijda,
Lazarus, Scherer, Ortony, Clore et Collins). Enfin les théories schématiques sug-
gèrent que les émotions sont en fait activées quand leurs éléments cognitifs le sont
(Leventhal). Le point commun de toutes ces théories cognitives est de souligner
l’importance de la cognition dans la naissance des émotions, ce qui les oppose aux
théories physiologiques ou évolutionnistes. Il semblerait cependant que ce désac-
cord provienne de l’utilisation différente du concept de cognition, et finalement
les chercheurs semblent s’accorder sur le rôle de cognitions de plus ou moins bas
niveau dans les émotions.
C.1.3 Choix d’une théorie à formaliser
Dans cet état de l’art nous avons présenté diverses théories des émotions qui diver-
gent sur plusieurs grandes questions. Nous allons maintenant expliquer pourquoi
nous choisissons de formaliser une théorie de l’évaluation cognitive plutôt qu’un
autre type de théorie, et laquelle en particulier. Pour cela nous exposons ici les
avantages des théories de l’appraisal tels qu’ils ont été identifiés par (Scherer,
Schorr, and Johnstone, 2001).
Tout d’abord ces théories permettent une différenciation fine entre les émo-
tions, en les faisant correspondre chacune à un motif d’évaluation particulier, c’est-
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à-dire à une certaine configuration des critères d’évaluation. Cette médiation cog-
nitive entre le stimulus et l’émotion est aussi la seule manière d’expliquer les
différences inter-individuelles : dans la même situation deux individus peuvent
ressentir des émotions très différente, ce qui résulte en fait de l’évaluation dif-
férente qu’ils font de la situation. Cette médiation rend aussi compte de la vari-
abilité temporelle des émotions : un même individu peut évaluer différemment la
même situation à différents moments. Une correspondance directe entre stimulus et
émotion ne pourrait expliquer aucun de ces phénomènes pourtant établis. De plus
les théories évolutionnistes prétendant que les émotions sont des réponses innées à
des situations connues ne peuvent expliquer comment des émotions se produisent
face à des situations inédites, inconnues. Enfin les théories de l’évaluation cogni-
tive expliquent pourquoi les réponses émotionnelles sont appropriées au contexte,
puisque c’est l’évaluation de ce contexte qui les déclenche.
C’est pourquoi dans cette thèse nous choisissons de formaliser une théorie de
l’évaluation cognitive, et plus particulièrement la typologie OCC (Ortony, Clore,
and Collins, 1988) qui a été conçue pour des applications en IA. Dans ce chapitre
nous donnerons donc plus de détails sur cette théorie particulière afin de permettre
au lecteur de comprendre la formalisation qui suivra.
C.1.4 Conclusion
Ce qu’il faut retenir de ce chapitre, c’est que malgré la profusion de théories
s’attaquant à l’explication de divers aspects des émotions (principalement leur clas-
sification et leur fonctionnement), aucun consensus n’a encore été trouvé sur les
nombreux problèmes qui se posent. Il est donc difficile pour les informaticiens
de s’y retrouver. C’est pourquoi il nous paraît tellement essentiel que le travail de
formalisation des théories psychologiques soit fait une fois pour toutes et puisse
ensuite être réutilisé facilement par les chercheurs.
C.2 Les émotions en informatique
Dans ce chapitre nous nous intéressons à l’utilisation des théories psychologiques
des émotions dans un domaine qui peut paraître complètement opposé : l’informatique.
Après avoir négligé les émotions pendant des décennies, l’informatique commence
à s’intéresser à leur potentiel pour des agents artificiels dans les années 90. Il est
important de remarquer que ce qu’on appelle émotions pour un agent virtuel ne
correspond pas exactement à ce qu’on appelle émotions chez un humain. Comme
le dit Picard (1997) ce sont plutôt des étiquettes caractérisant un état mental parti-
culier qui fait agir l’agent de telle manière qu’on a l’impression qu’il ressent cette
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émotion même si ce n’est pas vraiment le cas.
C.2.1 Pourquoi doter des agents virtuels d’émotions artificielles ?
La psychologie a reconnu le rôle des émotions dans le fonctionnement de l’esprit
humain, ainsi que leur fonction adaptative. Certains psychologues ont même pro-
posé des modèles facilement adaptables en informatiques. Pourtant les informati-
ciens ne s’intéressent d’abord aux émotions que pour rendre leurs agents plus crédi-
bles. Cette notion de “believability” a été introduite par Bates (Section 2.2.1).
Puis la neurologie a prouvé le rôle des émotions dans l’intelligence et créer des
modèles de leur impact sur le raisonnement (Section 2.2.2). Plusieurs informati-
ciens prennent alors conscience de l’importance des émotions pas seulement pour
la crédibilité de leur agent mais aussi à cause de leur impact sur les interactions
avec l’utilisateur : c’est le début de l’“Affective Computing”, introduit par Picard
(Section 2.2.3). Les agents émotionnels deviennent alors à la mode et de nombreux
travaux voient le jour à leur sujet. Dans la section 2.2 nous discutons les premiers
travaux de différents domaines de recherche visant à intégrer les émotions dans des
agents virtuels ou à prouver leur utilité pour ces agents.
C.2.2 Agents émotionnels et applications
Nous décrirons ensuite quelques architectures émotionnelles (Section 2.3), ainsi
que leurs applications pour la création d’agents pédagogiques (Section 2.4) et
d’agents conversationnels (Section 2.5).
Nous remarquons alors que dans ces applications, les émotions sont souvent
directement codées dans les agents. Les modèles sont donc souvent ad hoc, spé-
cifiques à leur application, non génériques et non réutilisables. C’est pourquoi
on voit émerger un nouveau domaine de recherche, visant la création de modèles
formels génériques des émotions. Dans la section 2.6 nous expliquons pourquoi
les logiques BDI peuvent être utilisées pour créer de tels modèles et décrivons
quelques essais dans ce sens.
C.2.3 Modèles formels des émotions en logique BDI
Nous avons différencié plusieurs types de travaux sur les émotions en informatique.
D’abord certains chercheurs conçoivent des architectures émotionnelles qui simu-
lent l’influence des émotions sur diverses fonctions cognitives ainsi que leur inter-
action avec l’humeur et la personnalité. L’agent EMA est doté de l’architecture la
plus ocmplète, qui intègre même des stratégies de coping. Ces travaux correspon-
dent à ce que Gratch et Marsella appellent les approches basées sur la simulation
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“simulation-based approaches”, cf. Section 2.2.4). Mais ces architectures sont sou-
vent complexes et exigent des représentations spécifiques.
Ensuite d’autres chercheurs implémentent directement des émotions dans leurs
agents pour atteindre un but spécifique comme les rendre plus crédibles durant une
conversation avec l’utilisateur (Section 2.5) ou les faire motiver un étudiant (Sec-
tion 2.4). Ces approches correspondent donc plutôt à ce que Gratch et Marsella ap-
pellent les approches guidées par la simulation (“simulation-driven approaches”).
Ils sont peu intéressés par le fonctionnement des émotions et par leur influence sur
les fonctions cognitives de l’agent (mémoire, coping...). Ils cherchent principale-
ment à rendre leur agent plus crédible du point de vue de l’utilisateur, si bien qu’ils
ne sont pas toujours très fidèles aux théories psychologiques.
De plus, même si certains agents sont basés sur une architecture émotionnelle
existante (e.g. Steve et Herman qui intègrent l’architecture Affective Reasoner), la
plupart ont leurs propres modules émotionnels, dépendants du domaines et donc ni
génériques ni réutilisables. Les informaticiens se basent donc sur diverses théories
psychologiques et utilisent diverses techniques pour formaliser ces théories. Ces
efforts désorganisés rendent difficile la réutilisation de ces modèles.
Il semble donc que la communauté agent ait besoin d’une architecture émo-
tionnelle générique et réutilisable, fidèle à la psychologie, et basée sur une tech-
nologie répandue prête à être implémentée dans des agents. Nous avons exploré
l’utilisation des logiques BDI pour développer un tel modèle. Comme l’utilisation
de la logique peut sembler surprenante voire contradictoire, nous commençons par
exposer (in Section 2.6.1) la pensée de Searle selon laquelle les émotions sont des
attitudes mentales ocmplexes. Nous discutons alors plusieurs tentatives de for-
maliser les émotions d’un agent dans un cadre BDI : le langage émotionnel de
Meyer basé sur sa logique KARO (Section 2.6.2) et la théorie de l’interaction ra-
tionnelle de Sadek utilisée par Ochs et al. (Section 2.6.3). Comme notre but est
aussi de procurer une formalisation logique des émotions, nous critiquerons les
formalisations existantes et conclurons sur comment nous pensons les améliorer
(Section 2.6.4).
C.2.4 Conclusion
Ce chapitre a prouvé que les émotions valent la peine d’être intégrées dans des
agents virtuels, car elles améliorent leur comportement dans un grand nombre
d’applications, qui vont des agents pédagogiques aux mondes virtuels. Nous avons
alors remarqué l’existence d’un grand nombre de travaux désorganisés pour créer
des agents émotionnels, ce qui rend nécessaire la création d’un modèle générique
des émotions que les informaticiens pourront réutiliser dans divers agents pour di-
verses applications. Nous avons alors discuté diverses tentatives pour procurer un
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tel modèle, en particulier en utilisant les logiques BDI, une technologie répandue
pour décrire des architectures d’agents rationnels. La philosophie de l’esprit sou-
tient l’hypothèse sous-jacente que les émotions peuvent être considérées comme
un type d’attitudes mentales. Nous avons alors critiqué plusieurs défauts des for-
malisations BDI existantes des émotions, en particulier le manque de généricité dû
à l’utilisation de buts au lieu de désirs, et l’accent mis sur les aspects individuels
aux dépends des aspects sociaux.
Au contraire notre but dans cette thèse, comme nous l’avons dit en introduc-
tion, est de proposer un modèle formel des émotions. En accord avec Searle ou
Meyer, nous considérons les émotions comme des attitudes mentales particulières
et choisissons de baser notre modèle sur une logique BDI. Ce modèle devra remplir
plusieurs contraintes. D’abord il devra être aussi fidèle que possible à la typologie
OCC, la théorie psychologique que nous avons choisi de formaliser. En effet la
psychologie a déjà expérimenté ses définitions depuis des décennies et nous de-
vons donc leur faire confiance. Deuxièmement nous voulons formaliser un grand
nombre d’émotions différentes, car des expressions émotionnelles diversifiées sont
essentielles pour rendre un agent crédible. En fait nous proposerons des définitions
pour vingt émotions de la typologie OCC. Troisièmement, nous voulons considérer
les aspects sociaux des émotions et nous introduirons donc un opérateur modal
pour représenter les normes sociales. Quatrièmement nous voulons rester aussi
génériques que possible, en particulier notre modèle ne devra pas être orienté tâche
comme c’est le cas pour ceux de Meyer et Ochs et al.: nous exprimerons donc
les émotions en termes de désirs plutôt qu’en termes de buts (ce choix sera plus
amplement discuté au Chapitre 4). Cinquièmement nous voulons être capables de
raisonner au sujet des émotions et de prouver certaines propriétés, c’est pourquoi
nous nous efforcerons de fournir une logique correcte et complète
La prochaine partie de cette thèse est dédiée au travail formel qui constitue le
coeur de cette thèse : introduction du cadre logique (Chapitre 3), formalisation
de la typologie OCC (Chapitre 4), et preuve formelle de propriétés des émotions
(Chapitre 5).
C.3 Cadre logique
Comme nous l’avons montré dans l’état de l’art, la communauté agent a récem-
ment commencé a s’intéresser de près aux agents émotionnelles. Malheureusement
la plupart des approches conçoivent leur propre modèle émotionnel en partant di-
rectement des théories psychologiques. Il existe donc une grande variété de mod-
èles informatiques des émotions, selon leur application, leur contexte d’utilisation,
ou le formalisme sous-jacent (cf. Chapitre 2). Nous pensons que la communauté
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agent a besoin d’un modèle formel générique des émotions, et nous soutenons que
les logiques BDI (viz. logiques de la croyance, du désir et de l’intention, e.g. Cohen
and Levesque (1990), Rao and Georgeff (1991; 1992), Sadek (1992), Herzig and
Longin (2004)) permettent de développer un tel modèle.
En effet les émotions sont un phénomène complexe dont la définition psy-
chologique est souvent abstraite, ambiguë et non consensuelle, ce qui mène à de
nombreux débats (cf. Chapter 1). Les définitions psychologiques des émotions
sont donc souvent subjectives alors que les informaticiens recherchent des défini-
tions claires, prêtes à être implémentées dans leurs agents. La logique formelle
procure un vocabulaire universel avec une sémantique claire. Elle permet aussi
de raisonner, de planifier et d’expliquer le comportement d’un agent. La formal-
isation logique d’un phénomène peut même révéler des problèmes non évidents.
Les logiques BDI (Cohen and Levesque (1990), Rao and Georgeff (1991,1992),
Sadek (1992), Herzig and Longin (2004), Wooldridge (2000)), basées sur la philoso-
phie du langage, de l’esprit et de l’action (cf. Bratman (1987), Searle (1969, 1983)),
proposent de modéliser les agents grâce à quelques concepts clés comme l’action
et les attitudes mentales (croyances, buts, désirs, intentions, choix...). Ce cadre
est communément utilisé dans la communauté agent et offre des propriétés in-
téressantes bien connues : grand pouvoir explicatif, vérifiabilité formelle, cadre
théorique rigoureux et bien établi d’un point de vue philosophique comme logique.
Dans ce chapitre nous fournissons donc un cadre logique BDI pour modéliser
les émotions. Notre logique est une logique modale propositionnelle. Alors qu’il y
a un large consensus sur la notion de croyance, il existe plusieurs concepts de désir
dans la littérature. Ces concepts peuvent être rangés dans deux catégories. Dans
la première le désir est vu comme quelque chose qui est abandonné une fois satis-
fait (comme le concept d’intention de Bratman), comme le désir de voir le soleil
en un jour pluvieux, qui disparaît quand le soleil revient. Dans la seconde caté-
gorie les désirs correspondent plutôt à des préférences générales dont l’existence
ne dépend pas de leur satisfaction, comme la préférence générale pour les journées
ensoleillées. Dans beaucoup d’approches BDI c’est cette seconde approche qui est
choisie, et de plus les désirs sont fortement reliés aux croyances (cf. le concept de
but de Cohen and Levesque (1990) ou Rao and Georgeff (1991), ou le concept de
choix de Sadek (1992) ou Herzig and Longin (2004)). Ici nous choisissons aussi
la deuxième vue, mais ne connectons pas les désirs aux croyances comme le font
les autres approches. Finalement, il est apparu que le concept d’intention pouvait
être omis dans notre cadre, ainsi que toutes les attitudes mentales “intermédiaires”
(choix, but à atteindre, but persistant, intention...), car ils ne sont pas nécessaires
pour décrire les émotions de la typologie OCC (cependant il faut noter que les in-
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tentions seront essentielles pour décrire les stratégies de coping, (cf. Chapter 8)).
De plus notre cadre utilise aussi des opérateurs modaux de temps, d’action, et
d’idéalité. Notre notion d’idéalité permet de représenter les standards (moraux,
légaux...) intériorisés par un agent.
Ce chapitre présente en détail notre cadre BDI, la sémantique et l’axiomatique
de nos opérateurs modaux. De plus nous y prouvons la correction et la complétude
de notre logique. Nous disposons alors d’un ensemble d’opérateurs modaux pour
décrire les attitudes mentales et les capacités de raisonnement d’un agent : croy-
ances, probabilités, désirs personnels, idéaux sociaux intériorisés, représentation
du temps et de l’action. La prochaine étape est de caractériser les émotions en ter-
mes de ces concepts. La correction et la complétude de notre logique sera alors très
importante pour raisonner formellement au sujet des émotions et prouver certaines
de leurs propriétés.
C.4 Définitions formelles des émotions
C.4.1 Choix d’une théorie psychologique à formaliser
Dans ce chapitre nous nous attaquons au coeur du travail : formaliser les émo-
tions. Nous avons déjà le cadre formel, il reste à justifier la source psychologique.
Comme nous l’avons dit au Chapitre 1, les théories de l’évaluation cognitive sont
mieux adaptées pour raisonner au sujet des émotions et de leurs antécédents cogni-
tives, c’est-à-dire de l’état mental particulier qui les a causées. Parmi les diverses
théories de l’appraisal disponibles, nous choisissons de formaliser la typologie
OCC (1988, cf. Section 1.3.3). En effet elle est plus simple à comprendre pour des
informaticiens que beaucoup d’autres théories car elle a été conçue pour être ap-
pliquée en Intelligence Artificielle. Cette approche est donc devenue la plus citée
par la communauté agent. Bien sûr cet argument n’assure pas que cette théorie soit
mieux adaptée pour développer des agents émotionnels. Ce problème sera discuté
au Chapter 7 où nous présenterons une expérience d’évaluation des résultats donnés
par cette théorie. En attendant dans ce chapitre nous partons de la typologie OCC
et essayons de formaliser ses définitions dans notre langage logique présenté au
Chapitre 3. En fait nous formalisons seulement deux branches de cette typologie.
La branche des émotions déclenchées par des événements contient des émotions
dont les conditions de déclenchement dépendent de l’évaluation de la désirabil-
ité des conséquences d’un événement par rapport à leur impact sur les buts de
l’agent. La branche des émotions déclenchées par les actions des agents contient
des émotions dont les conditions de déclenchement dépendent du jugement de la
responsabilité d’un agent (mérite ou blâme) qui a réalisé une certaine action, selon
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son respect des normes sociales, ou plus exactement de celles d’entres elles qu’il a
intériorisées, adoptées comme importantes.
C.4.2 Difficultés d’une formalisation logique des émotions
Une telle initiative soulève de nombreuses difficultés. La première est de compren-
dre ce que signifient les définitions psychologiques : celles-ci impliquent souvent
des concepts ambigus, et nous devons les interpréter avant de les formaliser. La
deuxième est de trouver une formalisation adaptée pour ces concepts : en effet un
langage logique est inévitablement beaucoup moins expressif que le langage na-
turel, et il est difficile de représenter des concepts psychologiques complexes avec
un jeu limité d’opérateurs modaux. Nos définitions formelles dépendent donc de
notre interprétation des définitions informelles d’Ortony et al., et cette interpréta-
tion est bien sûr discutable. C’est pourquoi nous n’exposerons pas nos définitions
formelles sans justifier soigneusement nos choix de formalisation. De plus nous
soutiendrons la justesse de nos choix en montrant que nos définitions permettent
de simuler les exemples cités par Ortony et al. pour illustrer leurs définitions.
C.4.3 Structure du chapitre
Dans ce chapitre nous exposons dix paires d’émotions opposées de la typologie
OCC, en respectant toujours la même structure. Nous commençons par donner la
définition psychologique ; puis nous proposons notre formalisation de cette défini-
tion et montrons qu’elle capture l’exemple donné par les auteurs. Nous discutons
ensuite nos choix de formalisation et les appuyons encore par des exemples. Fi-
nalement nous comparons les définitions de ces émotions par Ortony et al. avec
celles données par Lazarus ((Lazarus, 1991), Section 1.3.2) pour les mêmes émo-
tions ou des émotions proches.
C.4.4 Limitations de notre formalisation
C.4.4.1 Intensité des émotions, dynamique, mélange
Tout d’abord nos opérateurs modaux ne sont pas valués : ils n’ont pas de degré as-
socié, car il est très difficile d’associer une sémantique à de tels opérateurs (Laverny
and Lang (2004,2005a)). Nos émotions ne sont donc pas valuées non plus, elles
n’ont pas de degré d’intensité associé. C’est un défaut important car l’intensité
est essentielle pour caractériser une émotion (Frijda et al., 1992). Cela nous em-
pêche de formaliser des différenciations fines entre des émotions du même type
(par exemple : irritation, colère, rage), pourtant cruciales pour un agent expressif.
Cela nous empêche aussi de gérer leur évolution au cours du temps, en particulier
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leur décroissance normale après leur apparition. Nos émotions persistent donc tant
que leurs conditions restent vraies. Enfin nous ne pouvons pas non plus décrire
le mélange de plusieurs émotions déclenchées simultanément ; Gershenson (1999)
propose une solution originale à ce problème. De notre côté nous laissons ces
problèmes de calcul d’intensité pour des travaux ultérieurs. Cependant quand nous
avons implémenté notre agent (cf. Chapter 7) nous avons fait quelques concessions
au niveau de la sémantique pour obtenir des émotions avec une intensité.
Dans leurs définitions Ortony et al. utilisent ce qu’ils appellent des intensity
variables qui influencent l’intensité d’une émotion. Comme nous ne calculons pas
l’intensité des émotions nous avons intégré ces variables dans la définition quand
elles nous paraissaient très importantes, et nous les avons négligées sinon. Nous
ne conservons ainsi que l’essence du type générique d’émotion, l’intervention des
variables d’intensité créant des émotions particulières dans ce type.
C.4.4.2 Limitations à cause des opérateurs modaux
Un autre problème est la traduction des concepts complexes que peut exprimer le
langage naturel dans un vocabulaire limité d’opérateurs modaux. Il peut paraître
simple d’inventer des opérateurs qui correspondent exactement aux concepts néces-
saires, mais ce n’est pas le cas. Comme nous voulions conserver une logique cor-
recte et complète, nous avons dû faire quelques simplifications. C’est pourquoi
nous utilisons une logique temporelle linéaire où manquent certains opérateurs qui
auraient pu être utiles (cf. Section 4.4.3.1). Nous n’avons pas non plus pu représen-
ter précisément le lien entre une action et son effet (cf. Remark 1), car notre logique
Kt ne procure aucun opérateur qui exprime ce lien. L’opérateur STIT fait actuelle-
ment l’objet de recherches (Chellas, 1992; Horty and Belnap, 1995b; Troquard,
Trypuz, and Vieu, 2006) pour résoudre ce manque d’expressivité. Finalement ce
travail exclut pour l’instant les émotions déclenchées par les aspects d’objets, car
notre logique propositionnelle ne permet pas de les représenter. Dans des travaux
futurs une logique modale des prédicats pourrait permettre de les décrire.
Malgré ces simplifications nous avons réussi à formaliser vingt émotions de la
typologie OCC.
C.4.5 Comparaison entre Lazarus et OCC
Nous avons comparé dans ce chapitre les définitions offertes par Lazarus et par
Ortony et al. de certaines émotions. Lazarus semble au premier abord offrir des
définitions plus précuses, faisant intervenir des variables d’évaluations plus com-
plexes pour différencier de manière fine des émotions que Ortony et al. regroupe
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dans le même type d’émotion (e.g. culpabilité et honte, envie et jalousie, angoisse
et anxiété). Mais d’un autre côté il néglige certaines émotions définies par Ortony
et al. (e.g. admiration, reproche, remords, content pour, gloating...) et qui sem-
blent importantes. Finalement nous pouvons dire que la typologie OCC paraît plus
adaptée pour concevoir un agent émotionnel expressif. En effet on attend d’un tel
agent qu’il exprime des émotions adaptées dans une grande variété de situations, il
doit être robuste. Au contraire Lazarus privilégie la précision par rapport à la ro-
bustesse, si bien qu’un agent basé sur cette théorie pourrait exprimer des émotions
très précises dans certaines situations, mais n’exprimerait aucune émotion dans
d’autres. La théorie de Lazarus nous semble donc pouvoir être utile seulement
dans un deuxième temps : si les émotions de l’agent ne sont pas assez précises
dans certains cas nous pourrons raffiner nos définitions en nous inspirant de cette
théorie. Nous vérifierons par la suite si nous avons besoin de telles améliorations en
évaluant la crédibilité de notre agent auprès d’utilisateurs humains (cf. Chapter 7).
C.4.6 Suite du travail
Une fois que nos définitions formelles sont acceptées, nous pouvons prouver cer-
taines propriétés des émotions comme théorèmes de notre logique. Dans le Chapitre 5
nous exposons et prouvons quelques propriétés, en particulier des liens causaux et
temporels entre certaines émotions.
Ces propriétés contribuent à soutenir la justesse de nos définitions formelles.
Pour évaluer plus précisément notre modèle nous avons décidé de l’implémenter
dans un agent BDI. Cet agent expressif a ensuite été soumis à l’évaluation d’humains
qui ont jugé la pertinence et la crédibilité de ses émotions pendant un court scénario
(cf. Chapter 7). Ce travail a donné des résultats encourageants et nous projetons de
renouveler ces expériences en coopération avec des psychologues qui pourraient
tirer parti de ce moyen pour évaluer leurs théories.
Finalement nous pouvons remarquer que ce travail de formalisation ne con-
cerne pour l’instant que le processus d’appraisal, qui conduit au déclenchement
des émotions. Mais pour les psychologues le mécanisme émotionnel comprend
aussi un processus de coping qui décrit l’influence des émotions sur le comporte-
ment. Nous travaillons actuellement sur la formalisation de ce processus dans le
même cadre BDI. Le chapitre 8 décrit l’état actuel de notre recherche à ce sujet.
C.4.7 Conclusion
Un tel travail offre donc de nombreuses perspectives de continuation qui peuvent
être intéressantes pour différentes branches de recherche. Les concepteurs d’agents
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conversationnels animés seront intéressés par donner des capacités de coping à
leur agent pour rendre son comportement émotionnel et crédible (cf. Chapter 8).
Les psychologues trouveront intéressant d’évaluer leurs théories grâce à un agent
émotionnel (cf. Chapter 7). Enfin les philosophes et les logiciens apprécieront la
possibilité de prouver formellement des propriétés des émotions. C’est l’objet du
prochain chapitre.
C.5 Propriétés formelles des émotions
C.5.1 Introduction
Comme nous l’avons vu en décrivant les théories psychologiques des émotions
(Chapitre 1), les émotions sont un phénomène complexe qui a toujours été l’objet
de débats. En effet la définition et les propriétés de concepts définis de manière
informelle sont toujours discutables. Au contraire une formalisation logique d’un
concept permet de le désambiguïser.
Dans ce chapitre nous montrons comment notre formalisation logique des émo-
tions (Chapitre 4) permet de les désambiguïser et de raisonner à propos de leurs
propriétés, à condition que nos définitions soient acceptées. En effet comme notre
logique est correcte et complète, si certaines propriétés des émotions sont vraies
nous devons pouvoir les prouver, et si nous pouvons prouver certaines propriétés
c’est qu’elles sont vraies. Ces propriétés ne seront alors plus discutables.
Ce chapitre expose donc et prouve quelques propriétés des émotions, en par-
ticulier concernant les relations temporelles et causales qu’elles entretiennent (ou
n’entretiennent pas) les unes avec les autres. Certaines de ces propriétés vont au-
delà de ce qu’Ortony et al. exposent dans leur livre mais elles demeurent intuitives.
Un tel travail souligne les atouts d’un raisonnement formel sur les émotions.
C.5.2 Conclusion
Ce travail a contribué à montrer l’intérêt des logiques BDI pour formaliser les émo-
tions. D’abord, il existe déjà un grand nombre de travaux sur ces logiques dans la
communauté agent, et un tel modèle est prêt à être utilisé dans de nombreux agents
existants. De plus nous avons montré qu’une fois nos définitions acceptées nous
pouvions prouver un grand nombre de propriétés intuitives des émotions. Seule
une formalisation logique peut offrir de tels résultats sans équivoque au sujet de
phénomènes qui ne sont pas toujours clairement analysés dans la littérature psy-
chologique.
Cependant, les logiques BDI ne sont pas seulement un outil permettant de faire
des démonstrations. Elles sont aussi un puissant moyen de décrire le raisonnement
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d’un agent. Dans le prochain chapitre nous détaillons deux applications où notre
modèle intégré dans un agent BDI permet d’améliorer son fonctionnement.
C.6 Applications
C.6.1 Introduction
Les agents émotionnels trouvent de plus en plus d’applications (cf. Chapter 2)
dans des domaines aussi variés que les jeux vidéos, les logiciels pédagogiques,
l’apprentissage assisté par ordinateur, les environnements virtuels d’entraînement,
les agents conversationnels animés, les compagnons virtuels... Dans ce chapitre
nous décrivons deux applications que nous avons explorées pour notre modèle des
émotions. Ces applications ont été réalisées à un moment où notre modèle n’était
pas encore aussi riche que dans sa version actuelle, et ne couvrent donc pas toutes
les émotions définies au chapitre 4. Elles illustrent néanmoins qu’un tel mod-
èle n’est pas seulement utile pour raisonner abstraitement sur les émotions mais
aussi pour développer des agents émotionnels pour des applications concrètes. Ce
chapitre en décrit deux parmi les nombreuses possibles : un agent intelligent con-
scient des émotions de l’utilisateur afin de prendre soin de lui dans le cadre d’une
application d’Intelligence Ambiante ; et un agent conversationnel qui exprime ses
émotions pendant un dialogue avec un autre agent, pour paraître plus crédible et
favoriser l’immersion de l’utilisateur dans un monde virtuel.
C.6.2 Intelligence Ambiante
L’Intelligence Ambiante est l’art de concevoir des environnements intelligents, viz.
des environnements qui peuvent à tout moment adapter leur comportement à leur
utilisateur, à ses buts et ses besoins spécifiques, de manière à assurer son bien-être
de manière non intrusive voire quasiment invisible. Notre première application
consiste à concevoir un agent BDI capable de gérer ces tâches, et donc conscient
des émotions de l’utilisateur.
Les concepteurs d’agents ont exploré diverses méthodes pour découvrir l’émotion
de l’utilisateur quand celui-ci ne l’exprime pas directement. Prendinger and Ishizuka (2005)
utilisent les résultats de Picard (1997) pour déduire l’émotion de l’utilisateur à par-
tir du suivi de ses signaux physiologiques et de la direction de son regard. Cette
méthode permet de détecter en temps réel le moindre changement dans l’émotion
du sujet mais elle est plutôt envahissante, ce qui est contraire à un principe impor-
tant de l’Intelligence Ambiante. Une autre méthode a été explorée par Jaques et
al. (2004). Leur agent pédagogique déduit l’émotion de son élève en se mettant à
sa place (grâce à un modèle de l’utilisateur) pour évaluer les événements via une
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fonction d’appraisal basée sur la typologie OCC. Cette méthode ne fournit qu’une
vue subjective de l’état émotionnel de l’utilisateur mais elle est plutôt efficace si
elle est couplée à un bon modèle de ses attitudes mentales. De plus elle n’est pas
du tout envahissante, ce qui est très important. Par ailleurs cette méthode permet
aussi de raisonner sur les émotions, de comprendre par exemple leurs causes, et est
donc plus adaptée à la problématique de l’Intelligence Ambiante.
Une fois que l’agent connaît l’émotion de l’utilisateur il peut aider celui-ci à y
faire face si elle est négative (cf. Chapter 8). En psychologie (Lazarus and Folk-
man, 1984) le coping est le processus de choix par l’agent d’une stratégie visant
à supprimer ou atténuer une émotion négative qu’il ressent (par exemple en min-
imisant ou supprimant ses causes). Nous considérons ici qu’un agent émotionnel
pour l’Intelligence Ambiante peut aider l’utilisateur dans cette tâche.
Finalement nous pensons que pour un agent intégré dans un Système d’Intelligence
Ambiante (SIA), un modèle informatique des émotions est utiles dans les cas suiv-
ants :
• (C1) pour calculer l’émotion déclenchée chez l’utilisateur par un événement
extérieur (comme dans (Jaques et al., 2004)) ;
• (C2) pour anticiper l’effet émotionnel des actions possibles de l’agent sur
l’utilisateur :
– soit pour choisir une action dans le but de produire un certain effet
émotionnel (C2a)
– soit pour choisir entre plusieurs actions ayant des effets physiques com-
parables (C2b) ;
• (C3) pour comprendre les causes d’une émotion que le comportement de
l’utilisateur semble exprimer. Cette explication peut se faire :
– soit de manière directe quand toutes les informations nécessaires sont
connues (C3a)
– soit via la formulation d’hypothèses sur les croyances de l’utilisateur
(C3b).
Connaître l’émotion ressentie par l’utilisateur ainsi que les causes de cette
émotion est fondamental pour agir de manière réellement adaptée.
Dans cette première application nous utilisons notre modèle des émotions pour
décrire le comportement d’un agent intégré dans une SIA contrôlant une maison
intelligente chargé de prendre soin de son habitant en l’aidant à gérer ses émotions.
Nous montrons la puissance de notre cadre logique sur cinq scénarios différents
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correspondants aux cinq cas d’utilisation identifiés ci-dessus. Dans chaque cas
nous considérons que la maison intelligente est administrée par l’agent m, qui
peut recevoir de l’aide d’autres agents du SIA. Nous appelons h l’habitant de cette
maison intelligente.
Un tel raisonnement peut être utile en Intelligence Ambiante, mais aussi pour
les Interfaces Homme-Machine ou les agents pédagogiques. Seule une théorie
cognitive des émotions permet de raisonner de cette manière sur les antécédents des
émotions. Les logiques BDI sont alors particulièrement adaptées pour permettre à
l’agent de réaliser ce raisonnement.
C.6.3 Dialogue
Notre modèle logique des émotions décrit leur déclenchement cognitif, viz. il définit
les attitudes mentales qui les causent. Dans cette application nous nous intéres-
sons plus particulièrement au déclenchement des émotions au cours du dialogue,
i.e. nous considérons les émotions déclenchées par un énoncé, à la fois chez le
locuteur et chez l’auditeur. Cependant nous ne décrivons pas l’expression de ces
émotions (par des actes de discours expressifs par exemple) ni leur effet sur la suite
du dialogue (par exemple une modification de la construction du dialogue).
Un dialogue peut être vu comme une séquence d’actes de discours (Austin,
1962; Searle, 1969; Searle and Vanderveken, 1985) réalisés par chaque énoncé.
Ces actes de discours sont des actions particulières et on peut donc considérer
qu’elles déclencheront les émotions basées sur les actions de la typologie OCC.
Elles seraient alors évaluées par rapport aux normes conversationnelles auxquelles
les interlocuteurs sont soumis (par exemple les maximes de Grice (Grice, 1957)).
Mais cela n’est pas suffisant pour évaluer un acte de discours de manière complète,
car il transmet aussi des informations sur le monde qui doivent être évaluées. Par
exemple, imaginons un enfant qui casse un vase précieux mais l’avoue spontané-
ment à son père. Si le père n’évalue que l’action d’avouer une faute spontanément,
il sera fier de son fils pour son courage et son honnêteté. Mais il évaluera certaine-
ment aussi l’information “ton vase précieux est cassé” (ce que nous appelons ici le
contenu propositionnel) et sera triste de cette mauvaise nouvelle.
Recevoir un acte de discours est donc un autre moyen d’observer son environ-
nement et de connaître les stimuli pertinents. Nous considérons la réception d’un
acte de discours comme une perception indirecte d’un stimulus (celui qui est décrit
dans son contenu propositionnel, même si l’acte de discours n’est pas un assertif),
et ce stimulus peut déclencher une émotion de n’importe laquelle des trois branches
de la typologie OCC. En fait nous nous restreignons dans cette application précoce
aux cas où l’acte de discours est une assertion ou une requête au sujet d’un événe-
ment, et nous ne décrivons pas l’évaluation de l’action sous-jacente par rapport aux
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normes conversationnelles.
Dans ce chapitre nous analyserons un exemple de dialogue émotionnels entre
deux avatars1. Le contexte est un monde virtuel pour l’entraînement des pompiers.
Cette application montre que notre formalisation BDI des émotions peut être
combinée avec une sémantique BDI des actes de langage pour décrire les émotions
déclenchées pendant un dialogue. Cette application précoce est encore incomplète
et a nécessité des simplifications et des hypothèses, mais elle pourra facilement
être étendue à d’autres cas. Les émotions en réaction à la description d’une action
sont déclenchées de manière similaire que pour la description d’un événement.
Les émotions en réactions à des actes de discours considérés comme des actions
dépendent de normes conversationnelles. Une fois celles-ci formalisées, ces émo-
tions découleront naturellement de nos définitions. La formalisation de ces normes
constitue une continuation intéressante de ce travail.
De plus cette description est limitée à l’expression des émotions durant le di-
alogue, ces émotions n’ayant encore aucun effet sur le dialogue. Nous pensons
que cette influence pourra être exprimée en termes de stratégies de coping, viz. les
efforts qu’un individu fait pour gérer ses émotions. Une continuation naturelle de
ce travail est donc de formaliser ces stratégies de coping dans notre cadre BDI ((cf.
Chapter 8)).
C.6.4 Conclusion
Nous avons déjà discuté les avantages d’un modèle logique des émotions. Ce
chapitre montre qu’un tel modèle n’est pas seulement utile pour réaliser des preuves
formelles des propriétés des émotions, mais qu’il est aussi fonctionnel et prêt à être
implémenté et utilisé pour divers buts. Nous n’en avons exploré que deux mais
nous pensons qu’il en existe beaucoup plus (cf. Chapter 2).
Par ailleurs ces deux applications révèlent l’incomplétude de notre modèle
actuel des émotions. Nous avons formalisé le déclenchement des émotions mais
pas leur influence sur le comportement. Ainsi les exemples précédents n’ont pu
être que partiellement formalisés. Notre première tentative pour corriger ce défaut
en formalisant les stratégies de coping sera exposé au chapitre 8.
1Nous avons implémenté une plate-forme permettant la génération automatique de tels dialogues
émotionnels entre deux agents conversationnels. Cette plate-forme nommée a été présentée lors d’un
workshop francophone (Adam and Evrard, 2005)
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C.7 Implémentation et évaluation
Comme nous l’avons montré dans l’introduction de ce mémoire, la communauté
agent conçoit de plus en plus d’agents émotionels, en particulier des agents con-
versationnels animés (cf. Chapter 2). Pour garantir la pertinence des émotions ex-
primées dans le contexte de l’interaction (et ainsi préserver la crédibilité de l’agent)
les chercheurs s’appuient sur des théories psychologiques (cf. Chapter 1), et plus
particulièrement sur la typologie OCC (Ortony, Clore, and Collins, 1988)). Nous
pensons que la principale raison de cet engouement est la simplicité de cette typolo-
gie, qui la rend très accessible pour des informaticiens. Par contre nous remarquons
que d’un point de vue psychologique rien ne prouve que cette théorie soit meilleur
que les autres. Dans le cadre de la modélisation d’agents aussi crédibles et réal-
istes que possible cette question est pourtant essentielle, notamment du fait que les
théories psychologiques divergent parfois sensiblement dans leurs définitions des
émotions (cf. Chapter 1).
Dans ce chapitre nous voulons donc évaluer la pertinence des émotions qu’un
agent BDI peut exprimer en utilisant notre formalisation de la typologie OCC. Pour
cela nous implémentons notre cadre BDI dans un agent virtuel nommé PLEIAD
(Prolog Emotional Intelligent Agents Designer)2. PLEIAD exprime les émotions
qu’il “ressent” en réponse aux stimuli envoyés par l’utilisateur. Nous tenons à pré-
ciser dès maintenant que PLEIAD intègre à titre expérimental la gestion de degrés
numériques associés aux attitudes mentales, and de degrés d’intensité numériques
associés aux émotions. Nous avons alors testé PLEIAD sur un court scénario et
demandé à quelques personnes d’évaluer la pertinence des émotions exprimées
par l’agent (correspondent-elles aux émotions qu’ils auraient eux-mêmes ressenties
dans la même situation ?) et leur crédibilité (correspondent-elles à des émotions
communément admissibles dans ce genre de situations ?). Notre but est:
• de tester les prédictions de notre modèle théorique en les comparant aux
attentes de l’utilisateur ;
• de tester les prédictions de la typologie OCC elle-même par rapport à ces
attentes.
Nous décrivons d’abord l’implémentation de l’agent PLEIAD (Section 7.2),
puis exposons les modalités de de notre évaluation (Section 7.3), et finalement
discutons les résultats des évaluations et donnons nos conclusions au sujet de notre
modèle mais aussi au sujet de la théorie psychologique sous-jacente (Section 7.4).
2PLEIAD a été présenté pour la première fois lors du Workshop Francophone WACA’2006, cf.
(Adam, 2006). Les résultats de cette évaluation seront publiés dans une revue française (Adam,
Herzig, and Longin, 2007).
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Les résultats de cette première évaluation ouvrent de nombreuses perspectives
d’amélioration, au moins pour la partie qui dépend de nous, viz. notre propre
formalisation de la typologie OCC. Notre agent pourrait permettre de comparer
plusieurs formalisations différentes de cette typologie, à condition qu’elles soient
toutes exprimées dans la même logique. Par ailleurs il permet aussi de comparer les
prédictions de plusieurs théories psychologiques des émotions, à condition aussi de
les formaliser dans la même logique. Cette formalisation représente cependant un
gros travail qui pourra faire l’objet de recherches futures.
Nous nous intéressons en particulier à la théorie de l’appraisal de Lazarus,
qui a souvent semblé plus subtile et plus exacte que la typologie OCC durant les
évaluations. Cependant cette théorie est beaucoup plus complexe que la typologie
OCC, en partie car elle n’a pas été conçue pour être utilisée en Intelligence Ar-
tificielle. Elle implique des concepts complexes de responsabilité, d’implication
de soi (“ego-involvement”)... qui seront difficile à formaliser dans notre logique,
et plus généralement dans tout formalisme qui ne soit pas trop complexe. Pour
formaliser cette théorie, Gratch and Marsella (2004a) ont créé leur propre struc-
ture complexe de représentation de l’état mental de l’agent, en adaptant divers
formalismes existants (cf. Chapter 2). Un moyen plus simple est de représen-
ter la responsabilité via le concept d’“agency” que nous pouvons intégrer dans
notre logique BDI grâce à l’opérateur STIT (seeing-to-it-that, (Horty and Belnap,
1995a)), que nous avons déjà commencé à étudier (cf. (Herzig and Troquard, 2006;
Broersen, Herzig, and Troquard, 2006)).
Cependant nous devons nous poser la question du rapport entre le profit réalisé
en termes d’expressivité et crédibilité et les coûts additionnels produits par la com-
plexification de notre théorie. Est-il vraiment nécessaire pour un agent d’exprimer
des différences subtiles entre la culpabilité et la honte, ou entre la jalousie et l’envie
? Cela dépend grandement de l’application pour laquelle l’agent est prévu (cf.
Chapter 2). Finalement la théorie émotionnelle idéale pour ces agents pourrait être
un compromis entre plusieurs théories, utilisant parfois des notions simples mais
suffisantes et parfois des notions plus complexes pour certaines émotions critiques.
Mais de toutes façons, du fait que les chercheurs tentent de rendre leurs agents aussi
crédibles que possible, nous pensons qu’ils ne peuvent pas se permettre d’ignorer
des théories psychologiques plus complexes que la traditionnelle typologie OCC.
De plus la psychologie elle-même pourrait tirer avantage de telles recherches et en
particulier de la possibilité d’évaluer leurs théories, de manière à mieux compren-
dre les émotions humaines.
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C.8 Vers une formalisation du processus de coping
C.8.1 Introduction
Les émotions prennent une place de plus en plus importante dans la conception
d’agents pour diverses applications (cf. Chapter 2) : Intelligence Ambiante, agents
crédibles pour les mondes virtuels ou les jeux vidéos, agents conscients des émo-
tions de l’utilisateur pour des applications pédagogiques, ludiques, d’assistance ou
d’interface.
Les travaux existants sur les émotions en informatique (y compris les nôtres)
s’intéressent principalement au déclenchement des émotions (Pelachaud et al., 2002;
Meyer, 2004). La plupart du temps les chercheurs procurent une implémentation
de la typologie OCC. Pourtant cette typologie ne décrit que l’appraisal (le pro-
cessus évaluant l’environnement de l’agent pour déclencher une émotion appro-
priée), un processus qui ne représente qu’une partie du mécanisme émotionnel
humain. En effet, Lazarus a montré qu’un deuxième processus intervient : le
coping. Au sens de Lazarus and Folkman (1984), le coping représente les ten-
tatives conscientes de l’individu pour gérer des stimuli menaçants signalés par des
émotions négatives intenses déclenchées par le processus d’appraisal. Très peu
de modèles de ce second processus existent (Dastani and Meyer, 2006; Gratch
and Marsella, 2004a; Marsella and Gratch, 2003), alors que de nombreuses études
psychologiques avalisent l’influence des émotions sur le comportement (Damasio,
1994; Forgas, 1995).
Pourtant des agents avec des capacités de coping pourraient trouver des appli-
cations dans de nombreux domaines (cf. Chapter 6). Par exemple, les agents con-
versationnels animés pourraient non seulement exprimer leur émotion par une ex-
pression faciale ou des modifications vocales, mais la manifester par une modifica-
tion complète de leur comportement dialogique. En effet nous pensons que certains
comportements dialogiques humains sont en fait la manifestation de l’utilisation
stratégies de coping: mentir, interrompre son interlocuteur, refuser de répondre...
Les modèles standards du dialogue sont incapables d’expliquer de tels comporte-
ments qui bien que réalistes sont souvent considérés “irrationnels”, car ils adoptent
des hypothèses de rationalité (trop) fortes et restrictives qui ne correspondent pas
au raisonnement humain. Un modèle des stratégies de coping pourrait corriger
ce problème. Un autre exemple est l’Intelligence Ambiante : un agent intelligent
prenant soin de l’utilisateur l’assiste en fait dans l’utilisation de stratégies de cop-
ing.
Dans ce chapitre nous proposons donc de formaliser quelques stratégies de
coping. Ce travail est encore en cours et les résultats présentés ici sont prélimi-
naires. Notre but n’est pas de fournir un modèle accompli du processus de coping
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mais plutôt de désambiguïser les concepts impliqués dans l’implémentation d’un
agent émotionnel afin de pouvoir raisonner à leur sujet. Nous avons déjà montré
les avantages des logiques BDI pour désambiguïser des concepts complexes (cf.
Chapter 4) et pour raisonner sur leurs propriétés (cf. Chapter 5). Étant donnée
la complexité du processus émotionnel et l’expressivité limitée des logiques BDI
un tel modèle est évidemment réducteur, mais il offre des avantages indéniables.
Nous nous basons donc sur notre cadre BDI conçu pour formaliser l’appraisal (cf.
Chapter 3) et nous l’étendons pour rendre compte du coping. En particulier nous
avons besoin d’opérateurs de choix et d’intention qui n’étaient pas présents dans
ce formalisme.
Nous adaptons alors le modèle COPE (Carver, Scheier, and Weintraub, 1989)
qui propose un ensemble de quinze stratégies de coping. Nous considérons ces
stratégies comme des actions dont les préconditions et les effets sont exprimés en
termes des attitudes mentales de l’agent (croyances, désirs et intentions). Afin de
simplifier cette première approche nous nous restreignons dans un premier temps
au stratégies de coping concernant des émotions déclenchées par des événements.
Les émotions affectent alors le comportement de l’agent de deux manières : di-
rectement par le choix et l’application d’une stratégie de coping, et indirectement
par la modification des attitudes mentales impliquées dans son raisonnement.
Ce chapitre commence par une introduction du concept psychologique de cop-
ing (Section 8.2). Il décrit brièvement la sémantique et l’axiomatique des nouveaux
opérateurs modaux que nous ajoutons à notre cadre logique (Section 8.3), tout en
maintenant sa correction et sa complétude. Il définit ensuite de manière formelle
quelques stratégies de coping dans ce cadre (Section 8.4), et illustre leur utilisa-
tion effective sur un exemple provenant d’une simulation d’entraînement pour les
pompiers (Section 8.5). Finalement il présente une discussion d’autres formali-
sations existantes de stratégies de coping: l’agent EMA de Gratch and Marsella,
l’Affective Reasoner d’Elliott, et le langage agent de Meyer (Section 8.6).
C.8.2 Conclusion
Cette thèse a finalement permis de montrer que les logiques BDI sont assez ex-
pressives pour décrire le processus émotionnel dans son intégralité, c’est-à-dire à
la fois l’appraisal (cf. Chapter 4) et le coping (dans ce chapitre).
Les logiques BDI sont un cadre communément utilisé qui offre des propriétés
intéressantes, principalement sa réutilisabilité dans un grand nombre d’agents ex-
istants basés sur une architecture BDI. Les domaines d’application pour de tels
agents concernent principalement la conception de personnages humanoïdes pour
les mondes virtuels : un modèle émotionnel plausible améliore leur crédibilité et
donc l’immersion de l’utilisateur dans le monde virtuel. La possibilité de raisonner
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à propos des émotions d’un autre agent ouvre aussi des applications en Intelli-
gence Ambiante, où de tels agents pourraient détecter l’émotion de l’utilisateur
pour l’aider à y faire face en lui proposant des stratégies de coping adaptées (cf.
Chapter 6).
Il faut cependant mentionner quelques défauts de notre modèle. Tout d’abord
nous ne formalisons pas toutes les stratégies de coping mais seulement celles que
nous avons jugées les plus intéressantes pour des agents intelligents, et seulement
concernant les émotions déclenchées par des événements. Deuxièmement nous
ne gérons pas l’intensité et la dynamique des émotions, un problème trop impor-
tant pour être résolu ici, et nous supposons donc que l’exécution d’une stratégie
de coping fait simplement disparaître l’émotion immédiatement, au lieu de faire
diminuer son intensité. Troisièmement, nous avons seulement esquissé les déduc-
tions formelles dans ce chapitre, et n’avons pas complètement élaboré les mécan-
ismes de révision et de préservation des croyances en jeu. En particulier, le coping
nécessite d’abandonner nos axiomes de préservation des désirs.
Nos perspectives à court terme après cette description préliminaire consistent à
étendre ce modèle pour expliquer les émotions de la branche agent de la typologie
OCC. À plus long terme nous envisageons d’implémenter ce modèle dans un agent
conversationnel animé, afin de simuler des comportements dialogiques souvent ob-
servés dans les interactions humaines mais pas encore capturés par les modèles de
dialogue actuels (par exemple pourquoi changeons-nous brusquement de sujet ou
refusons-nous de répondre à une question ou d’admettre l’évidence). En effet nous
pensons que de tels comportements révèlent l’utilisation de stratégies de coping.
Conclusion
Cette thèse a présenté un projet pluridisciplinaire, qui a commencé par la com-
préhension de la définition psychologique des émotions, puis proposé leur formal-
isation logique et la déduction de certaines propriétés, pour arriver finalement à
l’implémentation informatique d’un agent émotionnel. Ce travail apporte de mul-
tiples contributions.
D’abord il offre à la communauté agent un modèle formel d’un grand nombre
d’émotions. Nos définitions des émotions sont voulues le plus réalistes possibles,
grâce à différents moyens : elles sont fidèles aux définitions psychologiques et peu-
vent rendre capturer les situations déclenchantes décrites dans la théorie originale
; elles permettent de prouver des propriétés intuitives des émotions ; et finalement
des humaines ont évalué positivement la pertinence des émotions exprimées par un
agent utilisant ces définitions. Ce modèle formel des émotions permet donc aux
chercheurs d’intégrer des émotions dans leurs agents sans devoir eux-mêmes inter-
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préter et formaliser une théorie psychologique. En effet cette tâche est difficile et
ne devrait être faite qu’une fois avant d’être ensuite réutilisée. C’est pourquoi nous
avons aussi fait en sorte que notre formalisation soit aussi générique que possible,
en utilisant un cadre bien connu : les logiques BDI.
Ensuite ce travail souligne que les logiques BDI sont un outil puissant pour
désambiguïser des concepts complexes et raisonner au sujet de leurs propriétés.
En effet nous avons été capables de donner des définitions formelles et donc non
ambiguës de vingt émotions, mais aussi de prouver des théorèmes au sujet de leurs
liens entre elles. Les logiques BDI sont souvent critiquées car on croit leur utilité
limitée à la réalisation de preuves certes formelles, mais trop abstraites. Pourtant
ces logiques permettent aussi de décrire l’architecture d’un agent. Nous avons
exploré deux applications pour un agent doté de notre modèle des émotions (un
agent conversationnel et un système d’Intelligence Ambiante) et avons même im-
plémenté un tel agent.
Cependant nos applications demeurent incomplètes, du fait que notre formal-
isme lui-même est incomplet. En effet le processus émotionnel humain est consti-
tué de deux composants : l’appraisal, qui mène au déclenchement des émotions, et
le coping, qui conduit à l’adaptation du comportement à l’émotion ressentie. Dans
cette thèse nous avons uniquement formalisé le processus d’appraisal, si bien que
les émotions déclenchées n’ont aucune influence sur le comportement de l’agent.
C’est pourquoi le dernier chapitre procure un aperçu de nos travaux en cours sur
le coping. Nous avons essayé de formaliser ce processus dans le même cadre BDI.
Ce processus a encore fait l’objet de moins de travaux que le déclenchement ou
l’expression des émotions. Cette thèse ouvre donc d’intéressantes perspectives de
recherche future.
Notre travail peut de plus être encore amélioré sur plusieurs points. Une pre-
mière amélioration locale concerne notre couverture de la typologie OCC, qui n’est
pas complète : nous n’avons pas formalisé la branche des émotions déclenchées
par les aspects d’objets, car notre logique actuelle ne permet pas de décrire ces
aspects. Plus généralement, l’expressivité limitée des logiques BDI (par compara-
ison avec le langage naturel) implique plusieurs limitations de notre modèle. Tout
d’abord nous ne pouvons pas calculer l’intensité des émotions déclenchées, ce qui
nous empêche aussi de gérer leur décroissance au cours du temps ou leur mélange
entre elles. Deuxièmement nous n’avons pas décrit l’interaction des différents
phénomènes émotionnels entre eux, c’est-à-dire comment plusieurs émotions peu-
vent se combiner pour former l’humeur, et comment l’humeur ou les émotions
courantes peuvent biaiser le déclenchement d’une nouvelle émotion. En effet ces
interactions sont liées avec l’intensité des émotions impliquées. Troisièmement
nous avons seulement pu donner une approximation du lien entre une action et
ses effets, car aucun opérateur modal rendant compte de ce lien n’est encore com-
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plètement axiomatisé. De plus nous n’avons pas exploré le concept d’émotions
de groupe, qui selon nous ferait intervenir des attitudes mentales de groupe et
nécessiterait donc l’introduction de nouveaux opérateurs non standards. Cepen-
dant nous avons commencé à formaliser les croyances de groupe (Tuomela, 1992;
Gaudou, Herzig, and Longin, 2007) et prévoyons de formaliser aussi les idéaux de
groupe. Enfin, l’étude de la complexité de notre logique dépasse le cadre de ce
travail.
Plus généralement, nous avons restreint notre travail aux aspects cognitifs des
émotions, et avons donc négligé les aspects biologiques, physiologiques et socio-
culturels pourtant essentiels. Ainsi la culture et les normes sociales exercent une
influence reconnue sur l’expression ou l’inhibition des émotions déclenchées. De
plus nous avons seulement effleuré le problème du coping qu’il est pourtant crucial
de formalisé pour rendre compte des émotions de manière exhaustive.
Cependant, malgré ces limitations, notre évaluation montre que les émotions
que notre modèle peut simuler sont perçues comme plutôt crédibles. Nous sup-
posons maintenant que la crédibilité est un aspect d’une propriété plus générale
des systèmes d’interaction : ils doivent inspirer confiance. Castelfranchi, Falcone,
and Marzo (2006) ont montré que les utilisateurs doivent avoir confiance en un
système pour l’utiliser. Nous sommes actuellement impliqués dans un projet dont
le but est de formaliser la notion de confiance dans une logique BDI. Cela devrait
permettre de désambiguïser cette notion et de raisonner automatiquement à son su-
jet. Ce modèle sera alors implémenté dans un agent et testé. Comme cette thèse, il
s’agit encore d’un projet pluridisciplinaire qui démarre de l’analyse philosophique
et sociologique d’un concept et mène à sa formalisation et son utilisation dans un
système informatique.
Finalement ce travail est juste un premier pas sur le long chemin qui mène à
la compréhension des émotions. Ce chemin doit être exploré collectivement par des
chercheurs provenant de disciplines aussi variées que la psychologie, l’informatique,
la biologie, la sociologie... Cette coopération peut paraître difficile au premier
abord, mais c’est ce qu’il en coûte de comprendre ce qui nous rend humains.
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